Classical probability theory, as axiomatized in 1933 by Andrey Kolmogorov, has provided a useful and almost universally accepted theory for describing and quantifying uncertainty in scientific applications outside quantum mechanics. Recently, cognitive psychologists and mathematical economists have provided examples where classical probability theory appears inadequate but the probability theory underlying quantum mechanics appears effective. Formally, quantum probability theory is a generalization of classical probability. This article explores relationships between generalized probability theories, in particular quantum-like probability theories and those that do not have full complementation operators (e.g. event spaces based on intuitionistic logic), and discusses how these generalizations bear on important issues in the foundations of probability and the development of non-classical probability theories for the behavioural sciences.
Classical probability theory, as axiomatized in 1933 by Andrey Kolmogorov, has provided a useful and almost universally accepted theory for describing and quantifying uncertainty in scientific applications outside quantum mechanics. Recently, cognitive psychologists and mathematical economists have provided examples where classical probability theory appears inadequate but the probability theory underlying quantum mechanics appears effective. Formally, quantum probability theory is a generalization of classical probability. This article explores relationships between generalized probability theories, in particular quantum-like probability theories and those that do not have full complementation operators (e.g. event spaces based on intuitionistic logic), and discusses how these generalizations bear on important issues in the foundations of probability and the development of non-classical probability theories for the behavioural sciences.
Abstract By formulating the axioms of quantum mechanics, von Neumann also laid the foundations of a “quantum probability theory”. As such, it is regarded a generalization of the “classical probability theory” due to Kolmogorov. Outside of quantum physics, however, Kolmogorov’s axioms enjoy universal applicability. This raises the question of whether quantum physics indeed requires such a generalization of our conception of probability or if von Neumann’s axiomatization of quantum mechanics was contingent on the absence of a general theory of probability in the 1920s. This work argues in favor of the latter position. In particular, it shows how to construct a mathematically rigorous theory for non-relativistic N -body quantum systems subject to a time-independent scalar potential, which is based on Kolmogorov’s axioms and physically natural random variables. Though this theory is provably distinct from its quantum-mechanical analog, it nonetheless reproduces central predictions of the latter. Further work may make an empirical comparison possible. Moreover, the approach can in principle be adapted to other classes of quantum-mechanical models. Part II of this series discusses the empirical violation of Bell inequalities in the context of this approach. Part III addresses the projection postulate and the question of measurement.
In this chapter, we consider the way quantum theory represents deterministic, statistical, and probabilistic aspects of Nature. After a discussion in Section 3.1 of uncertainty in general, we discuss in Sections 3.2-3.4 several formal notions of classical probability, their relation to the probability concept used in applied statistics, and their dependence on the description used. Section 3.5 briefly discusses various examples, where probabilistic features emerge from fully deterministic situations-a theme to be taken up in much more detail in Chapter 11. Section 3.6 then shows how the statistical aspects of the quantum formalism naturally follow from the weak law of large numbers. The notions of c-probability in the classical case and of q-probability in the quantum case are formally defined in Section 3.7. Historically, the concept of classical probability (including its use in stochastic processes) was given an undisputed formal mathematical foundation in 1933 in terms of the measure-theoretic setting of Kolmogorov [164]. Apart from this traditional axiomatic foundation of classical probability theory, there is a less well-known equivalent axiomatic treatment by Whittle [302] in terms of expectations. Here probabilities appear as the expectations of statements, {0, 1}-valued random variables. von Plato [240] discusses the history of the concept of probability. Krüger et al. [169] discuss the history of probability in the various fields of application. Sklar [275] discusses the philosophical problems of the probability concept, with an emphasis on statistical mechanics.
Two non-boolean methods are discussed for modeling context in behavioral data and theory. The first is based on intuitionistic logic, which is similar to classical logic except that not every event has a complement. Its probability theory is also similar to classical probability theory except that the definition of probability function needs to be generalized to unions of events instead of applying only to unions of disjoint events. The generalization is needed, because intuitionistic event spaces may not contain enough disjoint events for the classical definition to be effective. The second method develops a version of quantum logic for its underlying probability theory. It differs from Hilbert space logic used in quantum mechanics as a foundation for quantum probability theory in variety of ways. John von Neumann and others have commented about the lack of a relative frequency approach and a rational foundation for this probability theory. This article argues that its version of quantum probability theory does not have such issues. The method based on intuitionistic logic is useful for modeling cognitive interpretations that vary with context, for example, the mood of the decision maker, the context produced by the influence of other items in a choice experiment, etc. The method based on this article's quantum logic is useful for modeling probabilities across contexts, for example, how probabilities of events from different experiments are related.
This paper explores the limitations of Kolmogorov's measure-theoretic foundation of probability in the context of quantum mechanics and proposes an extension towards a non-commutative framework. We delve into the mathematical structures underlying quantum probability spaces, focusing on operator algebras and their associated states. We analyze the challenges in defining joint probabilities for non-commuting observables and present an overview of alternative approaches based on operator algebras, quantum logic, and non-commutative integration. Furthermore, we investigate the applications of non-commutative measure theory in quantum information theory, quantum field theory, and the foundations of quantum mechanics, highlighting the potential for a more comprehensive understanding of probabilistic phenomena in quantum systems.
In 1933, Kolmogorov synthesized the basic concepts of probability that were in general use at the time into concepts and deductions from a simple set of axioms that said probability was a σ-additive function from a boolean algebra of events into [0, 1]. In 1932, von Neumann realized that the use of probability in quantum mechanics required a different concept that he formulated as a σ-additive function from the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space onto [0,1]. In 1935, Birkhoff & von Neumann replaced Hilbert space with an algebraic generalization. Today, a slight modification of the Birkhoff-von Neumann generalization is called “quantum logic”. A central problem in the philosophy of probability is the justification of the definition of probability used in a given application. This is usually done by arguing for the rationality of that approach to the situation under consideration. A version of the Dutch book argument given by de Finetti in 1972 is often used to justify the Kolmogorov theory, especially in scientific applications. As von Neumann in 1955 noted, and his criticisms still hold, there is no acceptable foundation for quantum logic. While it is not argued here that a rational approach has been carried out for quantum physics, it is argued that (1) for many important situations found in behavioral science that quantum probability theory is a reasonable choice, and (2) that it has an arguably rational foundation to certain areas of behavioral science, for example, the behavioral paradigm of Between Subjects experiments.
Various proposals for generalizing event spaces for probability functions have been put forth in the mathematical, scientific, and philosophic literatures. In cognitive psychology such generalizations are used for explaining puzzling results in decision theory and for modeling the influence of context effects. This commentary discusses proposals for generalizing probability theory to event spaces that are not necessarily boolean algebras. Two prominent examples are quantum probability theory, which is based on the set of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space, and topological probability theory, which is based on the set of open sets of a topology. Both have been applied to a variety of cognitive situations. This commentary focuses on how event space properties can influence probability concepts and impact cognitive modeling.