Introduction orthodox quantum mechanics = only Schroedinger wave function wave function monism ?NO: the measurement problem.Bell's alternatives either the wave function is complete or it evolves differently BM GRW
Is wave function monism, the view that the wave function completely \ndescribes physical objects, a sensible view? GRW, one candidate \nto solve the measurement problem, might be taken to be an \nexample of such view. I argue in this paper that it not so obviously \nso. I first show that a bare version of wave function monism is impossible, \nand even if one can construct monistic theories with additional \nrules (but no additional ontologies), they are not to be taken seriously. \nInstead, a preferable choice is that of a quantum theory in which physical \nobjects are represented by entities in three–dimensional space or \nin four-dimensional space-time.
This is the first single volume about the collapse theories of quantum mechanics, which is becoming a very active field of research in both physics and philosophy. In standard quantum mechanics, it is postulated that when the wave function of a quantum system is measured, it no longer follows the Schrödinger equation, but instantaneously and randomly collapses to one of the wave functions that correspond to definite measurement results. However, why and how a definite measurement result appears is unknown. A promising solution to this problem are collapse theories in which the collapse of the wave function is spontaneous and dynamical. Chapters written by distinguished physicists and philosophers of physics discuss the origin and implications of wave-function collapse, the controversies around collapse models and their ontologies, and new arguments for the reality of wave function collapse. This is an invaluable resource for students and researchers interested in the philosophy of physics and foundations of quantum mechanics.
One way of obtaining a version of quantum mechanics without observers, and thus of solving the paradoxes of quantum mechanics, is to modify the Schrödinger evolution by implementing spontaneous collapses of the wave function. An explicit model of this kind was proposed in 1986 by Ghirardi, Rimini & Weber (GRW), involving a nonlinear, stochastic evolution of the wave function. We point out how, by focusing on the essential mathematical structure of the GRW model and a clear ontology, it can be generalized to (regularized) quantum field theories in a simple and natural way.
Quantum physics confronts contemporary metaphysicians with a fascinating and frustrating puzzle. It appears to be telling us something novel and surprising about the nature of the physical world, but it is hard to pin down exactly what it tells us. Hidden variable theories constitute a second major class of solutions to the measurement problem. They differ from the standard theory and spontaneous collapse theories in eschewing collapse altogether; according to hidden variable theories, the wavefunction always evolves according to the Schrodinger equation. The simplest and most radical response to the measurement problem is to assert that standard quantum mechanics without wavefunction collapse constitutes a complete physical theory. The many worlds theory is more flexible in this regard; according to the standard contemporary version, no presupposition is made concerning precisely which physical properties form the basis of measurement results. There are several approaches to quantum mechanics, any or none of which might yield an acceptable physical theory.
Introduction It is not exaggeration to claim that one of the major divides in the foundations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics derives from the way physicists and philosophers understand the status of the wave function. On the instrumentalist side of the camp, the wave function is regarded as a mere instrument to calculate probabilities that have been established by previous measurement outcomes. On the other “realistic” camp, the wave function is regarded as a new physical entity or a physical field of some sort. While both sides agree about the existence of quantum “particles” (the so-called theoretical entities), and therefore reject the radical agnosticism about them preached by van Fraassen (1980), the various “realistic” (and consequently, instrumentalist) philosophies of quantum mechanics are typically formulated in different, logically independent ways, so their implications need to be further investigated. For instance, on the one hand it seems plausible to claim that a realistic stance about the wave function is not the only way to defend “realism” about quantum theory. One can support a “flash” or a “density-of-stuff ” ontology (two variants of GRW), or an ontology of particles with well-defined positions (as in Bohmian mechanics), as primitive ontologies for observer-independent formulations of quantum mechanics (Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka and Zanghí, 2008). “Primitive ontologies”, as here are understood, are not only a fundamental ground for other ontological posits, but also entail a commitment to something concretely existing in spacetime (see also Allori, 2013). On the other hand, however, it is still debated whether such primitive ontologies can be autonomous from some form of realism about the wave function (Albert, 1996). In order to discuss this problem, we begin with a preliminary clarification of the meaning of “realism” and “instrumentalism” in physics, which are often subject to ideological and abstract discussions that often have little to do with the practice of physics (Section 9.2).
Among several possibilities for what reality could be like in view of the empirical facts of quantum mechanics, one is provided by theories of spontaneous wave function collapse, the best known of which is the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory. We show mathematically that in GRW theory (and similar theories) there are limitations to knowledge, that is, inhabitants of a GRW universe cannot find out all the facts true of their universe. As a specific example, they cannot accurately measure the number of collapses that a given physical system undergoes during a given time interval; in fact, they cannot reliably measure whether one or zero collapses occur. Put differently, in a GRW universe certain meaningful, factual questions are empirically undecidable. We discuss several types of limitations to knowledge and compare them with those in other (no-collapse) versions of quantum mechanics, such as Bohmian mechanics. Most of our results also apply to observer-induced collapses as in orthodox quantum mechanics (as opposed to the spontaneous collapses of GRW theory). 1 Introduction 1.1 Known examples of limitations to knowledge 1.2 Remarks2 Brief Review of GRW Theories 2.1 The GRW process 2.2 GRWm 2.3 GRWf3 First Examples of Limitations to Knowledge in GRW Theories4 Measurements of Flashes in GRWf, or of Collapses in GRWm 4.1 An example in which ψ is known 4.2 Other choices of ψ 4.3 Experiments beginning before t 2 4.4 If ψ is random 4.5 Optimal way of distinguishing two density matrices 4.6 If ψ is unknown5 Measurements of m(x) in GRWmAppendix