Two non-boolean methods are discussed for modeling context in behavioral data and theory. The first is based on intuitionistic logic, which is similar to classical logic except that not every event has a complement. Its probability theory is also similar to classical probability theory except that the definition of probability function needs to be generalized to unions of events instead of applying only to unions of disjoint events. The generalization is needed, because intuitionistic event spaces may not contain enough disjoint events for the classical definition to be effective. The second method develops a version of quantum logic for its underlying probability theory. It differs from Hilbert space logic used in quantum mechanics as a foundation for quantum probability theory in variety of ways. John von Neumann and others have commented about the lack of a relative frequency approach and a rational foundation for this probability theory. This article argues that its version of quantum probability theory does not have such issues. The method based on intuitionistic logic is useful for modeling cognitive interpretations that vary with context, for example, the mood of the decision maker, the context produced by the influence of other items in a choice experiment, etc. The method based on this article's quantum logic is useful for modeling probabilities across contexts, for example, how probabilities of events from different experiments are related.
Two non-boolean methods are discussed for modeling context in behavioral data and theory. The first is based on intuitionistic logic, which is similar to classical logic except that not every event has a complement. Its probability theory is also similar to classical probability theory except that the definition of probability function needs to be generalized to unions of events instead of applying only to unions of disjoint events. The generalization is needed, because intuitionistic event spaces may not contain enough disjoint events for the classical definition to be effective. The second method develops a version of quantum logic for its underlying probability theory. It differs from Hilbert space logic used in quantum mechanics as a foundation for quantum probability theory in variety of ways. John von Neumann and others have commented about the lack of a relative frequency approach and a rational foundation for this probability theory. This article argues that its version of quantum probability theory does not have such issues. The method based on intuitionistic logic is useful for modeling cognitive interpretations that vary with context, for example, the mood of the decision maker, the context produced by the influence of other items in a choice experiment, etc. The method based on this article's quantum logic is useful for modeling probabilities across contexts, for example, how probabilities of events from different experiments are related.
Classical probability theory, as axiomatized in 1933 by Andrey Kolmogorov, has provided a useful and almost universally accepted theory for describing and quantifying uncertainty in scientific applications outside quantum mechanics. Recently, cognitive psychologists and mathematical economists have provided examples where classical probability theory appears inadequate but the probability theory underlying quantum mechanics appears effective. Formally, quantum probability theory is a generalization of classical probability. This article explores relationships between generalized probability theories, in particular quantum-like probability theories and those that do not have full complementation operators (e.g. event spaces based on intuitionistic logic), and discusses how these generalizations bear on important issues in the foundations of probability and the development of non-classical probability theories for the behavioural sciences.
In 1933, Kolmogorov synthesized the basic concepts of probability that were in general use at the time into concepts and deductions from a simple set of axioms that said probability was a σ-additive function from a boolean algebra of events into [0, 1]. In 1932, von Neumann realized that the use of probability in quantum mechanics required a different concept that he formulated as a σ-additive function from the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space onto [0,1]. In 1935, Birkhoff & von Neumann replaced Hilbert space with an algebraic generalization. Today, a slight modification of the Birkhoff-von Neumann generalization is called “quantum logic”. A central problem in the philosophy of probability is the justification of the definition of probability used in a given application. This is usually done by arguing for the rationality of that approach to the situation under consideration. A version of the Dutch book argument given by de Finetti in 1972 is often used to justify the Kolmogorov theory, especially in scientific applications. As von Neumann in 1955 noted, and his criticisms still hold, there is no acceptable foundation for quantum logic. While it is not argued here that a rational approach has been carried out for quantum physics, it is argued that (1) for many important situations found in behavioral science that quantum probability theory is a reasonable choice, and (2) that it has an arguably rational foundation to certain areas of behavioral science, for example, the behavioral paradigm of Between Subjects experiments.
Various proposals for generalizing event spaces for probability functions have been put forth in the mathematical, scientific, and philosophic literatures. In cognitive psychology such generalizations are used for explaining puzzling results in decision theory and for modeling the influence of context effects. This commentary discusses proposals for generalizing probability theory to event spaces that are not necessarily boolean algebras. Two prominent examples are quantum probability theory, which is based on the set of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space, and topological probability theory, which is based on the set of open sets of a topology. Both have been applied to a variety of cognitive situations. This commentary focuses on how event space properties can influence probability concepts and impact cognitive modeling.
Quantum mechanics emerged as the result of a successful resolution of stringent empirical and profound conceptual conflicts within the development of atomic physics at the beginning of the last century. At first glance, it seems to be bizarre and even ridiculous to apply ideas of quantum physics in order to improve current psychological and linguistic or semantic ideas. However, a closer look shows that there are some parallels in the development of quantum physics and advanced theories of cognitive science. In psychology, geometric models of meaning have a long tradition. However, they suffer from many shortcomings which are illustrated by discussing several puzzles of bounded rationality. In the first part of this article, we argue that the present account of quantum cognition - taking quantum probabilities rather than classical probabilities - can give a more systematic description of these puzzles than the alternate and rather eclectic treatments in the traditional framework of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, the quantum probabilistic treatment does not always and does not automatically provide a deeper understanding and a true explanation of these puzzles. In the second part of this article, we explain the foundational issue from the perspective of Piron, Foulis, Randall, and others, and we apply it to the foundation of quantum cognition. In this connection, we show that quantum probabilities are of (virtual) conceptual necessity if grounded in an abstract algebraic framework of orthomodular lattices. This framework is motivated by assuming partial Boolean algebras (describing particular perspectives) that are combined into a uniform system while considering certain capacity restrictions. It is at this point that one important aspect of the whole idea of bounded rationality directly enters the theoretical scenery of quantum cognition: resource limitation.
This paper begins with a historical review of the mutual influence of physics and psychology, from Freud's invention of psychic energy inspired by von Boltzmann' thermodynamics to the enrichment quantum physics gained from the side of psychology by the notion of complementarity (the invention of Niels Bohr who was inspired by William James), besides we consider the resonance of the correspondence between Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Jung in both physics and psychology. Then we turn to the problem of development of mathematical models for laws of thought starting with Boolean logic and progressing towards foundations of classical probability theory. Interestingly, the laws of classical logic and probability are routinely violated not only by quantum statistical phenomena but by cognitive phenomena as well. This is yet another common feature between quantum physics and psychology. In particular, cognitive data can exhibit a kind of the probabilistic interference effect. This similarity with quantum physics convinced a multi-disciplinary group of scientists (physicists, psychologists, economists, sociologists) to apply the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics to modeling of cognition. We illustrate this activity by considering a few concrete phenomena: the order and disjunction effects, recognition of ambiguous figures, categorization-decision making. In Appendix 1 we briefly present essentials of theory of contextual probability and a method of representations of contextual probabilities by complex probability amplitudes (solution of the ``inverse Born's problem'') based on a quantum-like representation algorithm (QLRA).
Quantum probability theory, originally developed in the context of quantum mechanics, has increasingly been applied to social sciences to explain decision-making, cognition, and collective behavior. Unlike classical probability models, which assume pre-existing and well-defined preferences, quantum models incorporate superposition, interference, and non-commutativity to capture the contextual dependence and measurement effects observed in human decisions. This paper systematically explores the theoretical foundations of quantum probability in social sciences, discusses model construction techniques, and reviews empirical findings supporting its application. By examining case studies in quantum cognition, quantum game theory, and quantum voting, we illustrate how quantum approaches provide alternative explanations for phenomena such as order effects, measurement-induced attitude shifts, and collective polarization. The paper also discusses the methodological challenges and limitations of quantum social science, emphasizing the need for rigorous experimental validation and interdisciplinary collaboration. Finally, we highlight the potential for integrating quantum probability models with emerging technologies such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence, opening new avenues for social science research and policy applications.