Fluctuation and Noise Letters

Typicality in Pure Wave Mechanics

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Published Aug 15, 2016• 5 citations

Abstract

Hugh Everett III's pure wave mechanics is a deterministic physical theory with no probabilities. He nevertheless sought to show how his theory might be understood as making the same statistical predictions as the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics. We will consider Everett's argument for pure wave mechanics, how it depends on the notion of branch typicality, and the relationship between the predictions of pure wave mechanics and the standard quantum probabilities.

DOI: 10.1142/s0219477516400095

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