Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

On the Faithful Interpretation of Pure Wave Mechanics

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Published Jun 11, 2011• 38 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Given Hugh Everett III's understanding of the proper cognitive status of physical theories, his relative-state formulation of pure wave mechanics arguably qualifies as an empirically acceptable physical theory. The argument turns on the precise nature of the relationship that Everett requires between the empirical substructure of an empirically faithful physical theory and experience. On this view, Everett provides a weak resolution to both the determinate record and the probability problems encountered by pure wave mechanics, and does so in a way that avoids unnecessary metaphysical complications. Taking Everett's goal to be showing the empirical faithfulness of the relative-state formulation agrees well with his characterization of his project as one of seeking a model for observation in the correlation structure described by pure wave mechanics and seeking a measure of typicality over this empirical substructure that covaries with our empirically warranted expectations. 1 Pure Wave Mechanics and Relative States 2 Everett and Frank 3 Everett on the Nature of Physical Theories 4 Conditions for Empirical Faithfulness 5 The Empirical Faithfulness of Pure Wave Mechanics 6 Conclusion

DOI
10.1093/bjps/axr004

Related papers

Empirical faithfulness and typicality: a pragmatic reading of Everett's pure wave mechanics

Cocco, Susanna

Everett’s Relative State Formulation is one of the most famous and debated interpretations of Quantum Theory. Further deepening of the debates has been made possible by the discovery of his unpublished notes and manuscripts. \nMy purpose is to examine Everett’s ideas about physical theories, and show that his understanding of actual experience can be put into correspondence with the latest forms of constructive empiricism and empirical adequacy: the problem of ‘extra structure’, which is the reason for metaphysical interpretations, can be solved by using a pragmatic criterion to choose in which way the theory should correspond to empirical evidence. \nA quantitative justification for probabilities in Everettian context is given in terms of typicality.

•May 15, 2015•0 citations

Pure Wave Mechanics

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Abstract Everett thought of the quantum measurement problem as one of providing a consistent description of nested measurement. He proposed solving the measurement problem by simply supposing that all physical systems whatsoever always obey the linear dynamics and hence never collapse. Dropping the collapse dynamics immediately solves the measurement problem, but it introduces two new problems: explaining determinate measurement records and explaining quantum probabilities. In addition to these, we also consider the problem of empirical coherence in the context of pure wave mechanics. We then discuss how Everett himself understood determinate records and probabilities in his relative-state formulation of pure wave mechanics. What he ultimately provided was an argument that his formulation of quantum mechanics was consistent and empirically faithful. We will see why this is a relative weak standard by which to judge the empirical adequacy of a physical theory.

•Dec 26, 2019•0 citations

Typicality in Pure Wave Mechanics

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Hugh Everett III's pure wave mechanics is a deterministic physical theory with no probabilities. He nevertheless sought to show how his theory might be understood as making the same statistical predictions as the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics. We will consider Everett's argument for pure wave mechanics, how it depends on the notion of branch typicality, and the relationship between the predictions of pure wave mechanics and the standard quantum probabilities.

Fluctuation and Noise Letters•Aug 15, 2016•5 citations

Everett’s pure wave mechanics and the notion of worlds

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Everett ( 1957a , b , 1973 ) relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics has often been taken to involve a metaphysical commitment to the existence of many splitting worlds each containing physical copies of observers and the objects they observe. While there was earlier talk of splitting worlds in connection with Everett, this is largely due to DeWitt’s (Phys Today 23:30–35, 1970 ) popular presentation of the theory. While the thought of splitting worlds or parallel universes has captured the popular imagination, Everett himself favored the language of elements, branches, or relative states in describing his theory. The result is that there is no mention of splitting worlds or parallel universes in any of Everett’s published work. Everett, however, did write of splitting observers and was willing to adopt the language of many worlds in conversation with people who were themselves using such language. While there is evidence that Everett was not entirely comfortable with talk of many worlds, it does not seem to have mattered much to him what language one used to describe pure wave mechanics. This was in part a result of Everett’s empirical understanding of the cognitive status of his theory.

European Journal for Philosophy of Science•Mar 22, 2011•65 citations

Many Worlds and Such

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Abstract We consider a number of radically different ways that Everett’s pure wave mechanics has been understood. Each of these reconstructions aims to provide a stronger variety of empirical adequacy than Everett’s own formulation of the theory. Among the alternative formulations of quantum mechanics we consider are splitting worlds, decohering worlds, many minds, many threads, and many maps. Each of these differs in its metaphysical commitments and, hence, in how it explains determinate measurement records and probabilities. We focus, in particular, on the problem of accounting for the standard quantum probabilities. To this end, we consider the relationship between typicality and probability and contrast synchronic and forward-looking probabilities. We conclude with a brief discussion of epistemological, pragmatic, and information-theoretic formulations of quantum mechanics. A recurring issue in this chapter concerns what it should mean for a physical theory to be empirically adequate.

•Dec 26, 2019•0 citations

Quantum Worlds

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p45Because of the conceptual difficulties it faces, quantum mechanics provides a salient example of how alternative metaphysical commitments may clarify our understanding of a physical theory and the explanations it provides. Here we will consider how postulating alternative quantum worlds in the context of Hugh Everett III’s pure wave mechanics may serve to explain determinate measurement records and the standard quantum statistics. We will focus on the properties of such worlds, then briefly consider other metaphysical options available for interpreting pure wave mechanics. These reflections will serve to illustrate both the nature and the limits of naturalized metaphysics.

Principia an international journal of epistemology•Sep 22, 2016•5 citations
Given Hugh Everett III's understanding of the proper cognitive status of physical theories, his relative-state formulation of pure wave mechanics arguably qualifies as an empirically acceptable physical theory. The argument turns on the precise nature of the relationship that Everett requires between the empirical substructure of an empirically faithful physical theory and experience. On this view, Everett provides a weak resolution to both the determinate record and the probability problems encountered by pure wave mechanics, and does so in a way that avoids unnecessary metaphysical complications. Taking Everett's goal to be showing the empirical faithfulness of the relative-state formulation agrees well with his characterization of his project as one of seeking a model for observation in the correlation structure described by pure wave mechanics and seeking a measure of typicality over this empirical substructure that covaries with our empirically warranted expectations. 1 Pure Wave Mechanics and Relative States 2 Everett and Frank 3 Everett on the Nature of Physical Theories 4 Conditions for Empirical Faithfulness 5 The Empirical Faithfulness of Pure Wave Mechanics 6 Conclusion
Everett’s Relative State Formulation is one of the most famous and debated interpretations of Quantum Theory. Further deepening of the debates has been made possible by the discovery of his unpublished notes and manuscripts. \nMy purpose is to examine Everett’s ideas about physical theories, and show that his understanding of actual experience can be put into correspondence with the latest forms of constructive empiricism and empirical adequacy: the problem of ‘extra structure’, which is the reason for metaphysical interpretations, can be solved by using a pragmatic criterion to choose in which way the theory should correspond to empirical evidence. \nA quantitative justification for probabilities in Everettian context is given in terms of typicality.
Abstract Everett thought of the quantum measurement problem as one of providing a consistent description of nested measurement. He proposed solving the measurement problem by simply supposing that all physical systems whatsoever always obey the linear dynamics and hence never collapse. Dropping the collapse dynamics immediately solves the measurement problem, but it introduces two new problems: explaining determinate measurement records and explaining quantum probabilities. In addition to these, we also consider the problem of empirical coherence in the context of pure wave mechanics. We then discuss how Everett himself understood determinate records and probabilities in his relative-state formulation of pure wave mechanics. What he ultimately provided was an argument that his formulation of quantum mechanics was consistent and empirically faithful. We will see why this is a relative weak standard by which to judge the empirical adequacy of a physical theory.
Everett ( 1957a , b , 1973 ) relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics has often been taken to involve a metaphysical commitment to the existence of many splitting worlds each containing physical copies of observers and the objects they observe. While there was earlier talk of splitting worlds in connection with Everett, this is largely due to DeWitt’s (Phys Today 23:30–35, 1970 ) popular presentation of the theory. While the thought of splitting worlds or parallel universes has captured the popular imagination, Everett himself favored the language of elements, branches, or relative states in describing his theory. The result is that there is no mention of splitting worlds or parallel universes in any of Everett’s published work. Everett, however, did write of splitting observers and was willing to adopt the language of many worlds in conversation with people who were themselves using such language. While there is evidence that Everett was not entirely comfortable with talk of many worlds, it does not seem to have mattered much to him what language one used to describe pure wave mechanics. This was in part a result of Everett’s empirical understanding of the cognitive status of his theory.
Abstract We consider a number of radically different ways that Everett’s pure wave mechanics has been understood. Each of these reconstructions aims to provide a stronger variety of empirical adequacy than Everett’s own formulation of the theory. Among the alternative formulations of quantum mechanics we consider are splitting worlds, decohering worlds, many minds, many threads, and many maps. Each of these differs in its metaphysical commitments and, hence, in how it explains determinate measurement records and probabilities. We focus, in particular, on the problem of accounting for the standard quantum probabilities. To this end, we consider the relationship between typicality and probability and contrast synchronic and forward-looking probabilities. We conclude with a brief discussion of epistemological, pragmatic, and information-theoretic formulations of quantum mechanics. A recurring issue in this chapter concerns what it should mean for a physical theory to be empirically adequate.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p45Because of the conceptual difficulties it faces, quantum mechanics provides a salient example of how alternative metaphysical commitments may clarify our understanding of a physical theory and the explanations it provides. Here we will consider how postulating alternative quantum worlds in the context of Hugh Everett III’s pure wave mechanics may serve to explain determinate measurement records and the standard quantum statistics. We will focus on the properties of such worlds, then briefly consider other metaphysical options available for interpreting pure wave mechanics. These reflections will serve to illustrate both the nature and the limits of naturalized metaphysics.