The central motivating idea behind the development of this work is the concept of prespace, a hypothetical structure that is postulated by some physicists to underlie the fabric of space or space-time. I consider how such a structure could relate to space and space-time, and the rest of reality as we know it, and the implications of the existence of this structure for quantum theory. Understanding how this structure could relate to space and to the rest of reality requires, I believe, that we consider how space itself relates to reality, and how other so-called “spaces” used in physics relate to reality. In the first chapter I compare space and space-time to other spaces used in physics, such as configuration space, phase space and Hilbert space. I support what is known as the “property view” of space, opposing both the traditional views of space and space-time, substantivalism and relationism. I argue that all these spaces are property spaces. After examining the relationships of these spaces to causality, I argue that configuration space has, due to its role in quantum mechanics, a special status in the microscopic world similar to the status of position space in the macroscopic world. In chapter two prespace itself is considered. One way of approaching this structure is through the comparison of the prespace structure with a computational system, in particular to a cellular automaton, in which space or space-time and all other physical quantities are broken down into discrete units. I suggest that one way open for a prespace metaphysics can be found if physics is made fully discrete in this way. I suggest as a heuristic principle that the physical laws of our world are such that the computational cost of implementing those laws on an arbitrary computational system is minimized, adapting a heuristic principle of this type proposed by Feynman (1982). In the final chapter some of the ideas of the previous chapters are applied in an examination of the physics and metaphysics of quantum theory. I first discuss the “measurement problem” of quantum mechanics: this problem and its proposed solution are the primary subjects of the final chapter. It turns out that considering how quantum theory could be made fully discrete leads naturally to a suggestion of how standard linear quantum mechanics could be modified to give rise to a solution to the measurement problem. The computational heuristic principle reinforces the same solution. I call the modified quantum mechanics Critical Complexity Quantum Mechanics (CCQM). I compare CCQM with some of the other proposed solutions to the measurement problem, in particular the spontaneous localization model of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986). Finally I argue that the measure of complexity of quantum mechanical states I introduce in CCQM also provides a new definition of entropy for quantum mechanics, and suggests a solution to the problem of providing an objective foundation for statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and the arrow of time.
The central motivating idea behind the development of this work is the concept of prespace, a hypothetical structure that is postulated by some physicists to underlie the fabric of space or space-time. I consider how such a structure could relate to space and space-time, and the rest of reality as we know it, and the implications of the existence of this structure for quantum theory. Understanding how this structure could relate to space and to the rest of reality requires, I believe, that we consider how space itself relates to reality, and how other so-called “spaces” used in physics relate to reality. In the first chapter I compare space and space-time to other spaces used in physics, such as configuration space, phase space and Hilbert space. I support what is known as the “property view” of space, opposing both the traditional views of space and space-time, substantivalism and relationism. I argue that all these spaces are property spaces. After examining the relationships of these spaces to causality, I argue that configuration space has, due to its role in quantum mechanics, a special status in the microscopic world similar to the status of position space in the macroscopic world. In chapter two prespace itself is considered. One way of approaching this structure is through the comparison of the prespace structure with a computational system, in particular to a cellular automaton, in which space or space-time and all other physical quantities are broken down into discrete units. I suggest that one way open for a prespace metaphysics can be found if physics is made fully discrete in this way. I suggest as a heuristic principle that the physical laws of our world are such that the computational cost of implementing those laws on an arbitrary computational system is minimized, adapting a heuristic principle of this type proposed by Feynman (1982). In the final chapter some of the ideas of the previous chapters are applied in an examination of the physics and metaphysics of quantum theory. I first discuss the “measurement problem” of quantum mechanics: this problem and its proposed solution are the primary subjects of the final chapter. It turns out that considering how quantum theory could be made fully discrete leads naturally to a suggestion of how standard linear quantum mechanics could be modified to give rise to a solution to the measurement problem. The computational heuristic principle reinforces the same solution. I call the modified quantum mechanics Critical Complexity Quantum Mechanics (CCQM). I compare CCQM with some of the other proposed solutions to the measurement problem, in particular the spontaneous localization model of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986). Finally I argue that the measure of complexity of quantum mechanical states I introduce in CCQM also provides a new definition of entropy for quantum mechanics, and suggests a solution to the problem of providing an objective foundation for statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and the arrow of time.
The central idea of this work is the concept of prespace, a hypothetical structure that is postulated to underlie the fabric of space or space-time. I consider how such a structure could relate to space and space-time, and the implications of the existence of this structure for quantum theory. I compare space and space-time to other spaces used in physics, such as configuration space, phase space, and Hilbert space. I support the 'property view' of space, opposing both the traditional views of space and space-time, substantivalism and relationism. I argue that configuration space has a special status in the microscopic world similar to the status of position space in the macroscopic world. The prespace structure is compared with a computational system, in particular to a cellular automaton, in which space and all physical quantities are broken into discrete units. One way open for a prespace metaphysics can be found if physics is made fully discrete. I suggest as a heuristic principle that the physical laws of our world are such that the computational cost of implementing those laws on an arbitrary computational system is minimized. I discuss the 'measurement problem' of quantum mechanics. Considering how quantum theory could be made fully discrete leads naturally to a suggestion of how standard linear quantum mechanics could be modified to give a solution to the measurement problem, calling this model Critical Complexity Quantum Mechanics (CCQM). I compare CCQM with some other proposed solutions to the measurement problem, in particular, the spontaneous localization model of Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber. Finally, I argue that the measure of the complexity of quantum mechanical states introduced in CCQM also provides a new definition of entropy for quantum mechanics, and suggests an objective foundation for statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and the arrow of time.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Based on a number of experimentally verified physical observations, it is argued that the standard principles of quantum mechanics should be applied to the Universe as a whole. Thus, a paradigm is proposed in which the entire Universe is represented by a pure state wavefunction contained in a factorisable Hilbert space of enormous dimension, and where this statevector is developed by successive applications of operators that correspond to unitary rotations and Hermitian tests. Moreover, because by definition the Universe contains everything, it is argued that these operators must be chosen self-referentially; the overall dynamics of the system is envisaged to be analogous to a gigantic, self-governing, quantum computation. The issue of how the Universe could choose these operators without requiring or referring to a fictitious external observer is addressed. The processes by which conventional physics might be recovered from this fundamental, mathematical and global description of reality are particularly investigated. Specifically, it is demonstrated that by considering the changing properties, separabilities and factorisations of both the state and the operators as the Universe proceeds though a sequence of discrete computations, familiar notions such as classical distinguishability, particle physics, space, time, special relativity and endo-physical experiments can all begin to emerge from the proposed picture. A pregeometric vision of cosmology is therefore discussed, with all of physics ultimately arising from the relationships occurring between the elements of the underlying mathematical structure.
The argument of this article is threefold. First, the article argues that from its rise in the sixteenth century to our own time, the advancement of modern physics as mathematical-experimental science has been defined by the invention of new mathematical structures. Second, the article argues that quantum theory, especially following quantum mechanics, gives this thesis a radically new meaning by virtue of the following two features: on the one hand, quantum phenomena are defined as essentially different from those found in all previous physics by purely physical features; and on the other, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory are defined by purely mathematical postulates, which connect them to quantum phenomena strictly in terms of probabilities, without, as in all previous physics, representing or otherwise relating to how these phenomena physically come about. While these two features may appear discordant, if not inconsistent, I argue that they are in accord with each other, at least in certain interpretations (including the one adopted here), designated as “reality without realism”, RWR, interpretations. This argument also allows this article to offer a new perspective on a thorny problem of the relationships between continuity and discontinuity in quantum physics. In particular, rather than being concerned only with the discreteness and continuity of quantum objects or phenomena, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory relate their continuous mathematics to the irreducibly discrete quantum phenomena in terms of probabilistic predictions while, at least in RWR interpretations, precluding a representation or even conception of how these phenomena come about. This subject is rarely, if ever, discussed apart from previous work by the present author. It is, however, given a new dimension in this article which introduces, as one of its main contributions, a new principle: the mathematical complexity principle.
Scope of this book Quantum mechanics is a difficult subject, and this book is intended to help the reader overcome the main difficulties in the way to understanding it. The first part of the book, Chs. 2–16, contains a systematic presentation of the basic principles of quantum theory, along with a number of examples which illustrate how these principles apply to particular quantum systems. The applications are, for the most part, limited to toy models whose simple structure allows one to see what is going on without using complicated mathematics or lengthy formulas. The principles themselves, however, are formulated in such a way that they can be applied to (almost) any nonrelativistic quantum system. In the second part of the book, Chs. 17–25, these principles are applied to quantum measurements and various quantum paradoxes, subjects which give rise to serious conceptual problems when they are not treated in a fully consistent manner. The final chapters are of a somewhat different character. Chapter 26 on decoherence and the classical limit of quantum theory is a very sketchy introduction to these important topics along with some indication as to how the basic principles presented in the first part of the book can be used for understanding them. Chapter 27 on quantum theory and reality belongs to the interface between physics and philosophy and indicates why quantum theory is compatible with a real world whose existence is not dependent on what scientists think and believe, or the experiments they choose to carry out. The Bibliography contains references for those interested in further reading or in tracing the origin of some of the ideas presented in earlier chapters.
The argument of this article is threefold. First, the article argues that, from its rise in the sixteenth century to our own time, the advancement of modern physics, as mathematical-experimental science, has been defined by the invention of new mathematical structures. Secondly, the article argues that quantum theory, specifically with quantum mechanics, gave this thesis a radically new meaning by virtue of the following two features: one the one hand, quantum phenomena themselves are defined by purely physical features, as essentially different from all previous physics; and on the other, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory are defined by purely mathematical postulates, which connect them to quantum phenomena strictly in terms of probabilities, without representing or otherwise relating to how these phenomena physically come about. While these two features may appear discordant, if not inconsistent, I argue that they are in accord with each other, at least in certain interpretations (including the one adopted here), designated as “reality without realism,” RWR, interpretations. This argument allows this article to offer a new perspective on a thorny problem of the relationships between continuity and discontinuity in quantum physics. In particular, rather than being concern only with the discreteness and continuity of quantum objects or phenomena, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory relate their continuous mathematics to the irreducibly discrete quantum phenomena, in terms of probabilistic predictions, while, at least in RWR interpretations, precluding a representation or even conception of how these phenomena come about. This subject is rarely, if ever discussed, apart from previous work by the present author. It will, however, be given a new dimension in this article which introduces, as one of its main contributions, a new principle: the mathematical complexity principle.