My topics are two theses about quantum mechanics that are widely doubted but curiously tempting: value-definiteness and contextualism. Value-definiteness holds that every observable has a definite value; contextualism follows from value-definiteness, and claims that one Hermitian operator can represent many observables. In fact, contextualism is my deeper interest Although it is not a view with an army of defenders, it has a long history of discussion in the literature. (See, for example, Belinfante 1973, van Fraassen 1973, Shimony 1984, Redhead 1987). The bulk of this paper will be concerned with a puzzle about degenerate operators that arises out of the standard accounts of contextualism. But before we get to the details, let us begin with a lurid example.
My topics are two theses about quantum mechanics that are widely doubted but curiously tempting: value-definiteness and contextualism. Value-definiteness holds that every observable has a definite value; contextualism follows from value-definiteness, and claims that one Hermitian operator can represent many observables. In fact, contextualism is my deeper interest Although it is not a view with an army of defenders, it has a long history of discussion in the literature. (See, for example, Belinfante 1973, van Fraassen 1973, Shimony 1984, Redhead 1987). The bulk of this paper will be concerned with a puzzle about degenerate operators that arises out of the standard accounts of contextualism. But before we get to the details, let us begin with a lurid example.
I propose now to examine Bohr's informal theory of measurement from a somewhat more formal point of view, and to consider how his theory relates to the orthodox theory of measurement in quantum mechanics. This is a difficult task, since Bohr nowhere discusses the theory of measurement in formal terms. My discussion, therefore, will be less closely tied to Bohr's own statements. I shall also consider some important objections to the theory. The objective-values theory of measurement Before we look into this theory, it will be useful to have a brief sketch of some of the relevant formal elements of quantum mechanics. In the Hilbert space formulation of quantum mechanics the measurable physical properties (‘observables’) of an object are represented by linear Hermitian operators A , B , … which have complete orthonormal sets of eigenvalues a n , b n , … corresponding to the subspaces (closed linear manifolds) of a Hilbert space H . These operators are in one-to-one correspondence with the projection measures P A , P B , … on the Hilbert space such that P A = Σ n a n P n , where P n are the projections of the eigenvectors ψ n belonging to the eigenvalues a n of A , and a n are discrete, non-degenerate values (for simplicity I shall deal only with operators which have such values, and shall denote observables and the corresponding operators by the same symbols).
The newly revised edition of this well-known book categorizes prevalent views on measurement as described by quantum mechanics, discusses basics agreed to by many who on other issues disagree, and describes some of the problems. Although many paragraphs rest unchanged from the first (1991) edition, results found since 1991 are used to reorganize and sharpen the focus of the book, so that even the old paragraphs are now understood differently and more clearly. One advance in the second edition is a new and more general no-go theorem; another is separation of formal derivations from interpretation. The dozen or so definitions essential to following the book even casually are stated clearly. By this means the authors succeed pretty well in achieving their stated desire to make the book comprehensible to those who do not share their philosophic predispositions. While I differ in philosophy from the authors, attending to their discussion uncovered weaknesses in my own thinking and improved it. The mathematical language of quantum mechanics expresses a system under measurement by states (as rays in a Hilbert space) and a hamiltonian operator, distinct from the apparatus that produces outcomes, which is expressed by a positive operator-valued (POV) measure. In this way quantum language separates state preparation from state measurement. Often the Hilbert space is viewed as a tensor product of subspaces, allowing further conceptual separations. The authors take the stance that quantum mechanics calls for splitting the empirical world into parts, the most essential being (1) objective systems S (to be observed) and (2) apparatus A (preparation and registration devices that produces outcomes (or, as the authors write, definite pointer values) of the observed system). In some interpretations, one or both of an observer and an environment appear as additional parts. What is to be included in the system S versus the apparatus A is not specified by the language, but is open to the theoretician; a probe, for example, can be analysed as either part of the apparatus or as part of the system, as was discussed by von Neumann in work cited by the authors. With what should a theory of measurement be concerned? A broad division of approaches is defined by how one answers the question: should one try to do away with the cut between measuring apparatus and system? The authors phrase this as a choice of REFERENT, a term which in my mind puts them on shaky semantic ground; anyway The Quantum Theory of Measurement is concerned with implications of the `yes'. The book unfolds with the power of a tragedy, in which the logical consequences lead, step-by-step, to the statement and proof of theorem 6.2.1, which, roughly speaking, asserts the non-existence of a solution to the problem of getting definite pointer values from measuring apparatus that exhibits the superposition demanded by its description as a quantum system. Possible responses to this theorem are discussed, among them the many-worlds interpretation and a modification of quantum mechanics that elevates decoherence to a principle. Citations of the literature are thorough, and many points of view are crisply summarized. The book is indispensable to both those who work in the broad direction chosen by the authors and to those who wish to set any other direction in context.
There is no such thing as “The Quantum Logical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”. Rather, there is a cluster of interpretations, all of which can be described as “quantum logical”. Here I provide a general framework for discussing interpretations of this kind, and then locate various suggestions within it. The presentation owes much to van Fraassen (see, in particular, van Fraassen 1974 ); his “modal interpretation” is one of those I discuss, along with those of Jauch, Putnam and Kochen. I begin by rehearsing some orthodox quantum theory. Within quantum mechanics we deal with a set 0 of measurable quantities, orobservables(position, momentum, components of spin and so on). Experiment can determine the value of an observable for a given system: the values so determined will be real numbers. A maximal amount of information about what the result would be for a given system, whatever experiment we chose to perform on it, is available once we know thestateof the system.
Consider the general form of the state of a quantum system, (eq. 1), where the are (non-degenerate) eigenvectors of an operator, A, corresponding to an observable, A. According to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (the precise details of which do not concern me here), A does not have a definite value on the system in the state . But now suppose we measure A by coupling the system to a measuring apparatus. The composite system is then (eq. 2) where the are the indicator-states of the apparatus. Again, the standard interpretation tells us that the apparatus is not in a definite indicator-state. But how can this be? Measurements do have definite results. The apparatus is always in a definite state. I have just reviewed one version of the measurement problem. The modal interpretation of quantum mechanics proposes a solution.
The semantics underlying the propositional structure of Hilbert space quantum mechanics involves an inherent ambiguity concerning the impossibility of assigning definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. Although the preceding Kochen-Specker result forbids a global, absolute assignment of truth values to quantum mechanical propositions, it does not exclude ones that are contextual. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton “uniqueness theorem” is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a suitable “preferred” observable. It is suggested that the most natural choice of the latter, especially for confronting the problem of truth valuation in quantum mechanics, results in the determinateness of the observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The resulting account of truth is compatible with a realist conception of truth. Such an account essentially denies that there can be a universal context of reference or an Archimedean standpoint from which to evaluate logically the totality of facts of nature.