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Postquantum Preshared Keys for IKEv2

Valery Smyslov, Panos Kampanakis, Scott R. Fluhrer, David A. McGrew

Published Jan 21, 2019• 7 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The possibility of Quantum Computers pose a serious challenge to cryptography algorithms deployed widely today. IKEv2 is one example of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a Quantum Computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support quantum secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant to a Quantum Computer, by using preshared keys.

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The possibility of quantum computers poses a serious challenge to cryptographic algorithms deployed widely today. IKEv2 is one example of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a quantum computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support quantum-secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant to a quantum computer, by using preshared keys.

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The possibility of quantum computers poses a serious challenge to cryptographic algorithms deployed widely today. IKEv2 is one example of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a quantum computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support quantum-secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant to a quantum computer, by using preshared keys.

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Alternative Approach for Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2 for Post-quantum Security

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An IKEv2 extension defined in [RFC8784] allows IPsec traffic to be protected against someone storing VPN communications today and decrypting it later, when (and if) quantum computers are available. However, this protection doesn't cover an initial IKEv2 SA, which might be unacceptable in some scenarios. This specification defines an alternative way get the same protection against quantum computers, which allows to extend it on the initial IKEv2 SA.

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The recent advances in the development of quantum computers pose a threat to the cryptography used today. While symmetric algorithms can adapt to those challenges, no prevalent key exchange method can protect against quantum computer based attacks. There already exist several new, quantum-resistant approaches. Yet, all of them either lack in confidence regarding their security or require large data to be transmitted. Due to the lack of confidence in these algorithms, researchers tend towards hybrid key exchange methods which combine at least two different algorithms. As long as one of them prevails, the shared secret remains secure. Yet, these hybrid key exchanges together with algorithms which transmit large payloads require significant changes to the design of security protocols. IKEv2 is willing to introduce radical changes in order to support as many different algorithms as possible. This was expected to impact the protocol's operational feasibility, but remained to be tested due to the lack of a working reference implementation of the newly proposed internet drafts. To address this issue, we implemented these drafts using a modified version of the OpenIKED as basis that already comprised the first steps towards the concept's integration. During the implementation we found that several design choices severely hinder a clean and maintainable structure. With the resulting implementation, we tested the adjusted protocol under real-world conditions. The results show that the result generally works but struggles to cope with slow, lossy networks. Based on these insights, we drafted an improved protocol design which also supports the full range of quantum-resistant key exchange methods. In contrast to the current drafts, it promises a cheaper and more maintainable implementation.

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A Virtual Private Network (VPN) ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data transferred between two endpoints, even if the means of transport are insecure. One popular protocol is Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) which operates at OSI layer 3 and protects all protocols at higher layers. Cryptographic keys in IPSec are negotiated using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. IKE negotiates security parameters for IPSec sessions. In particular, the IKEv2 protocol uses the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm to establish a secret key shared between two nodes on a network. Although solving such a problem remains difficult with current computing power, it is believed that generic quantum computers will be able to solve this problem, which implies that the security of IKEv2 is compromised. There are, however, several cryptographic systems that are trusted to be resistant to attacks by quantum computers. This family of cryptosystems is known as quantum-resistant cryptography (QRC). In this paper, after highlighting the requirements for a secure key exchange protocol, we briefly review the QRC solutions that have been proposed in the recent literature.

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Quantum computing has tremendous potential to change the world by solving many previously unsolvable problems. However, with this tremendous computational power comes threats to our existing technologies safeguarding the world's communication channels and data storage. Specifically, it threatens our standardized and widely deployed cryptographic systems that are in use today. These existing cryptosystems are based on mathematical techniques that are difficult (essentially infeasible) for a classical computer to solve. Quantum computing presents a threat since many previously infeasible problems are likely to become feasible or even easy to solve by a quantum computer. This paper briefly reviews quantum computing and its properties before studying related work into postquantum cryptography. The eventuality of quantum computing is discussed based on readily available research and public information, in addition to expert opinion, which then provides insight into the eventuality of postquantum cryptography and the validity of action, or inaction, around this research. Further topics focus on the standardization of postquantum cryptosystems, and future research trends and opportunities in the field of postquantum cryptography.

ACM SIGCAS Computers and Society•Sep 1, 2023•3 citations
The possibility of Quantum Computers pose a serious challenge to
cryptography algorithms deployed widely today. IKEv2 is one example of
a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN
communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a Quantum
Computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended
to support quantum secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not
likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before
then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be
resistant to a Quantum Computer, by using preshared keys.
The possibility of quantum computers poses a serious challenge to cryptographic algorithms deployed widely today. IKEv2 is one example of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a quantum computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support quantum-secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant to a quantum computer, by using preshared keys.
The possibility of quantum computers poses a serious challenge to cryptographic algorithms deployed widely today. IKEv2 is one example of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a quantum computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support quantum-secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant to a quantum computer, by using preshared keys.
The recent advances in the development of quantum computers pose a threat to the cryptography used today. While symmetric algorithms can adapt to those challenges, no prevalent key exchange method can protect against quantum computer based attacks. There already exist several new, quantum-resistant approaches. Yet, all of them either lack in confidence regarding their security or require large data to be transmitted. Due to the lack of confidence in these algorithms, researchers tend towards hybrid key exchange methods which combine at least two different algorithms. As long as one of them prevails, the shared secret remains secure. Yet, these hybrid key exchanges together with algorithms which transmit large payloads require significant changes to the design of security protocols. IKEv2 is willing to introduce radical changes in order to support as many different algorithms as possible. This was expected to impact the protocol's operational feasibility, but remained to be tested due to the lack of a working reference implementation of the newly proposed internet drafts. To address this issue, we implemented these drafts using a modified version of the OpenIKED as basis that already comprised the first steps towards the concept's integration. During the implementation we found that several design choices severely hinder a clean and maintainable structure. With the resulting implementation, we tested the adjusted protocol under real-world conditions. The results show that the result generally works but struggles to cope with slow, lossy networks. Based on these insights, we drafted an improved protocol design which also supports the full range of quantum-resistant key exchange methods. In contrast to the current drafts, it promises a cheaper and more maintainable implementation.
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data transferred between two endpoints, even if the means of transport are insecure. One popular protocol is Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) which operates at OSI layer 3 and protects all protocols at higher layers. Cryptographic keys in IPSec are negotiated using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. IKE negotiates security parameters for IPSec sessions. In particular, the IKEv2 protocol uses the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm to establish a secret key shared between two nodes on a network. Although solving such a problem remains difficult with current computing power, it is believed that generic quantum computers will be able to solve this problem, which implies that the security of IKEv2 is compromised. There are, however, several cryptographic systems that are trusted to be resistant to attacks by quantum computers. This family of cryptosystems is known as quantum-resistant cryptography (QRC). In this paper, after highlighting the requirements for a secure key exchange protocol, we briefly review the QRC solutions that have been proposed in the recent literature.
Quantum computing has tremendous potential to change the world by solving many previously unsolvable problems. However, with this tremendous computational power comes threats to our existing technologies safeguarding the world's communication channels and data storage. Specifically, it threatens our standardized and widely deployed cryptographic systems that are in use today. These existing cryptosystems are based on mathematical techniques that are difficult (essentially infeasible) for a classical computer to solve. Quantum computing presents a threat since many previously infeasible problems are likely to become feasible or even easy to solve by a quantum computer. This paper briefly reviews quantum computing and its properties before studying related work into postquantum cryptography. The eventuality of quantum computing is discussed based on readily available research and public information, in addition to expert opinion, which then provides insight into the eventuality of postquantum cryptography and the validity of action, or inaction, around this research. Further topics focus on the standardization of postquantum cryptosystems, and future research trends and opportunities in the field of postquantum cryptography.