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Journal of Naval University of Engineering

Security of B92 protocol related to single basis eavesdropping

Jun Gao

Published Jan 1, 2009• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The security of B92 protocol was studied in the terms of single basis with the probability and the information theory.The relation between the optimal eavesdropping angle and the signal probability was obtained.The mutual information among Alice,Bob and Eve was calculated with the theory of Markovian chain series channel.The results of comparison with the conclusion in the case of POVM eavesdropping show that Eve can guess the quantum bit with higher probability by single basis,and the average mutual information obtained by single basis is rather high.The conclusion offers a new criterion for cheking Eve.

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Security analysis of the Bennett 1992 quantum key-distribution protocol over a realistic channel

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In this thesis, we analyze the security of the Bennett 1992 quantum key-distribution protocol (B92 protocol) over a realistic channel assuming that bit values are encoded in single photon polarization states. First, we study the security of the B92 protocol against individual attack. In the individual attack, eavesdropper (Eve) interacts a qubit emitted by the sender (Alice) with her probe system followed by a measurement on each probe. To make our analysis simple, we propose a modified B92 protocol. Using this protocol, Alice and the receiver (Bob) can estimate Eve's information gain as a function of a few parameters that reflect the imperfections of devices or Eve's disturbance. We find a counter-intuitive behavior of Eve's maximum information gain, i.e., it decreases as the amount of disturbances increases. We also estimate the secret key gain that is the net growth of the secret key per one pulse. We show the region where the modified B92 protocol over a realistic channel is secure against individual attack. Next, we study the unconditional security of the B92 protocol, which is the security against any attack. To prove the security, we first propose a protocol that is unconditionally secure and can be reduced to the B92 protocol. This protocol employs the entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) based on a filtering operation and the Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum error correcting codes. The bit errors and the phase errors, which have to be estimated for the EDP based on the CSS codes, are correlated after the filtering operation, and we can bound the amount of phase errors from the observed bit errors by an estimation method involving nonorthogonal measurements. The angle between the two states shows a trade-off between accuracy of the estimation and robustness to noises. We show a way to run the unconditionally secure B92.

•Mar 24, 2004•0 citations
The security of B92 protocol was studied in the terms of single basis with the probability and the information theory.The relation between the optimal eavesdropping angle and the signal probability was obtained.The mutual information among Alice,Bob and Eve was calculated with the theory of Markovian chain series channel.The results of comparison with the conclusion in the case of POVM eavesdropping show that Eve can guess the quantum bit with higher probability by single basis,and the average mutual information obtained by single basis is rather high.The conclusion offers a new criterion for cheking Eve.
Carry out research on the variation rule of the average mutual information between Alice and Eve IAE, Alice and Bob IABand bit error rate qe(AE), qe(AB), when the eavesdropper Eve uses the same measurement basis as Bob, eavesdropping the communication between Alice and Bob on the basis of intercepting-retransmission pattern. Based on the symmetrical characteristic of source sequence, making research on the variation features of IAE, IAB, and then make respective simulation with tool of Matlab. Research results provide the guarantee for optimal quantum communication of legal users and theoretical guidance for detecting presence of eavesdroppers on the basis of average mutual information.
In this paper, we simulate the quantum channel with a binary symmetric channel and a binary erasure channel, a series channel and a Markovian chain channel in classical information theory, then calculate respectively the mutual information between the signal's deliverer, the legal receiver and the eavesdropper, the bit error rate during propagating the signals with the theory about the quantum measurement channel and the quantum information theory. For B92 protocol, a simple quantum cryptography distribution scheme, we study the bound and the property of mutual information obtained by the legal receiver and the eavesdropper, seek the relationship between the bit error rates and the eavesdropper's way, in two cases of the opaque eavesdropping and the translucent eavesdropping. A new criteria for checking the eavesdropper and ensuring the legal correspondent is estimated. Furthermore, the comparison in bit error rates caused respectively in two different measuring ways indicates that POVM is better than the standard measurement by the way of orthogonal projecting for reducing the bit error rate and increasing effective communication.
In this thesis, we analyze the security of the Bennett 1992 quantum key-distribution protocol (B92 protocol) over a realistic channel assuming that bit values are encoded in single photon polarization states. First, we study the security of the B92 protocol against individual attack. In the individual attack, eavesdropper (Eve) interacts a qubit emitted by the sender (Alice) with her probe system followed by a measurement on each probe. To make our analysis simple, we propose a modified B92 protocol. Using this protocol, Alice and the receiver (Bob) can estimate Eve's information gain as a function of a few parameters that reflect the imperfections of devices or Eve's disturbance. We find a counter-intuitive behavior of Eve's maximum information gain, i.e., it decreases as the amount of disturbances increases. We also estimate the secret key gain that is the net growth of the secret key per one pulse. We show the region where the modified B92 protocol over a realistic channel is secure against individual attack. Next, we study the unconditional security of the B92 protocol, which is the security against any attack. To prove the security, we first propose a protocol that is unconditionally secure and can be reduced to the B92 protocol. This protocol employs the entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) based on a filtering operation and the Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum error correcting codes. The bit errors and the phase errors, which have to be estimated for the EDP based on the CSS codes, are correlated after the filtering operation, and we can bound the amount of phase errors from the observed bit errors by an estimation method involving nonorthogonal measurements. The angle between the two states shows a trade-off between accuracy of the estimation and robustness to noises. We show a way to run the unconditionally secure B92.