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Alternative Approach for Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2 for Post-quantum Security

Valery Smyslov

Published Jan 1, 2000• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

An IKEv2 extension defined in [RFC8784] allows IPsec traffic to be protected against someone storing VPN communications today and decrypting it later, when (and if) quantum computers are available. However, this protection doesn't cover an initial IKEv2 SA, which might be unacceptable in some scenarios. This specification defines an alternative way get the same protection against quantum computers, which allows to extend it on the initial IKEv2 SA.

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An IKEv2 extension defined in [RFC8784] allows IPsec traffic to be
protected against someone storing VPN communications today and
decrypting it later, when (and if) quantum computers are available.
However, this protection doesn't cover an initial IKEv2 SA, which
might be unacceptable in some scenarios. This specification defines an
alternative way get the same protection against quantum computers,
which allows to extend it on the initial IKEv2 SA.
The possibility of quantum computers poses a serious challenge to cryptographic algorithms deployed widely today. IKEv2 is one example of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a quantum computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support quantum-secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant to a quantum computer, by using preshared keys.
The possibility of quantum computers poses a serious challenge to cryptographic algorithms deployed widely today. IKEv2 is one example of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a quantum computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support quantum-secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant to a quantum computer, by using preshared keys.
The possibility of Quantum Computers pose a serious challenge to cryptography algorithms deployed widely today. IKEv2 is one example of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a Quantum Computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support quantum secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant to a Quantum Computer, by using preshared keys.
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data transferred between two endpoints, even if the means of transport are insecure. One popular protocol is Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) which operates at OSI layer 3 and protects all protocols at higher layers. Cryptographic keys in IPSec are negotiated using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. IKE negotiates security parameters for IPSec sessions. In particular, the IKEv2 protocol uses the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm to establish a secret key shared between two nodes on a network. Although solving such a problem remains difficult with current computing power, it is believed that generic quantum computers will be able to solve this problem, which implies that the security of IKEv2 is compromised. There are, however, several cryptographic systems that are trusted to be resistant to attacks by quantum computers. This family of cryptosystems is known as quantum-resistant cryptography (QRC). In this paper, after highlighting the requirements for a secure key exchange protocol, we briefly review the QRC solutions that have been proposed in the recent literature.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a mechanism for creating shared, secret, random bits. This document describes extensions to the IKEv2 protocol to use random bits created via QKD as keys for IPsec. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement mechanism is replaced with QKD. The use of QKD-generated keys with standard IPsec will extend the lifetime of privacy guarantees for IPsec-protected data: future technological advances that break Diffie-Hellman key exchange will not disclose data until such time as the encryption algorithm used for the IPsec tunnel is broken.
The rise of quantum computing poses significant risks to classical cryptographic algorithms, especially those used in digital signatures within Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). This paper proposes a hybrid cryptographic framework for IPsec VPNs that combines traditional digital signatures with post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) techniques to enhance security against both conventional and quantum threats. Our method introduces a dual-signature scheme integrated into the IKEv2 protocol, verified using formal methods via the Tamarin Prover to ensure robustness. We further evaluate performance using a modified StrongSwan implementation under realistic network conditions. Results show that while hybrid signatures introduce modest overhead, they provide a viable and forward-compatible solution for securing VPNs in the post-quantum era.