The Common Cause Explanation for Quantum Correlations of the EPR Type

Tomasz Bigaj

Published Jan 1, 2003• 1 citation

Abstract

In the article van Fraassen's argument against the possibility of the com- mon cause explanation of EPR correlations is analyzed. It is pointed out that the crucial assumption of this argument is given in an ambiguous way, and that only one of its interpretations leads to the above conclusion. Several other omissions and misleading statements in van Fraassen's analysis are brought into considerations. At the end the corrected version of the original argument is given and its negative result is finally accepted.

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