Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Ziran bianzhengfa yanjiu

B.C.van Fraassen's Analysis of EPR Correlation and My Review

Wan Xiao-long

Published Jan 1, 2004• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In this article, I introduce and review B.C.van Fraassen'thought that is EPR Correlation can't be interpreted to any of these six kinds of correlations: Chance, Coincidence, Co-ordination,Pre-established harmony,Logical identity, and Common cause, bus only a statistics correlation?

Related papers

The Common Cause Explanation for Quantum Correlations of the EPR Type

Tomasz Bigaj

In the article van Fraassen's argument against the possibility of the com- mon cause explanation of EPR correlations is analyzed. It is pointed out that the crucial assumption of this argument is given in an ambiguous way, and that only one of its interpretations leads to the above conclusion. Several other omissions and misleading statements in van Fraassen's analysis are brought into considerations. At the end the corrected version of the original argument is given and its negative result is finally accepted.

•Jan 1, 2003•1 citation

EPR: The Correlations are Still A Mystery

Frederick M. Kronz

This paper is a critical discussion of a recent article by Bas van Fraassen (1985) in which he suggests the following view: we should admit that we have no explanation of the EPR correlations, but refuse to consider the correlations as mysterious nevertheless (pp. 126–128). We shall focus on just three of the claims made by van Fraassen in support of this view. The three claims are these: (1) The EPR correlations cannot be explained by signals being transmitted from one component of an EPR compound to the other (pp. 114–115). (2) There is, in the EPR situation, no empirically verifiable action at a distance (pp. 124–126). (3) The demand for an explanation of the EPR correlations is similar to the Aristotelian demand of the post-Newtonian proponents of the law of inertia to explain what keeps a body moving if there are no forces impressed on it (pp. 126–128).

Philosophy of Science•Dec 1, 1988•3 citations

EPR CORRELATIONS, BELL INEQUALITIES AND COMMON CAUSE SYSTEMS

Gábor Hofer‐Szabó

Standard common causal explanations of the EPR situation assume a so-called joint common cause system that is a common cause for all correlations. However, the assumption of a joint common cause system together with some other physically motivated assumptions concerning locality and no-conspiracy results in various Bell inequalities. Since Bell inequalities are violated for appropriate measurement settings, a local, non-conspiratorial joint common causal explanation of the EPR situation is ruled out. But why do we assume that a common causal explanation of a set of correlation consists in finding a joint common cause system for all correlations and not just in finding separate common cause systems for the different correlations? What are the \nperspectives of a local, non-conspiratorial separate common causal explanation for the EPR scenario? And finally, how do Bell inequalities relate to the weaker assumption of separate common cause systems? \n

•Mar 5, 2014•1 citation

Non-local common cause explanations for EPR

Matthias Egg, Michaël Esfeld

The paper argues that a causal explanation of the correlated outcomes of EPR-type experiments is desirable and possible. It shows how Bohmian mechanics and the GRW mass density theory offer such an explanation in terms of a non-local common cause.

arXiv:1312.2801•Dec 10, 2013•0 citations

The Limits of Common Cause Approach to EPR Correlation

Katsuaki Higashi

Foundations of Physics•May 7, 2008•5 citations

Causal processes and propensities in quantum mechanics

Mauricio Suárez

I offer an alternative interpretation of Van Fraassen's influential arguments against causal realism in quantum mechanics. These arguments provide in fact a good guide to the different causal models available for the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations, which in turn shed light on the nature of quantum propensities.

THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science•Sep 6, 2004•10 citations
In the article van Fraassen's argument against the possibility of the com- mon cause explanation of EPR correlations is analyzed. It is pointed out that the crucial assumption of this argument is given in an ambiguous way, and that only one of its interpretations leads to the above conclusion. Several other omissions and misleading statements in van Fraassen's analysis are brought into considerations. At the end the corrected version of the original argument is given and its negative result is finally accepted.
This paper is a critical discussion of a recent article by Bas van Fraassen (1985) in which he suggests the following view: we should admit that we have no explanation of the EPR correlations, but refuse to consider the correlations as mysterious nevertheless (pp. 126–128). We shall focus on just three of the claims made by van Fraassen in support of this view. The three claims are these: (1) The EPR correlations cannot be explained by signals being transmitted from one component of an EPR compound to the other (pp. 114–115). (2) There is, in the EPR situation, no empirically verifiable action at a distance (pp. 124–126). (3) The demand for an explanation of the EPR correlations is similar to the Aristotelian demand of the post-Newtonian proponents of the law of inertia to explain what keeps a body moving if there are no forces impressed on it (pp. 126–128).
Standard common causal explanations of the EPR situation assume a so-called joint common cause system that is a common cause for all correlations. However, the assumption of a joint common cause system together with some other physically motivated assumptions concerning locality and no-conspiracy results in various Bell inequalities. Since Bell inequalities are violated for appropriate measurement settings, a local, non-conspiratorial joint common causal explanation of the EPR situation is ruled out. But why do we assume that a common causal explanation of a set of correlation consists in finding a joint common cause system for all correlations and not just in finding separate common cause systems for the different correlations? What are the \nperspectives of a local, non-conspiratorial separate common causal explanation for the EPR scenario? And finally, how do Bell inequalities relate to the weaker assumption of separate common cause systems? \n