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Attack and improvement of a certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol

Zhang Quan-lin

Published Jan 1, 2015• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This paper analyzed a bilinear pairing-free certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol proposed by Kim et al. The protocol did not satisfy an important security feature that was the basic impersonation attack under public key replacement attack. As well as,it mounted a specific attack on the protocol. Then an improved certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol was presented in order to satisfy the missing security property. The analysis shows that the improved protocol can efficiently withstand public key replacement attack and satisfy some necessary security properties.

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This paper analyzed a bilinear pairing-free certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol proposed by Kim et al. The protocol did not satisfy an important security feature that was the basic impersonation attack under public key replacement attack. As well as,it mounted a specific attack on the protocol. Then an improved certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol was presented in order to satisfy the missing security property. The analysis shows that the improved protocol can efficiently withstand public key replacement attack and satisfy some necessary security properties.
This paper studied two-party authenticated agreement protocol in the certificateless public setting.Analyzed the security of Liu-xu's certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocol,and it was shown that the scheme did not achieve strong security.The scheme was vulnerable to key compromise impersonation attack and leakage of ephemeral secrets attack.The reason why the attack can work was analyzed and proposed an improved scheme to remove the attack.It is not hard to devise certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocols that look secure,but making the proofs word is not always so simple.
Recently, two certificateless three-party authenticated key agreement protocols were proposed, and both protocols were claimed they can meet the desirable security properties including forward security, key compromise impersonation resistance and so on. Through cryptanalysis, we show that one neither meets forward security and key compromise impersonation resistance nor resists an attack by an adversary who knows all users' secret values, and the other cannot resist key compromise impersonation attack. Finally, we propose improved protocols to make up two original protocols' security weaknesses, respectively. Further security analysis shows that our improved protocols can remove such security weaknesses.
Certificateless public key cryptography has appealing features,namely it does not require the use of certificates and does not have a private key escrow feature.This paper describes a certificateless key agreement protocol based on bilinear pairings.The identity authentication in the protocol depends on a digital signature scheme.This paper proves the security of the signature scheme.The results show that in the random oracle model with the discrete logarithm assumption,the signature scheme resists existential forgeries against adaptive chosen-message attacks.The results farther show that the protocol preserves the desired security properties,including known-key security,unknown key-share resilience,perfect forward secrecy,key-compromise impersonation resilience and leakage of ephemeral private key resilience.The protocol requires much lower computation overhead than related protocols,since it uses fewer bilinear pairing operations and no modular exponentiation.
Authenticated key agreement protocol is a fundamental building block for ensuring private communications between two or more parties over an insecure network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In the recent work, Wang et al. proposed an efficient two-party certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol from pairings used to protect the Web client/server communication. However, we found the scheme cannot withstand key compromise impersonation attack, and also, is vulnerable to one form of the man-in-the-middle attack -- key replicating attack, thus it doesn't possess some desirable security attributes,such as key compromise impersonation resilience and key integrity. We analyze the key replicating attack against the protocol in the BR93 security model in detail, and demonstrate that the protocol is not secure if the adversary was allowed to send a reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) is a new paradigm in public key cryptography which avoids the inherent key escrow problem of identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and yet requires no certificates to guarantee the authenticity of users' public keys. It was first introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003. Subsequently, several certificateless two-party key agreement protocols were presented. Unfortunately, some of these protocols are not as secure as they were claimed to be. We will show that some existing certificateless key agreement protocols do not satisfy the requirements of key-compromise impersonation security and known session-specific temporary information security. Further more, we present two improved certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocols which possess all security attributes of a key agreement protocol.
As the fundamental building block for secure communication in the open network, authenticated key agreement protocols are usually constructed in the public key setting. Certificateless public key cryptography combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In this paper, we present a secure and efficient two-party authenticated key agreement protocol based on the efficient certificateless public key encryption scheme due to Cheng and Comley. Security analysis shows that it achieves perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy and almost all the other known security attributes for authenticated key agreement protocol, such as known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control. Compared to other comparable schemes, it is more secure and has nice efficiency.