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International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing

Impersonation Attack on CertificateLess Key Agreement Protocol

Gaurav Sharma, Suman Bala, Anil Kumar Verma

Published Jan 1, 2015• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Key agreement is a fundamental activity to establish communication between two parties. Kim et al. (2013) proposed a CertificateLess two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocol, which is secure in extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. This paper describes the security flaw of Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, which is found vulnerable against Key-Compromise Impersonation (K-CI) attack. For the resistance of the attack in Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, a defensive measure has been proposed, which is secure in eCK model.

DOI
10.1504/ijahuc.2015.10001792

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Impersonation attack on CertificateLess key agreement protocol

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Information technology newsletter•Jan 1, 2015•0 citations
Key agreement is a fundamental activity to establish communication between two parties. Kim et al. (2013) proposed a CertificateLess two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocol, which is secure in extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. This paper describes the security flaw of Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, which is found vulnerable against Key-Compromise Impersonation (K-CI) attack. For the resistance of the attack in Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, a defensive measure has been proposed, which is secure in eCK model.
Key agreement is a fundamental activity to establish communication between two parties. Kim et al. (2013) proposed a CertificateLess two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocol, which is secure in extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. This paper describes the security flaw of Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, which is found vulnerable against Key-Compromise Impersonation (K-CI) attack. For the resistance of the attack in Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, a defensive measure has been proposed, which is secure in eCK model.
Abstract. Recently, He et al. (Computers and Mathematics with Applications, 2012, 64(6): 1914-1926) proposed a new efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol. They claimed their protocol was provably secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. In this paper, we will show that their protocol is insecure. A type I adversary, who obtains one party’s ephemeral private key, can impersonate the party to cheat the other party and compute the shared session key successfully. For overcoming this weakness, we also propose a simple countermeasure.
Authenticated key agreement protocol is a fundamental building block for ensuring private communications between two or more parties over an insecure network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In the recent work, Wang et al. proposed an efficient two-party certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol from pairings used to protect the Web client/server communication. However, we found the scheme cannot withstand key compromise impersonation attack, and also, is vulnerable to one form of the man-in-the-middle attack -- key replicating attack, thus it doesn't possess some desirable security attributes,such as key compromise impersonation resilience and key integrity. We analyze the key replicating attack against the protocol in the BR93 security model in detail, and demonstrate that the protocol is not secure if the adversary was allowed to send a reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.
The main goal of cryptography is to enable secure communication over a public channel; often a secret shared among the communicating parties is used to achieve this. The process by which these parties agree on such a shared secret is called key agreement. In this thesis, we focus on two-party key agreement protocols in the public-key setting and study the various methods used to establish and validate public keys. We pay particular attention to certificateless key agreement schemes and attempt to formalize a relevant notion of security. To that end, we give a possible extension of the existing extended Canetti-Krawzcyk security model applicable to the certificateless setting. We observe that none of the certificateless protocols we have seen in the literature are secure in this model; it is an open question whether such schemes exist. We analyze several published certificateless key agreement protocols, demonstrating the existence of key compromise impersonation attacks and even a man-in-the-middle attack in one case, contrary to the claims of the authors. We also briefly describe weaknesses exhibited by these protocols in the context of our suggested security model.
Almostall the certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocols found in the literature, suffer either serious security problems or inefficient performance that involves high computational costs.In this paper, we design a secure and efficient CTAKA protocol.Within the proposed CTAKA protocol, the KGC publishes the public keys of the users in a public directory (LDAP server) that has a certificate to prove its identity to the users.The LDAP certificate is the only existing certificate within the scheme.Both the two communicating parties are able to compute a common secret per session key using a secure generated random number.The protocol is fully secure against type 1 attack and fully secure against type 2 attacks under the assumptions that the KGC is an honest party and each party within the network has the full capability to keep its secret values safe.Moreover, the setup of the protocol does not include pairings and the whole key agreement process requires only four point scalar multiplications, two point additions, one hash function evaluation and one message exchange.
This paper analyzed a bilinear pairing-free certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol proposed by Kim et al. The protocol did not satisfy an important security feature that was the basic impersonation attack under public key replacement attack. As well as,it mounted a specific attack on the protocol. Then an improved certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol was presented in order to satisfy the missing security property. The analysis shows that the improved protocol can efficiently withstand public key replacement attack and satisfy some necessary security properties.