Quantum mechanics, which has no completely accepted interpretation but many seemingly strange physical results, has been interpreted in a number of bizarre and fascinating way over the years. The two interpretations examined in this paper, Bohr and Ulfbeck's “Genuine Fortuitousness” and Stuckey, Silberstein, and Cifone's “Relational Blockworld” seem to be two such strange interpretations; Genuine Fortuitousness posits that causality is not fundamental to the universe, and Relational Blockworld suggests that time does not act as we perceive it to act. In this paper, I analyze these two interpretations of quantum mechanics, examining the predecessors whose works they drew from, both interpretations' physical and mathematical derivations, and their physical and philosophical consequences. After this intensive review of each interpretation, I determine that, despite the fact that Genuine Fortuitousness and Relational Blockworld make claims that run contrary to common sense, both interpretations are important and interesting ways of looking at the quantum world that may proffer solutions to some of the toughest problems plaguing physics today.
Quantum mechanics, which has no completely accepted interpretation but many seemingly strange physical results, has been interpreted in a number of bizarre and fascinating way over the years. The two interpretations examined in this paper, Bohr and Ulfbeck's “Genuine Fortuitousness” and Stuckey, Silberstein, and Cifone's “Relational Blockworld” seem to be two such strange interpretations; Genuine Fortuitousness posits that causality is not fundamental to the universe, and Relational Blockworld suggests that time does not act as we perceive it to act. In this paper, I analyze these two interpretations of quantum mechanics, examining the predecessors whose works they drew from, both interpretations' physical and mathematical derivations, and their physical and philosophical consequences. After this intensive review of each interpretation, I determine that, despite the fact that Genuine Fortuitousness and Relational Blockworld make claims that run contrary to common sense, both interpretations are important and interesting ways of looking at the quantum world that may proffer solutions to some of the toughest problems plaguing physics today.
We present a perspective that can resolve most of the tensions between non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM) and special relativity while deflating "quantum mysteries." All of this is achieved using spacetime symmetries as fundamental in a blockworld setting, i.e., by interpreting spacetime relations as fundamental to relata. To justify this "Relational Blockworld" (RBW), we adopt a result due to G. Kaiser whereby the relativity of simultaneity, stemming from the Poincare algebra, is responsible for the canonical commutation relations of QM. And, we incorporate a result due to A. Bohr, B. Mottelson and O. Ulfbeck whereby the density matrix for a given experimental situation is obtained from its spacetime symmetry group. We provide an example to illustrate the explanatory nature of RBW and conclude by showing how RBW deflates "quantum mysteries" on geometric grounds.
We present a spacetime setting for non-relativistic quantum mechanics that deflates "quantum mysteries" and relates non-relativistic quantum mechanics to special relativity. This is achieved by assuming spacetime symmetries are fundamental in a blockworld setting, i.e., by interpreting spacetime relations as fundamental to relata. To justify this Relational Blockworld (RBW), we adopt a result due to G. Kaiser whereby the relativity of simultaneity, stemming from the Poincare algebra of special relativity, is responsible for the canonical commutation relations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. And, we incorporate a result due to A. Bohr, B. Mottelson and O. Ulfbeck whereby the density matrix for a given experimental situation is obtained from its spacetime symmetry group. We provide an example to illustrate the explanatory nature of RBW and conclude by explaining how RBW deflates "quantum mysteries."
This article offers a critical analysis of Carlo Rovelli’s conceptual positions in works devoted to interpretations of quantum mechanics and the notion of time. Attention is paid to the relational interpretation developed by the author in “Helgoland: Making Sense of the Quantum Revolution” and to its philosophical foundations, which go back to the ideas of Ernst Mach and Nagarjuna. The article examines key elements of the quantum-mechanical formalism, including the superposition principle, interference effects, and commutation relations, with emphasis on their interpretive consequences. The article also analyzes Rovelli’s critical remarks on alternative approaches, such as Hugh Everett III’s many-worlds interpretation, hidden-variable theories associated with the works of Louis de Broglie and David Bohm, as well as models that propose a physical explanation of wave-function collapse. It is shown that some of the author’s arguments are limited in scope and do not consider contemporary experimental results, in particular studies that cast doubt on the epistemological interpretation of the wave function. Special attention is given to internal contradictions in Rovelli’s relational approach, including the problem of the ontological status of objects and the reconciliation of the principle of relationality with the existence of invariant physical quantities. The interpretation of time given by Rovelli in works such as The Order of Time and A Brief History of Time is also examined. The limitations of his ontological approach to time within loop quantum gravity are emphasized.
The main thread of chapter 4 introduces some of the major mysteries and interpretational issues of quantum mechanics (QM). These mysteries and issues include: quantum superposition, quantum nonlocality, Bell’s inequality, entanglement, delayed choice, the measurement problem, and the lack of counterfactual definiteness. All these mysteries and interpretational issues of QM result from dynamical explanation in the mechanical universe and are dispatched using the authors’ adynamical explanation in the block universe, called Relational Blockworld (RBW). A possible link between RBW and quantum information theory is provided. The metaphysical underpinnings of RBW, such as contextual emergence, spatiotemporal ontological contextuality, and adynamical global constraints, are provided in Philosophy of Physics for Chapter 4. That is also where RBW is situated with respect to retrocausal accounts and it is shown that RBW is a realist, psi-epistemic account of QM. All the relevant formalism for this chapter is provided in Foundational Physics for Chapter 4.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.
In 2005, an essay was published in Nature asserting that the universe is mental and that we must abandon our tendency to conceptualize observations as things. Since then, experiments have confirmed that — as predicted by quantum mechanics — reality is contextual, which contradicts at least intuitive formulations of realism and corroborates the hypothesis of a mental universe. Yet, to give this hypothesis a coherent rendering, one must explain how a mental universe can — at least in principle — accommodate (a) our experience of ourselves as distinct individual minds sharing a world beyond the control of our volition; and (b) the empirical fact that this world is contextual despite being seemingly shared. By combining a modern formulation of the ontology of idealism with the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, the present paper attempts to provide a viable explanatory framework for both points. In the process of doing so, the paper also addresses key philosophical qualms of the relational interpretation.