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THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science

Causal processes and propensities in quantum mechanics

Mauricio Suárez

Published Sep 6, 2004• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

I offer an alternative interpretation of Van Fraassen's influential arguments against causal realism in quantum mechanics. These arguments provide in fact a good guide to the different causal models available for the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations, which in turn shed light on the nature of quantum propensities.
DOI
10.1387/theoria.582

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This Ph.D. thesis is about causality in Quantum Mechanics, namely about the possibility to provide a causal explanation for quantum Einstein – Podolsky – Rosen (EPR) correlations.The well-known interpretation of the Bell’s Theorem by Bastian Van Fraassen, who inferred that quantum correlations cannot be embedded in any causal model, compels us to suppose that microscopic nature cannot have a causal structure and that causality is an anthropological concept.However, this interpretation is not commonly accepted and this doctoral thesis is the first general overview of some recent works about causal explanation for EPR correlations. Particularly, it analyses the possible causal explanations for the EPR/Bohm experiments by means of the Hans Reichenbach’s model, by means of backward causation models, and by means of models that imply a direct causal link. In order to do it, it pays particular attention to the Relativistic space-time features and it considers the studies in the History of Philosophy about the link between causal arrow and temporal arrow. Moreover, this work aims to endorse the idea that the best way to explain EPR/Bohm correlations causally is to adopt an indeterministic non-Reichenbachian common cause model, particularly Cartwright’sgeneral forksmodel.My conclusion is that causal models for quantum correlations remain viable, and that there is no contrast between genuinely indeterministic interpretation of Quantum Theory and causal explanation, with the philosophical implication that the Causal Realism is still acceptable.
La teoria de l'explicació causal de Wesley Salmon troba, segons el mateix Salmon, una important dificultat en les correlacions Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) de la mecànica quàntica. En un influent article, publicat el 1982, Bas van Fraassen desenvolupar un argument en contra del realisme causal a partir d'una anàlisi de les correlacions EPR. Molts filòsofs de la ciència i experts en inferència causal, inclosos alguns realistes causals com Wesley Salmon, han acceptat l'argument de Van Fraassen, interpretant com una prova irrefutable que les correlacions quàntiques no són susceptibles d'explicació causal alguna. En aquest article em proposo demostrar que-lluny de refutar el realisme causal-l'argument de Van Fraassen constitueix una bona guia tant dels diferents models causals possibles per a les correlacions EPR, com de les seves virtuts i defectes relatius. Les correlacions EPR són un excel · lent banc de proves per contrastar i comparar les diferents teories d'explicació causal.