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Cognitive Science

Towards an empirical test of realism in cognition.

James M. Yearsley, Emmanuel M. Pothos

Published Jan 1, 2015• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We discuss recent progress towards an empirical test of ‘realism’\nin cognition, ‘realism’ in this context being the property\nthat cognitive variables always have well defined (if unknown)\nvalues at all times. Our main result is an inequality obeyed by\nrealist theories, which could be tested by a suitable experiment.\nWe focus our attention in this contribution on two particular\nissues. The first is the exact notion of realism which is to be\ntested, as this has received less attention in earlier work. The\nsecond is an important technical issue about the inequality we\nuse; in earlier work Atmanspacher and Filk (2010) considered\na different expression, and we explain why our inequality is\nmore suitable for use under realistic experimental conditions

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We discuss recent progress towards an empirical test of ‘realism’\nin cognition, ‘realism’ in this context being the property\nthat cognitive variables always have well defined (if unknown)\nvalues at all times. Our main result is an inequality obeyed by\nrealist theories, which could be tested by a suitable experiment.\nWe focus our attention in this contribution on two particular\nissues. The first is the exact notion of realism which is to be\ntested, as this has received less attention in earlier work. The\nsecond is an important technical issue about the inequality we\nuse; in earlier work Atmanspacher and Filk (2010) considered\na different expression, and we explain why our inequality is\nmore suitable for use under realistic experimental conditions
In a recent paper [arXiv:1301.2887] Ahrens et al. claim that our "(...) experiment on qutrits does not test Klyachko et al.'s inequality, but an inequality with extra correlations" and that the "(...) experiment cannot be considered a proper test of a noncontextuality inequality, since the same observable is measured with different setups in different contexts". We disagree with these claims. In this note we briefly re-state how our test of the non-contextuality inequality was constructed. We explain how we keep the context of measurements when switching between different terms of the tested inequality, and we argue that we did in fact test the Klyachko, Can, Binicioglu and Shumovsky inequality. In doing so, we also clarify why our experiment is indeed a proper test of noncontextual realism.
All mental representations change with time. A baseline intuition is that mental representations have specific values at different time points, which may be more or less accessible, depending on noise, forgetting processes, etc. We present a radical alternative, motivated by recent research using the mathematics from quantum theory for cognitive modelling. Such cognitive models raise the possibility that certain possibilities or events may be incompatible, so that perfect knowledge of one necessitates uncertainty for the others. In the context of time-dependence, in physics, this issue is explored with the so-called temporal Bell (TB) or Leggett-Garg inequalities. We consider in detail the theoretical and empirical challenges involved in exploring the TB inequalities in the context of cognitive systems. One interesting conclusion is that we believe the study of the TB inequalities to be empirically more constrained in psychology than in physics. Specifically, we show how the TB inequalities, as applied to cognitive systems, can be derived from two simple assumptions: cognitive realism and cognitive completeness. We discuss possible implications of putative violations of the TB inequalities for cognitive models and our understanding of time in cognition in general. Overall, this paper provides a surprising, novel direction in relation to how time should be conceptualized in cognition.
I consider the extent to which the applicability of the concept of classical realism is constrained, irrespective of the validity or not of the quantum formalism, by existing experiments both in the EPR–Bell setup, including recent experiments testing ‘nonlocal realistic’ theories, and in the area of ‘macroscopic quantum coherence’. Unless we are willing to sacrifice one or more other intuitively plausible notions such as that of the conventional ‘arrow of time’, it appears impossible, in either context, to maintain the classical notion of realism.
Recently the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, especially methods of quantum probability theory, started to be widely used in a variety of applications outside of physics, e.g., cognition and psychology as well as economy and finances. To distinguish such models from genuine quantum physical models, they often called quantum-like (although often people simply speak about, e.g., "quantum cognition"). These novel applications generate a number of foundational questions. Nowadays we can speak about a new science - foundations of quantum-like modeling. At the first stage this science was mainly about comparison of classical and quantum models, mainly in the probabilistic setting. It was found that statistical data from cognitive psychology violate some basic constraints posed on data by classical probability theory (Kolmogorov, 1933); in particular, the constraints given by the formula of total probability and Bell's type inequalities. Recently another question attracted some attention. In spite of real success in applications, there are no reason to believe that the quantum probability would cover completely all problems of, e.g., cognition. May be more general probability models have to be explored. A similar problem attracted a lot of attention in foundations of quantum physics culminating in a series of experiments to check Sorkin's equality for the triple-slit experiment by Weihs' group. In this note we present a similar test in the cognitive experimental setting. Performance of this test would either give further confirmation of the adequacy of the quantum probability model to cognitive applications or rejection of the conventional quantum model. Thus this note opens the door for a series of exciting experimental tests for the quantum-like model of cognition.
We discuss the recently observed “loophole free” violation of Bell’s inequalities in the framework of a physically realist view of quantum mechanics (QM), which requires that physical properties are attributed jointly to a system, and to the context in which it is embedded. This approach is clearly different from classical realism, but it does define a meaningful “quantum realism” from a general philosophical point of view. Consistently with Bell test experiments, this quantum realism embeds some form of non-locality, but does not contain any action at a distance, in agreement with QM.