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Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science

Analysis of the Quantum Mechanical Measurement Process

Eugene Paul Wigner, Mutsuo M. Yanase

Published Jan 1, 1973• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The quantum mechanical measurement process is analysed in detail, especially from the group theoretical point of view. The first three chapters review the results obtained before briefly. In §1, the classical theory of measurement, originated by von Neumann, is birefly described. The importance of considering more general schemes of measurements than the original one is, however, emphasized. In §2, the role of conservation laws, in imposing limitations on the possibility of measurements, is discussed. Accurately measurable quantities are defined in this context. In §3, the role of conservation laws is further analysed. It is shown that the conserved quantity of the apparatus cannot be used for a “pointer reading.” The following two chapters discuss the nature of the exactly measurable quantities. In §4, exactly measurable quantities are explicitly determined. It is shown that the measurement of projection operators in the Hilbert space of the object which commute with the operators of the restricted Poincaré group give all the information on the states of the object that can be obtained by accurate measurements. In §5, the measurement on objects which are composed of more than one particle is discussed. The last chapter, §6, deals with approximately measurable quantities, but no complete estimate of the unavoidable inaccuracy of the measurement of these is obtained. It also contains some concluding remarks.

DOI
10.4288/jafpos1956.4.171

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The quantum mechanical measurement process is analysed in detail, especially from the group theoretical point of view. The first three chapters review the results obtained before briefly. In §1, the classical theory of measurement, originated by von Neumann, is birefly described. The importance of considering more general schemes of measurements than the original one is, however, emphasized. In §2, the role of conservation laws, in imposing limitations on the possibility of measurements, is discussed. Accurately measurable quantities are defined in this context. In §3, the role of conservation laws is further analysed. It is shown that the conserved quantity of the apparatus cannot be used for a “pointer reading.” The following two chapters discuss the nature of the exactly measurable quantities. In §4, exactly measurable quantities are explicitly determined. It is shown that the measurement of projection operators in the Hilbert space of the object which commute with the operators of the restricted Poincaré group give all the information on the states of the object that can be obtained by accurate measurements. In §5, the measurement on objects which are composed of more than one particle is discussed. The last chapter, §6, deals with approximately measurable quantities, but no complete estimate of the unavoidable inaccuracy of the measurement of these is obtained. It also contains some concluding remarks.
We use the term ‘measurement’ to refer to the interaction between an object and an apparatus on the basis of which information concerning the initial state of the object may be obtained from information on the resulting state of the apparatus. The quantum theory of measurement is a quantum theoretic investigation of such interactions in order to analyse the correlations between object and apparatus that measurement must establish. Although there is a sizeable literature on quantum measurements there appear to be just two sorts of interactions that have been employed. There are the ‘disturbing’ interactions consistent with the analysis of Landau and Peierls (8) as developed by Pauli (11) and by Landau and Lifshitz (7), and there are the ‘non-disturbing’ interactions explicitly set out by von Neumann ((10), chs. 5, 6), and that dominate the literature. In this paper we shall investigate the most general types of interactions that could possibly constitute measurements and provide a precise mathematical characterization (section 2). We shall then examine an interesting subclass, corresponding to Landau's ideas, that contains both of the above sorts of measurements (section 3). Finally, we shall discuss von Neumann measurements explicitly and explore the purported limitations suggested by Wigner(12) and Araki and Yanase (2). We hope, in this way, to provide a comprehensive basis for discussions of quantum measurements.
The newly revised edition of this well-known book categorizes prevalent views on measurement as described by quantum mechanics, discusses basics agreed to by many who on other issues disagree, and describes some of the problems. Although many paragraphs rest unchanged from the first (1991) edition, results found since 1991 are used to reorganize and sharpen the focus of the book, so that even the old paragraphs are now understood differently and more clearly. One advance in the second edition is a new and more general no-go theorem; another is separation of formal derivations from interpretation. The dozen or so definitions essential to following the book even casually are stated clearly. By this means the authors succeed pretty well in achieving their stated desire to make the book comprehensible to those who do not share their philosophic predispositions. While I differ in philosophy from the authors, attending to their discussion uncovered weaknesses in my own thinking and improved it. The mathematical language of quantum mechanics expresses a system under measurement by states (as rays in a Hilbert space) and a hamiltonian operator, distinct from the apparatus that produces outcomes, which is expressed by a positive operator-valued (POV) measure. In this way quantum language separates state preparation from state measurement. Often the Hilbert space is viewed as a tensor product of subspaces, allowing further conceptual separations. The authors take the stance that quantum mechanics calls for splitting the empirical world into parts, the most essential being (1) objective systems S (to be observed) and (2) apparatus A (preparation and registration devices that produces outcomes (or, as the authors write, definite pointer values) of the observed system). In some interpretations, one or both of an observer and an environment appear as additional parts. What is to be included in the system S versus the apparatus A is not specified by the language, but is open to the theoretician; a probe, for example, can be analysed as either part of the apparatus or as part of the system, as was discussed by von Neumann in work cited by the authors. With what should a theory of measurement be concerned? A broad division of approaches is defined by how one answers the question: should one try to do away with the cut between measuring apparatus and system? The authors phrase this as a choice of REFERENT, a term which in my mind puts them on shaky semantic ground; anyway The Quantum Theory of Measurement is concerned with implications of the `yes'. The book unfolds with the power of a tragedy, in which the logical consequences lead, step-by-step, to the statement and proof of theorem 6.2.1, which, roughly speaking, asserts the non-existence of a solution to the problem of getting definite pointer values from measuring apparatus that exhibits the superposition demanded by its description as a quantum system. Possible responses to this theorem are discussed, among them the many-worlds interpretation and a modification of quantum mechanics that elevates decoherence to a principle. Citations of the literature are thorough, and many points of view are crisply summarized. The book is indispensable to both those who work in the broad direction chosen by the authors and to those who wish to set any other direction in context.
A new classification of quantum mechanical quantities according to their measurability is discussed. We have three different types of quantities: first, exactly measurable quantities which commute with all the conserved quantities; second, approximately measurable quantities which do not commute with all additive conserved quantities; and finally nonmeasurable quantities which are conjugate to the absolute invariants. The epistemological implications of the measurement process are discussed and it is pointed out that the quantum mechanical description of this process does not furnish an adequate explanation of the acquisition of knowledge.
This is the first of two papers showing that the quantum problem of measurement remains unsolved even when the initial state of the apparatus is described by a statistical operator and when the results of measurement have a small probability of being erroneous. A realistic treatment of the measurement of observables of microscopic objects (e.g., the position or the spin of an electron) by means of observables of macroscopic apparatus (e.g., the position of a spot on a photographic plate) requires the consideration of errors. The first paper considers measurement procedures of the following type: An initial eigenstate of the object observable leads to a final statistical operator of the object plus apparatus which describes a mixture of “approximate” eigenstates of the apparatus observable. It is proved that each of a large class of initial states leads to a final statistical operator which does not describe any mixture containing even one “approximate” eigenstate of the apparatus observable. INTRODUCTION Several writers have tried to solve the quantum-mechanical problem of measurement through one or both of the following proposals: (a) describthe initial state of the measuring apparatus by a projection onto a subspace of the associated Hilbert space or by a statistical operator, thus taking into account the practical impossibility of knowing the exact quantum state of a macroscopic object; (b) recognizing that there may be some physical inaccuracy, such as a small error in the position of a pointer needle, in the final registration of the outcome of the measurement by the apparatus.
The concept of measurement plays both a central and a problematic role in quantum mechanics. First of all, and unusually, the word ‘measurement’ figures in the fundamental axioms of quantum mechanics - in principle (3) of Chapter 2 for example - and in this quantum physics is quite unlike classical physics as a whole. For though a measurement made on a classical system naturally involves an interaction between the system and a measuring apparatus, there is nothing special according to classical physics about measurement interactions. Describing the measuring process is a straightforward problem of applied classical physics. The classical laws of motion do not break down during the measuring process. For example, suppose you observe a classical particle using light bounced off it. In the classical account you can make the disturbance on the observed system as small as you like and, ‘in principle', you can observe the system with arbitrary accuracy. ‘In principle’ - a favorite expression of the philosopher of physics - means what it always means in physics. The contrast is with ‘in practice'. Of course, in practice there are all sorts of limitations on measurement. There are also some theoretical limitations, like those due to thermodynamics. But these are not the limitations imposed by the theory we are considering, namely classical mechanics. Such limitations as there are are imposed by some other theory. (The expression ‘in principle’ tends to be used when we are discussing the principles of a particular theory and, theoretically but not in practice, physics is a collection of disjoint theories.)
Extracting information from a quantum system inevitably requires the performance of a measurement, and it is no surprise that the theory of measurement plays a central role in our subject. The physical nature of the measurement process remains one of the great philosophical problems in the formulation of quantum theory. Fortunately, however, it is sufficient for us to take a pragmatic view by asking what measurements are possible and how the theory describes them, without addressing the physical mechanism of the measurement process. This is the approach we shall adopt. We shall find that it leads us to a powerful and general description of both the probabilities associated with measurement outcomes and the manner in which the observation transforms the quantum state of the measured system. The simplest form of measurement was given a mathematical formulation by von Neumann, and we shall refer to measurements of this type as von Neumann measurements or projective measurements. It is this description of measurements that is usually introduced in elementary quantum theory courses. We start with an observable quantity A represented by a Hermitian operator Â, the eigenvalues of which are the possible results of the measurement of A. The relationship between the operator, its eigenstates {|λnñ}, and its (real) eigenvalues {λn} is expressed by the eigenvalue equation . . . Â |λn_ = λn|λn_. (4.1) . . .