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Cryptanalysis of an efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol.

Qingfeng Cheng

Published Jan 1, 2012• 4 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract. Recently, He et al. (Computers and Mathematics with Applications, 2012, 64(6): 1914-1926) proposed a new efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol. They claimed their protocol was provably secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. In this paper, we will show that their protocol is insecure. A type I adversary, who obtains one party’s ephemeral private key, can impersonate the party to cheat the other party and compute the shared session key successfully. For overcoming this weakness, we also propose a simple countermeasure.

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International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing•Jan 1, 2017•3 citations
Abstract. Recently, He et al. (Computers and Mathematics with Applications, 2012, 64(6): 1914-1926) proposed a new efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol. They claimed their protocol was provably secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. In this paper, we will show that their protocol is insecure. A type I adversary, who obtains one party’s ephemeral private key, can impersonate the party to cheat the other party and compute the shared session key successfully. For overcoming this weakness, we also propose a simple countermeasure.
Recently, two certificateless three-party authenticated key agreement protocols were proposed, and both protocols were claimed they can meet the desirable security properties including forward security, key compromise impersonation resistance and so on. Through cryptanalysis, we show that one neither meets forward security and key compromise impersonation resistance nor resists an attack by an adversary who knows all users' secret values, and the other cannot resist key compromise impersonation attack. Finally, we propose improved protocols to make up two original protocols' security weaknesses, respectively. Further security analysis shows that our improved protocols can remove such security weaknesses.
Certificateless cryptography aims at combining the advantages of identity based and public key cryptography in order to avoid the key escrow problem inherent in the identity based cryptography and cumbersome certificate management in the traditional public key infrastructure. The provably secure certificateless key agreement protocol is proposed by Lippold et al. in 2009, but their protocol suffers from computation burden. Owing to the above-mentioned situations, a new certificateless two party key agreement protocol (CL-KA) is proposed and the security attributes are analyzed in the extended Canetti-Krawzcyk(eCK) security model. Our protocol only requires each entity to compute two pairings, up to now, it turns out to be the most efficient one of all the previously known security CL-KA schemes.
Two-party key agreement protocol allows two communication parties to share a common key for secure communication. Constructed from the certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC), a certificateless key agreement (CL-KA) protocol can not only solve the key escrow problem inherited from identity-based systems, but also avoid the troublesome issue of certificate management. Although the topic of two-party CL-KA has been extensively studied during past few years, it is unknown whether such a protocol can be achieved with only one exchanged message. In this paper, we put this idea into practice and propose a new one-round CL-KA for two-party. Specifically, each party of the proposed protocol only has to transmit one group element for sharing a session key and still maintains low computational costs. Moreover, we analyze the security of our scheme in the extended Canetti-Krawzcyk (eCK) security model.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.itc.45.1.12595
Authenticated key agreement protocol is a fundamental building block for ensuring private communications between two or more parties over an insecure network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In the recent work, Wang et al. proposed an efficient two-party certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol from pairings used to protect the Web client/server communication. However, we found the scheme cannot withstand key compromise impersonation attack, and also, is vulnerable to one form of the man-in-the-middle attack -- key replicating attack, thus it doesn't possess some desirable security attributes,such as key compromise impersonation resilience and key integrity. We analyze the key replicating attack against the protocol in the BR93 security model in detail, and demonstrate that the protocol is not secure if the adversary was allowed to send a reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.
Key agreement is a fundamental activity to establish communication between two parties. Kim et al. (2013) proposed a CertificateLess two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocol, which is secure in extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. This paper describes the security flaw of Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, which is found vulnerable against Key-Compromise Impersonation (K-CI) attack. For the resistance of the attack in Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, a defensive measure has been proposed, which is secure in eCK model.
Security and efficiency are two key requirements for most of the authentication protocol, especially for the mobile wireless network. However, security and efficiency are a contradiction for the design of authentication protocol, it is hard to meet the two requirements simultaneously. Since certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) has an advantage in wiping off key escrow problem, many certificateless authentication key agreement (CL_AKA) protocols have been proposed. The existing CL_AKA protocols may meet either security requirement well or efficiency requirement well, but cannot meet the two well. In this paper, we propose an efficient two-party CL_AKA protocol with strong security. We perform an in-depth security analysis in extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model to show the proposed CL_AKA protocol is provably secure. The performance analysis shows that the proposed protocol can meet the strong security and efficiency requirements simultaneously.