Philosophy of Science

Quantum Logic, Realism, and Value Definiteness

Allen Stairs

Published Dec 1, 1983• 109 citations

Abstract

One of the most interesting programs in the foundations of quantum mechanics is therealist quantum logicapproach associated with Putnam, Bub, Demopoulos and Friedman (and which is the focus of my own research.) I believe that realist quantum logic is our best hope for making sense of quantum mechanics, but I have come to suspect that the usual version may not be the correct one. In this paper, I would like to say why and to propose an alternative.

DOI: 10.1086/289140

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