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Security analysis of authenticated key agreement protocols and digital signature schemes

Peter Nose

Published Mar 17, 2014• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Key agreement and digital signature are two significant and most useful contributions of modern cryptography. Such protocols and schemes allow two or more parties to establish a common session key securely in the presence of a malicious adversary and provide means of ensuring data origin authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation. Thus, secure key agreement protocols and signature schemes are fundamental building blocks for constructing complex higher-level protocols. In this thesis, we deal with security analysis of existing key agreement protocols and digital signature schemes. We examine ten authenticated key agreement protocols without key confirmation, out of which half are two-party and the other half are three-party, and one deterministic identity-based aggregate signature scheme. By giving concrete attacks, we show that these protocols and the scheme do not possess the desirable security attributes or security attributes claimed by their authors. We also present a secure deterministic identity-based signature scheme that supports partial aggregation. First, we show that Okamoto's and Chen et al.’s protocol cannot withstand the key-compromise impersonation attack and that Tan et al.’s, Lim et al.’s and two protocols of Holbl et al. are insecure against the impersonation attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. Next, we prove that one protocol of Holbl et al. is vulnerable to the insider attack, one to the unknown key-share attack, one protocol allows an adversary to compute the private key of any user and one protocol allows her to compute the shared session key. We also show that Selvi et. al.'s deterministic identity-based aggregate signature scheme is universally forgeable, i.e., anyone is able to easily generate valid signatures on any messages of his choice having on average twelve genuine digital signatures. In the end, we introduce a new deterministic identity-based signature scheme and formally prove its security in the random oracle model. The scheme is a major improvement of the signature scheme proposed by Selvi et. al. and offers the same tight security reduction to the underlying gap Diffie-Hellman problem. Because the newly proposed scheme is deterministic it allows partial aggregation, i.e., all the signatures from the same signer can be aggregated into one single short signature.

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Key agreement and digital signature are two significant and most useful contributions of modern cryptography. Such protocols and schemes allow two or more parties to establish a common session key securely in the presence of a malicious adversary and provide means of ensuring data origin authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation. Thus, secure key agreement protocols and signature schemes are fundamental building blocks for constructing complex higher-level protocols.
In this thesis, we deal with security analysis of existing key agreement protocols and digital signature schemes. We examine ten authenticated key agreement protocols without key confirmation, out of which half are two-party and the other half are three-party, and one deterministic identity-based aggregate signature scheme. By giving concrete attacks, we show that these protocols and the scheme do not possess the desirable security attributes or security attributes claimed by their authors. We also present a secure deterministic identity-based signature scheme that supports partial aggregation.
First, we show that Okamoto's and Chen et al.’s protocol cannot withstand the key-compromise impersonation attack and that Tan et al.’s, Lim et al.’s and two protocols of Holbl et al. are insecure against the impersonation attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. Next, we prove that one protocol of Holbl et al. is vulnerable to the insider attack, one to the unknown key-share attack, one protocol allows an adversary to compute the private key of any user and one protocol allows her to compute the shared session key. We also show that Selvi et. al.'s deterministic identity-based aggregate signature scheme is universally forgeable, i.e., anyone is able to easily generate valid signatures on any messages of his choice having on average twelve genuine digital signatures.
In the end, we introduce a new deterministic identity-based signature scheme and formally prove its security in the random oracle model. The scheme is a major improvement of the signature scheme proposed by Selvi et. al. and offers the same tight security reduction to the underlying gap Diffie-Hellman problem. Because the newly proposed scheme is deterministic it allows partial aggregation, i.e., all the signatures from the same signer can be aggregated into one single short signature.
Certificateless public key cryptography has appealing features,namely it does not require the use of certificates and does not have a private key escrow feature.This paper describes a certificateless key agreement protocol based on bilinear pairings.The identity authentication in the protocol depends on a digital signature scheme.This paper proves the security of the signature scheme.The results show that in the random oracle model with the discrete logarithm assumption,the signature scheme resists existential forgeries against adaptive chosen-message attacks.The results farther show that the protocol preserves the desired security properties,including known-key security,unknown key-share resilience,perfect forward secrecy,key-compromise impersonation resilience and leakage of ephemeral private key resilience.The protocol requires much lower computation overhead than related protocols,since it uses fewer bilinear pairing operations and no modular exponentiation.
With the advancement in Internet-based technologies, network applications are no longer just limited to one-to-one communication; instead, it has become a publicly accessible resource. Regardless of this growth, such applications bring specific challenges concerning authentication, integrity, and privacy. Cryptography stands as an ideal solution to overcome these issues through an interactive method of secure communication called Key Exchange. Key exchange protocols allow two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret transmitted over a public channel without revealing any information to an eavesdropper. This thesis contributes to the design and analysis of the variants of key exchange protocols along with their applications. As per the security requirements, the proposed schemes are either designed in an interactive model or a non-interactive model. Each scheme undergoes a series of formal and informal security analysis. The formal analysis provides simulation result using cryptographic models. Whereas, an informal analysis showcases the theoretical proves on known attacks where an adversary controls the network. The performance analysis maps the protocol’s efficiency based on the computation cost and communication size. The first contribution introduces an interactive two-party authenticated key exchange protocol. We begin by investigating the security flaws in an existing system such as, lack of user anonymity, trace attack, clogging attack, and failure to resist replay attack. Then proposed an authenticated self-certified key exchange protocol that overcomes the addressed issues. Also, it eliminates the requirements of a trusted certificate authority to authorize the entities. The scheme achieves anonymity during session execution, mutual authentication and enables session key agreement.Based on the ideology, an application is designed, forsecure communication between ad-hoc nodes in a mobile ad-hoc network. The second contribution contributes to the design of an Identity-based authenticated three-party key exchange protocol that overcomes the incapability of managing huge peer-to-peer communication and high computation cost faced by two-party authenticated key exchange protocols. The proposed scheme preserves user privacy by enabling the property of anonymity and ensures non-repudiation. Based on the ideology, an application is designed to establish a secure session key between two users with the help of a trusted server for an electronic payment system. The third contribution proposes an interactive pairing-free certificateless authenticated group key agreement scheme suitable for a resource constrained mobile network. The scheme allows any user to join or leave the group dynamically. The key agreement protocol devised in this scheme ensures un-deniability property by incorporating the signcryption, and unsigncryption algorithm. The final contribution presents a non-interactive Identity-based deniable authentication protocol that allows an intended receiver to identify the origin of a given message without being able to prove sender’s identity to a third party.
In this paper, the tripartite identity-based key agreement is investigated. Inspired by designated verifier signature schemes, a tripartite identity-based key agreement protocol with explicit authentication is proposed with the good authentication of signatures. The new protocol can achieve remarkable security properties, such as perfect forward secrecy and unknown key share. More theoretically, the security proving of the protocol is given in the random oracle model under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. The efficiency of the protocol is lying on that three parties can establish an agreed session key after only one round of message exchange. Detailed efficiency analysis compared with other protocols is also made.
The main goal of cryptography is to enable secure communication over a public channel; often a secret shared among the communicating parties is used to achieve this. The process by which these parties agree on such a shared secret is called key agreement. In this thesis, we focus on two-party key agreement protocols in the public-key setting and study the various methods used to establish and validate public keys. We pay particular attention to certificateless key agreement schemes and attempt to formalize a relevant notion of security. To that end, we give a possible extension of the existing extended Canetti-Krawzcyk security model applicable to the certificateless setting. We observe that none of the certificateless protocols we have seen in the literature are secure in this model; it is an open question whether such schemes exist. We analyze several published certificateless key agreement protocols, demonstrating the existence of key compromise impersonation attacks and even a man-in-the-middle attack in one case, contrary to the claims of the authors. We also briefly describe weaknesses exhibited by these protocols in the context of our suggested security model.
Two-Party Authenticated key agreement protocol is essential for setting up the common session key for parties to establish secure channel for network communication in the open environment. Most of proposed schemes require expensive bilinear pairing operation and only provide limited security attributes. So such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require stronger sense of secrecy. In this paper, we first analysis two schemes recently proposed by Cao etc., and then present a one-round ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol with more desired security attributes, which need no pairing operations while still achieve nice computational efficiency. These security attributes include known-key secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. Moreover, it captures the enhanced security attributes known session-specific temporary key information secrecy, which means that even the ephemeral secret key were compromised, the adversary can hardly acquire the agreed session key.
In recent years, a large number of identity-based key agreement protocols from pairings have been proposed. Some of them are elegant and practical. However, using most of those protocols, the session key which users arrive is depended on the identity information. In this paper, we first propose a two-party identity-based key agreement protocol based on pairings whose security relies on the hardness of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model, and the session key is independent of the identity information. After that we extend the protocol to an identity-based group key agreement protocol, which uses no broadcasting. The proposed key agreement protocol achieves the security attributes: known session key security, perfect forward secrecy, no key compromise impersonation, no unknown key share and no key control.