Abstract By formulating the axioms of quantum mechanics, von Neumann also laid the foundations of a “quantum probability theory”. As such, it is regarded a generalization of the “classical probability theory” due to Kolmogorov. Outside of quantum physics, however, Kolmogorov’s axioms enjoy universal applicability. This raises the question of whether quantum physics indeed requires such a generalization of our conception of probability or if von Neumann’s axiomatization of quantum mechanics was contingent on the absence of a general theory of probability in the 1920s. This work argues in favor of the latter position. In particular, it shows how to construct a mathematically rigorous theory for non-relativistic N -body quantum systems subject to a time-independent scalar potential, which is based on Kolmogorov’s axioms and physically natural random variables. Though this theory is provably distinct from its quantum-mechanical analog, it nonetheless reproduces central predictions of the latter. Further work may make an empirical comparison possible. Moreover, the approach can in principle be adapted to other classes of quantum-mechanical models. Part II of this series discusses the empirical violation of Bell inequalities in the context of this approach. Part III addresses the projection postulate and the question of measurement.
Abstract By formulating the axioms of quantum mechanics, von Neumann also laid the foundations of a “quantum probability theory”. As such, it is regarded a generalization of the “classical probability theory” due to Kolmogorov. Outside of quantum physics, however, Kolmogorov’s axioms enjoy universal applicability. This raises the question of whether quantum physics indeed requires such a generalization of our conception of probability or if von Neumann’s axiomatization of quantum mechanics was contingent on the absence of a general theory of probability in the 1920s. This work argues in favor of the latter position. In particular, it shows how to construct a mathematically rigorous theory for non-relativistic N -body quantum systems subject to a time-independent scalar potential, which is based on Kolmogorov’s axioms and physically natural random variables. Though this theory is provably distinct from its quantum-mechanical analog, it nonetheless reproduces central predictions of the latter. Further work may make an empirical comparison possible. Moreover, the approach can in principle be adapted to other classes of quantum-mechanical models. Part II of this series discusses the empirical violation of Bell inequalities in the context of this approach. Part III addresses the projection postulate and the question of measurement.
After briefly recalling some of the main theses of quantum probability concerning the foundational aspects of quantum mechanics and of probability theory, we describe the various categories of axioms in classical probability theory and focus our attention on the classical conditioning axioms. Four classical conditioning axioms are proposed, their probabilistic and model-independent meaning is discussed and it is proven that: (i) the only mathematical realization of these axioms is the classical Bayes rule (or equivalently the classical theorem of composite probabilities) and (ii) von Neumann's projection postulate, which can be considered one of the first examples of quantum conditioning axioms, violates two of these axioms. Finally, we construct an example showing that, even in classical probability, an uncritical application of Bayes' rule can lead to non-optimal predictions. This article is part of the theme issue 'Quantum theory and topology in models of decision making (Part 2)'.
Among the various "no-go theorems" in the foundations of quantum mechanics, Bell inequalities are among the few, which do not implicitly rely on the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. Instead, Bell inequalities are commonly understood to rest on Kolmogorov's theory of probability and a "locality" assumption. Physical evidence supporting their violation is hence taken as evidence against at least one of these two assumptions.
This work provides a comprehensive analysis of the physical debate on Bell inequalities from the point of view of Kolmogorov's theory of probability, focusing on the Bell-Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt inequality (BCHSH inequality). The central contribution is the motivation and mathematical study of the notion of contextuality in Bell experiments: in so-called contextual Bell models the detectors themselves behave randomly and the distribution of the random detector parameters depends on the chosen detector settings. It is shown how even "classical" Bell experiments motivate such a description. The need to account for contextuality was pointed out before by de la Peña, Cetto, Brody, Lochak, Bohm, Hiley and others. A broad class of contextual models is proven to satisfy the BCHSH inequality, thereby generalizing a previous result by Gill and Lambare. Nonetheless, even under strong locality requirements, contextual Bell models may violate the BCHSH inequality: based on work by Popescu and Rohrlich, we consider a "proof of concept" example exhibiting the maximum possible violation.
Contrary to the much debated "loopholes" in empirical tests of Bell inequalities, contextuality thus reveals a conceptual misunderstanding in the physical conclusions commonly drawn from Bell inequality violations.
In 1933, Kolmogorov synthesized the basic concepts of probability that were in general use at the time into concepts and deductions from a simple set of axioms that said probability was a σ-additive function from a boolean algebra of events into [0, 1]. In 1932, von Neumann realized that the use of probability in quantum mechanics required a different concept that he formulated as a σ-additive function from the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space onto [0,1]. In 1935, Birkhoff & von Neumann replaced Hilbert space with an algebraic generalization. Today, a slight modification of the Birkhoff-von Neumann generalization is called “quantum logic”. A central problem in the philosophy of probability is the justification of the definition of probability used in a given application. This is usually done by arguing for the rationality of that approach to the situation under consideration. A version of the Dutch book argument given by de Finetti in 1972 is often used to justify the Kolmogorov theory, especially in scientific applications. As von Neumann in 1955 noted, and his criticisms still hold, there is no acceptable foundation for quantum logic. While it is not argued here that a rational approach has been carried out for quantum physics, it is argued that (1) for many important situations found in behavioral science that quantum probability theory is a reasonable choice, and (2) that it has an arguably rational foundation to certain areas of behavioral science, for example, the behavioral paradigm of Between Subjects experiments.
The mathematics of classical probability theory was subsumed into classical measure theory by Kolmogorov in 1933.Quantum theory as nonclassical probability theory was incorporated into the beginnings of noncommutative measure theory by von Neumann in the early thirties, as well.To precisely this end, von Neumann initiated the study of what are now called von Neumann algebras and, with Murray, made a first classification of such algebras into three types.The nonrelativistic quantum theory of systems with finitely many degrees of freedom deals exclusively with type I algebras.However, for the description of further quantum systems, the other types of von Neumann algebras are indispensable.The paper reviews quantum probability theory in terms of general von Neumann algebras, stressing the similarity of the conceptual structure of classical and noncommutative probability theories and emphasizing the correspondence between the classical and quantum concepts, though also indicating the nonclassical nature of quantum probabilistic predictions.In addition, differences between the probability theories in the type I, II and III settings are explained.A brief description is given of quantum systems for which probability theory based on type I algebras is known to be insufficient.These illustrate the physical significance of the previously mentioned differences.
This chapter contains a brief introduction to mathematical formalism and QM axiomatics. It is oriented to non-physicists. Since QM is a statistical theory it is natural to start with the classical probability model (Kolmogorov [ 191 ], 1933). Then we present the basics of the theory of Hilbert spaces and Hermitian operators and the representation of pure and mixed states by normalized vectors and density operators. This introduction is sufficient to formulate the axiomatics of QM in the form of five postulates. The projection postulate (the most questionable postulate of QM) is presented in a separate section. We sharply distinguish between the cases of quantum observables represented by Hermitian operators with nondegenerate and degenerate spectra, von Neumann’s and Ltiders’s forms of the projection postulate. The axiomatics is completed by a short section on the main interpretations of QM. The projection postulate (LUders’s form) plays a crucial role in the definition of quantum conditional (transition) probability. By operating with the latter we consider interference of probabilities for two incompatible observables as a modification of the formula of total probability by adding the interference term. This viewpoint to interference of probabilities was elaborated in a series of works by Khrennikov. Since classical probability theory is based on the 142 Boolean algebra of events, a violation of the law of total probability can be treated as the probabilistic sign of a violation of the laws of the Boolean logics. From this viewpoint, quantum theory can be considered as representing a new kind of logic, so-called quantum logic. The latter is also briefly presented in a separate section. We continue this review with a new portion of quantum mathematics, namely the notion of the tensor product of Hilbert spaces and the tensor product of operators. After the section on Dirac’s notation with ket and bra vector, we discuss briefly the notion of qubit and entanglement of a few qubits. This chapter concludes with a presentation of the detailed analysis of the probabilistic structure of the two-slit experiment in a bunch of different experimental contexts. This contextual structure leads to a violation of the law of total probability and non-Kolmogorovean probabilistic structure of this experiment.
In this chapter, we consider the way quantum theory represents deterministic, statistical, and probabilistic aspects of Nature. After a discussion in Section 3.1 of uncertainty in general, we discuss in Sections 3.2-3.4 several formal notions of classical probability, their relation to the probability concept used in applied statistics, and their dependence on the description used. Section 3.5 briefly discusses various examples, where probabilistic features emerge from fully deterministic situations-a theme to be taken up in much more detail in Chapter 11. Section 3.6 then shows how the statistical aspects of the quantum formalism naturally follow from the weak law of large numbers. The notions of c-probability in the classical case and of q-probability in the quantum case are formally defined in Section 3.7. Historically, the concept of classical probability (including its use in stochastic processes) was given an undisputed formal mathematical foundation in 1933 in terms of the measure-theoretic setting of Kolmogorov [164]. Apart from this traditional axiomatic foundation of classical probability theory, there is a less well-known equivalent axiomatic treatment by Whittle [302] in terms of expectations. Here probabilities appear as the expectations of statements, {0, 1}-valued random variables. von Plato [240] discusses the history of the concept of probability. Krüger et al. [169] discuss the history of probability in the various fields of application. Sklar [275] discusses the philosophical problems of the probability concept, with an emphasis on statistical mechanics.