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Reports on Progress in Physics

Realism and the physical world

A. J. Leggett

Published Jan 29, 2008• 204 citations
Publisher

Abstract

I consider the extent to which the applicability of the concept of classical realism is constrained, irrespective of the validity or not of the quantum formalism, by existing experiments both in the EPR–Bell setup, including recent experiments testing ‘nonlocal realistic’ theories, and in the area of ‘macroscopic quantum coherence’. Unless we are willing to sacrifice one or more other intuitively plausible notions such as that of the conventional ‘arrow of time’, it appears impossible, in either context, to maintain the classical notion of realism.

DOI
10.1088/0034-4885/71/2/022001

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I consider the extent to which the applicability of the concept of classical realism is constrained, irrespective of the validity or not of the quantum formalism, by existing experiments both in the EPR–Bell setup, including recent experiments testing ‘nonlocal realistic’ theories, and in the area of ‘macroscopic quantum coherence’. Unless we are willing to sacrifice one or more other intuitively plausible notions such as that of the conventional ‘arrow of time’, it appears impossible, in either context, to maintain the classical notion of realism.
Our everyday experiences support the hypothesis that physical systems exist independently of the act of observation. Concordant theories are characterized by the objective realism assumption whereby the act of measurement simply reveals preexisting well-defined elements of reality. In stark contrast quantum mechanics portrays a world in which reality loses its objectivity and is in fact created by observation. Quantum contextuality as first discovered by Bell [1] and Kochen-Specker [2] captures aspects of this philosophical clash between classical and quantum descriptions of the world. Here we briefly summarize some of the more recent advances in the field of quantum contextuality. We approach quantum contextuality through its close relation to Bell type nonlocal scenarios and highlight some of the rapidly developing tests and experimental implementations.
More them any other topic in the foundations of physics, the problem of the arrow (or arrows!) of time seems to be characterized by a unique ‘slipperiness’: it is not only difficult to find answers to the questions once posed, but difficult to find meaningful questions to ask in the first place. Perhaps this is because an asymmetry with respect to the sense of time is built into us at an even deeper level than other ‘synthetic a priori’ conceptions about the world such as the continued existence of unknown objects. However that may be, in this situation, rather than trying to pose general questions which may turn out in the end to be ill-defined, there may be something to be said for trying to formulate much less speculative, indeed perhaps in retrospect trivial questions to which at least we have a hope of finding a definite answer. This is what I shall do in this essay: to be specific, I shall ask whether a test which is currently being designed concerning the validity of a certain ‘common-sense’ view of the macroscopic world (‘macrorealism’) would be affected if we were to relax our common-sense assumptions about the direction of causality in time. Let me start with a very brief review of established ideas concerning the formal (a)symmetry of the quantum theory with respect to the direction of time. The classic works on this subject are the paper of Aharonov et al. (‘ABL’) and the book by Belinfante. In these discussions the notion of ‘measurement’ is taken as primitive and undefined.
We discuss the recently observed “loophole free” violation of Bell’s inequalities in the framework of a physically realist view of quantum mechanics (QM), which requires that physical properties are attributed jointly to a system, and to the context in which it is embedded. This approach is clearly different from classical realism, but it does define a meaningful “quantum realism” from a general philosophical point of view. Consistently with Bell test experiments, this quantum realism embeds some form of non-locality, but does not contain any action at a distance, in agreement with QM.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
Recent experiments of Gröblacher et al proved the violation of a Leggett-type inequality that was claimed to be valid for a broad class of non-local hidden-variable theories. The impossibility of constructing a non-local and realistic theory, unless it entails highly counterintuitive features, seems thus to have been experimentally proved. This would bring us close to a definite refutation of realism. Indeed, realism was proved to be also incompatible with locality, according to a series of experiments testing Bell inequalities. The present paper addresses the said experiments of Gröblacher et al and presents an explicit, contextual and realistic, model that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics. It thus violates the Leggett-type inequality that was established with the aim of ruling out a supposedly broad class of non-local models. We can thus conclude that plausible contextual, realistic, models are still tenable. This restates the possibility of a future completion of quantum mechanics by a realistic and contextual theory which is not in a class containing only highly counterintuitive models. The class that was ruled out by the experiments of Gröblacher et al is thus proved to be a limited one, arbitrarily separating models that physically belong in the same class.
Our everyday experiences support the hypothesis that physical systems exist independently of the act of observation. Concordant theories are characterized by the objective realism assumption whereby the act of measurement simply reveals preexisting well defined elements of reality. In stark contrast quantum mechanics portrays a world in which reality loses its objectivity and is in fact created by observation. Quantum contextuality as first discovered by Bell [Rev. Mod. Phys. 38, 447 (1966)] and Kochen-Specker [J. Math. Mech. 17, 59 (1967)] captures aspects of this philosophical clash between classical and quantum descriptions of the world. Here we briefly summarize some of the more recent advances in the field of quantum contextuality. We approach quantum contextuality through its close relation to Bell type nonlocal scenarios and highlight some of the rapidly developing tests and experimental implementations.