Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Some Remarks on Wave Function Monism

Valia Allori

Published Oct 1, 2010• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

Is wave function monism, the view that the wave function completely \ndescribes physical objects, a sensible view? GRW, one candidate \nto solve the measurement problem, might be taken to be an \nexample of such view. I argue in this paper that it not so obviously \nso. I first show that a bare version of wave function monism is impossible, \nand even if one can construct monistic theories with additional \nrules (but no additional ontologies), they are not to be taken seriously. \nInstead, a preferable choice is that of a quantum theory in which physical \nobjects are represented by entities in three–dimensional space or \nin four-dimensional space-time.

Related papers

On the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics

Valia Allori

What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.

•Jan 1, 2013•38 citations

On Wave Function Monism in Spontaneous Collapse Theories

Valia Allori

Introduction orthodox quantum mechanics = only Schroedinger wave function wave function monism ?NO: the measurement problem.Bell's alternatives either the wave function is complete or it evolves differently BM GRW

•Mar 31, 2010•0 citations

Dimensions

Peter J. Lewis

Abstract The three major interpretations of quantum mechanics—Bohm, GRW, and many worlds—all treat the wave function as a physical entity. But this entity apparently resides in a high-dimensional configuration space, with three coordinates for each particle in the universe. Some conclude on this basis that the three-dimensionality of the world of experience is an illusion. Others respond by adding three-dimensional ontology to the theory or by reinterpreting the wave function either as a law or as an indirect representation of properties in three-dimensional space. It is argued that the latter possibility makes it unnecessary to postulate either additional ontology or a fundamentally high-dimensional world.

•Aug 18, 2016•0 citations

Representation of the wave function on the three-dimensional space

Ovidiu Cristinel Stoica

One of the major concerns of Schr\"odinger, Lorentz, Einstein, and many others about the wave function is that it is defined on the $3\mathbf{N}$-dimensional configuration space, rather than on the three-dimensional (3D) physical space. This gives the impression that quantum mechanics cannot have a $3\mathrm{D}$ space or space-time ontology, even in the absence of quantum measurements. In particular, this seems to affect interpretations which take the wave function as a physical entity, in particular, the many-worlds and the spontaneous collapse interpretations, and some versions of the pilot wave theory. Here, a representation of the many-particle states is given, as multilayered fields defined on the three-dimensional physical space. This representation is equivalent to the usual representation on the configuration space, but it makes it explicit that it is possible to interpret the wave functions as defined on the physical space. As long as only unitary evolution is involved, the interactions are local. I intended this representation to capture and formalize the nonexplicit and informal intuition of many working quantum physicists, who, by considering the wave function sometimes to be defined on the configuration space and sometimes on the physical space, may seem to researchers in the foundations of quantum theory as adopting an inconsistent view about its ontology. This representation does not aim to solve the measurement problem, and it allows for Schr\"odinger cats just like the usual one. But, it may help various interpretations to solve these problems, through inclusion of the wave function as (part of) their primitive ontology. In appendices, it is shown how the multilayered field representation can be extended to quantum field theory.

arXiv:1906.12229•Physical Review A•Oct 21, 2019•10 citations

Quantum Mechanics and the Consciousness Constraint

Philip Goff

Abstract This chapter argues that wave function monism – a popular theory of the ontology of quantum mechanics – cannot be true, on the grounds that its truth is inconsistent with the reality of consciousness. According to wave function monism, fundamental physical reality consists of a complex-valued field in a high-dimensional space. Building on a specific analysis of the grounding relationship, this chapter bolsters the challenge faced by wave function monism in accounting for ordinary physical objects, before arguing that its failure to account for ordinary physical objects entails a failure to account for consciousness. The argument does not assume either a materialist or an anti-materialist view of consciousness.

•Jul 18, 2022•16 citations

Varieties of Wave Function Realism, or, WTF is WFR?

Myrvold, Wayne C.

The phrase “Wave Function Realism” (WFR) has come to be used for a family of views according to which quantum theory motivates us to think that quantum wave functions are fields on a space of extremely high dimension, which is in some sense more fundamental that ordinary three-dimensional space or four-dimensional spacetime. With an aim at gaining clarity about the nature of the project, I distinguish between varieties of Wave Function Realism that one might hold. I focus on two axes of distinction. One has to do with the nature of the project. Is it an Interpretive project, one of accepting standard quantum theory pretty much as we have it, and exploring its implications for ontology? Or is it a Constructive project, which finds standard quantum theory wanting in crucial aspects, and seeks to construct a new theory that will satisfy some set of metaphysical constraints? The other has to do with how radical the claims are that are made about the nature of spacetime. Does the fundamental space on which the wave functions of WFR are defined have intrinsic structure corresponding to the low-dimensional spacetime structure? I call versions of WFR on which this is so “Mild” versions, as on such a view any sense in which the low-dimensional spatial structure is non-fundamental would be at best a highly attenuated one. A more radical view, which I call “Spicy,” has it that the fundamental space has no intrinsic structure corresponding to our low dimension spacetime, and that such structure is emergent from the structure and evolution of certain sort of wave functions. Judging from what they say about the view, it seems that proponents of WFR intend it to be Interpretive and Spicy. I will argue that there can be no such position. Standard quantum mechanics makes such heavy use of low-dimensional spacetime structure that an Interpretive version of WFR must be Extremely Mild. A Spicy but Constructive version has yet to be formulated.

•Apr 1, 2025•0 citations
Is wave function monism, the view that the wave function completely \ndescribes physical objects, a sensible view? GRW, one candidate \nto solve the measurement problem, might be taken to be an \nexample of such view. I argue in this paper that it not so obviously \nso. I first show that a bare version of wave function monism is impossible, \nand even if one can construct monistic theories with additional \nrules (but no additional ontologies), they are not to be taken seriously. \nInstead, a preferable choice is that of a quantum theory in which physical \nobjects are represented by entities in three–dimensional space or \nin four-dimensional space-time.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
Abstract The three major interpretations of quantum mechanics—Bohm, GRW, and many worlds—all treat the wave function as a physical entity. But this entity apparently resides in a high-dimensional configuration space, with three coordinates for each particle in the universe. Some conclude on this basis that the three-dimensionality of the world of experience is an illusion. Others respond by adding three-dimensional ontology to the theory or by reinterpreting the wave function either as a law or as an indirect representation of properties in three-dimensional space. It is argued that the latter possibility makes it unnecessary to postulate either additional ontology or a fundamentally high-dimensional world.
One of the major concerns of Schr\"odinger, Lorentz, Einstein, and many others about the wave function is that it is defined on the 3N3\mathbf{N}3N-dimensional configuration space, rather than on the three-dimensional (3D) physical space. This gives the impression that quantum mechanics cannot have a 3D3\mathrm{D}3D space or space-time ontology, even in the absence of quantum measurements. In particular, this seems to affect interpretations which take the wave function as a physical entity, in particular, the many-worlds and the spontaneous collapse interpretations, and some versions of the pilot wave theory. Here, a representation of the many-particle states is given, as multilayered fields defined on the three-dimensional physical space. This representation is equivalent to the usual representation on the configuration space, but it makes it explicit that it is possible to interpret the wave functions as defined on the physical space. As long as only unitary evolution is involved, the interactions are local. I intended this representation to capture and formalize the nonexplicit and informal intuition of many working quantum physicists, who, by considering the wave function sometimes to be defined on the configuration space and sometimes on the physical space, may seem to researchers in the foundations of quantum theory as adopting an inconsistent view about its ontology. This representation does not aim to solve the measurement problem, and it allows for Schr\"odinger cats just like the usual one. But, it may help various interpretations to solve these problems, through inclusion of the wave function as (part of) their primitive ontology. In appendices, it is shown how the multilayered field representation can be extended to quantum field theory.
Abstract This chapter argues that wave function monism – a popular theory of the ontology of quantum mechanics – cannot be true, on the grounds that its truth is inconsistent with the reality of consciousness. According to wave function monism, fundamental physical reality consists of a complex-valued field in a high-dimensional space. Building on a specific analysis of the grounding relationship, this chapter bolsters the challenge faced by wave function monism in accounting for ordinary physical objects, before arguing that its failure to account for ordinary physical objects entails a failure to account for consciousness. The argument does not assume either a materialist or an anti-materialist view of consciousness.
The phrase “Wave Function Realism” (WFR) has come to be used for a family of views according to which quantum theory motivates us to think that quantum wave functions are fields on a space of extremely high dimension, which is in some sense more fundamental that ordinary three-dimensional space or four-dimensional spacetime. With an aim at gaining clarity about the nature of the project, I distinguish between varieties of Wave Function Realism that one might hold. I focus on two axes of distinction. One has to do with the nature of the project. Is it an Interpretive project, one of accepting standard quantum theory pretty much as we have it, and exploring its implications for ontology? Or is it a Constructive project, which finds standard quantum theory wanting in crucial aspects, and seeks to construct a new theory that will satisfy some set of metaphysical constraints? The other has to do with how radical the claims are that are made about the nature of spacetime. Does the fundamental space on which the wave functions of WFR are defined have intrinsic structure corresponding to the low-dimensional spacetime structure? I call versions of WFR on which this is so “Mild” versions, as on such a view any sense in which the low-dimensional spatial structure is non-fundamental would be at best a highly attenuated one. A more radical view, which I call “Spicy,” has it that the fundamental space has no intrinsic structure corresponding to our low dimension spacetime, and that such structure is emergent from the structure and evolution of certain sort of wave functions. Judging from what they say about the view, it seems that proponents of WFR intend it to be Interpretive and Spicy. I will argue that there can be no such position. Standard quantum mechanics makes such heavy use of low-dimensional spacetime structure that an Interpretive version of WFR must be Extremely Mild. A Spicy but Constructive version has yet to be formulated.