Abstract This chapter argues that wave function monism – a popular theory of the ontology of quantum mechanics – cannot be true, on the grounds that its truth is inconsistent with the reality of consciousness. According to wave function monism, fundamental physical reality consists of a complex-valued field in a high-dimensional space. Building on a specific analysis of the grounding relationship, this chapter bolsters the challenge faced by wave function monism in accounting for ordinary physical objects, before arguing that its failure to account for ordinary physical objects entails a failure to account for consciousness. The argument does not assume either a materialist or an anti-materialist view of consciousness.
Abstract This chapter argues that wave function monism – a popular theory of the ontology of quantum mechanics – cannot be true, on the grounds that its truth is inconsistent with the reality of consciousness. According to wave function monism, fundamental physical reality consists of a complex-valued field in a high-dimensional space. Building on a specific analysis of the grounding relationship, this chapter bolsters the challenge faced by wave function monism in accounting for ordinary physical objects, before arguing that its failure to account for ordinary physical objects entails a failure to account for consciousness. The argument does not assume either a materialist or an anti-materialist view of consciousness.
Is wave function monism, the view that the wave function completely \ndescribes physical objects, a sensible view? GRW, one candidate \nto solve the measurement problem, might be taken to be an \nexample of such view. I argue in this paper that it not so obviously \nso. I first show that a bare version of wave function monism is impossible, \nand even if one can construct monistic theories with additional \nrules (but no additional ontologies), they are not to be taken seriously. \nInstead, a preferable choice is that of a quantum theory in which physical \nobjects are represented by entities in three–dimensional space or \nin four-dimensional space-time.
In the previous chapter, we referred to dual-aspect monism frames; we observe here that whether the psycho-physically neutral reality in such frames may refer to consciousness is an open question. By consciousness, however, we mean fundamental awareness, not functional consciousness, which is conventionally meant by materialistic or physicalist frames. We will turn to the issue of fundamental consciousness in the next two chapters. In this chapter, we explore possible links between consciousness (fundamental or not) and quantum mechanics (QM), and insights for quantum-like framework (QLF) or psycho-physical reality in general. Consciousness is, by far, the most enigmatic issue to conceptualise in modern science. The mainstream direction is materialism, where consciousness is an emergent phenomenon from matter, which has been given the name the hard problem. Emergence can be of different types, for example, weak and strong (goes by other names like epistemic and ontic or metaphysical, respectively). While in the case of weak emergence, in principle, higher-level descriptions of realities can be reduced to fundamental descriptions, in the strong emergence view, higher-level descriptions of realities have their own effective dynamical laws which are irreducible.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
This paper explores the intricate relationship between the observer, consciousness, and quantum mechanics, attempting to defend the interpretation of the wave function as a representation of consciousness. More precisely, in our framework, a quantum state, represented by a wave function, determines a state of consciousness related to the first-person experiences, w, of the events E, detected by senses. Building on Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, we argue that the wave function is not an objective universal entity, but rather one that is inherently associated with the first-person experiences w∈P of an observer O . The set P also includes other observers, O′, as subsets. We demonstrate that this proposal does not lead to solipsism, because there is no unique hierarchy of observers, as indicated above, but there are many possible hierarchies of observers, such that, e.g., the roles of the first-person observer, O, and the third-person observer, O′ are interchanged. The corresponding quantum states, ψO and ψO′, are elements of the space of all possible quantum states, the Hilbert space, H. It is this larger space that we identify as the objective reality. Thus, our approach overcomes the main obstacle faced by researchers who tried to make sense of quantum mechanics, namely, the wall of solipsism. In this framework, the Everett many-worlds interpretation and the wave function collapse interpretation are not mutually exclusive but instead represent complementary perspectives within the hierarchy of observers, each offering insight into the underlying physics from a different vantage point.
Physics Within Nondual Consciousness Amit Goswami Introduction A basic problem of philosophy is to establish monism underlying all the apparent dualisms that exist around and about us. Some of these dualisms are consciousness/matter transcendent/immanent conscious/unconscious subject/object life/nonlife mind/brain exteriority/inferiority subject/person The straightforward approach, of course, is to consider all these as real dualities—this is the philosophy of dualism. However, the philosophy of dualism is not considered tenable if we take a scientific, explanatory, and verifiable approach. Take the dualism of consciousness and matter, for example. If consciousness and matter are truly dualistic, that is, made of two entirely different substances, then how do they interact? Their interaction requires a mediator. The obvious absence of a mediator speaks in favor of a monism. According to many physicists, scientists, and philosophers, physics must be carried out on the basis of the philosophy of material or scientific realism—the philosophy that only matter is real; all else, including consciousness, is an epiphenomenon of matter. It is assumed that such an approach serves to establish monism, based on material supremacy, over dualism. But material monism is a pseudomonism. In truth, material-realistic models of consciousness are unable to explain the hard questions of consciousness such as the subject/object split nature of experience (Chalmers 1995). Similarly, there are holistic approaches within the basic materialist ontology (Capra 1996) that try to resolve the consciousness/matter and transcendent/immanent dualisms by regarding consciousness as a holistic aspect of matter (the whole is greater than the parts), but this completely ignores the transcendent aspect of consciousness (Wilber 1996). The philosopher Daniel Dennet (1991) agrees that materialist cognitive-science models of consciousness in the brain do succumb to an underlying dualism, the implicit idea that a homunculus is looking at the computer output that the brain [End Page 535] generates. Dennet's own answer is operationalism (also called logical positivism). Consciousness is a purely operational concept; there is no substance to it and no causal efficacy, and thus no explanation is needed for the hard questions of consciousness. Operationalism does not work because consciousness does have causal efficacy as exhibited in such phenomena as creativity, ethics, and spirituality. But how does one include a causally potent consciousness in material-realist science, in which there is only upward causation—cause rising upwards in the hierarchical structures of matter? Elementary particles and their interactions cause all phenomena of the atoms; atoms and their interactions cause all phenomena of the molecules; molecules and their interactions cause all phenomena of the neurons; neurons are responsible for all phenomena of the brain; and the brain is the causal basis for consciousness. The physicist Henry Stapp (1995) has shown that in classical physics there are only two ways that consciousness can be treated: epiphenomenalism and dualism. But quantum physics has opened a way to introduce a causally efficacious consciousness in physics, and thus in all science (Goswami 1993; Herbert 1993; Stapp 1993; Eccles 1994). In particular, I have shown (Goswami 1989, 1990, 1993) that if quantum physics is interpreted on the basis of the primacy of consciousness as according to the philosophy of monistic idealism, then all the well-known paradoxes of quantum physics can be resolved satisfactorily. Like material realism, the philosophy of monistic idealism is also very old. The oldest known version is probably the Indian Vedānta, but the esoteric traditions behind all great religions are based on this philosophy. In the Western academy, Plato is perhaps the most easily identified monistic idealist. In monistic idealism, consciousness is the ground of all being and is transcendent. What we see as the immanent reality lies transcendent within consciousness until consciousness creates it by a power that Easterners call maya and that Plato identified as projection. The transcendent and the immanent are complementary aspects of one and the same thing; nama (name) and rupa (form) in Vedānta, yang and yin in Taoism, heaven and earth in Christianity, and the archetypes and the shadow show in the allegory of Plato's cave (Plato 1980) are some examples of such complementary pairs. This pair, along with consciousness (which transcends them both), makes up the trinity...