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한국멀티미디어학회 학술발표논문집

On The Deniability of Ma et al.'s Deniable Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol

Meng-Hui Lim, Sang-Gon Lee

Published May 1, 2008• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

A deniable authentication protocol enables the protocol participants to authenticate their respective peers, while able to deny their participation after the protocol execution. In 2007, Ma et al. have proposed a chameleon-based deniable authenticated key agreement protocol. However, we discover that this scheme is in fact undeniable due to some flaws in it’ s protocol design. In this paper, we prove the opposite of their claims and discuss the undeniability of the scheme in detail.

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A deniable authentication protocol enables the protocol participants to authenticate their respective peers, while able to deny their participation after the protocol execution. In 2007, Ma et al. have proposed a chameleon-based deniable authenticated key agreement protocol. However, we discover that this scheme is in fact undeniable due to some flaws in it’ s protocol design. In this paper, we prove the opposite of their claims and discuss the undeniability of the scheme in detail.
A deniable authentication protocol enables the protocol participants to authenticate their respective peers, while able to deny their participation after the protocol execution. This protocol can be extremely useful in some practical applications such as online negotiation and electronic voting. In 2007, Ma et al. proposed a chameleon-based deniable authenticated key agreement protocol while in 2006, Lin-Chang proposed another improved deniable authentication protocol. However, we discover that both these schemes are in fact undeniable due to some flaws in their protocol design. In this paper, we prove the opposite of their claims and discuss the undeniability of their schemes in detail.
This paper presents a deniable authenticated key agreement protocol. This protocol can provide an authenticated session key while the sender and the receiver can deny their involvement in such a protocol if the protocol is executed successfully. Then both can deny their transmitted messages protected by the authenticated session key. If this protocol fails, no authenticated session key can be established and no protected messages can be transmitted. The protocol can be proved secure against key compromise impersonation attack. The protocol employs a new method to isolate a session key from confirmation keys.
The A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 authenticated group key agreement protocols showed to be flawed in 2001. Even though the corresponding attacks (or some variants of them) have been rediscovered in several different frameworks, no fixed version of these protocols has been proposed until now. In this paper, we prove that it is in fact impossible to design a scalable authenticated group key agreement protocol based on the same design assumptions as the A-GDH ones. We proceed by providing a systematic way to derive an attack against any A-GDH-type protocol with at least four participants and exhibit protocols with two and three participants which we cannot break using our technique. As far as we know, this is the first generic insecurity result reported in the literature concerning authentication protocols.
The notion of deniable authentication protocol was introduced in 1998 by Dwork et al. [11] and Aumann and Rabin [1, 2] independently. As a new cryptographic authentication protocol, a deniable authentication protocol enables an intended receiver to identify the source of a given message without being able to prove the identity of the sender to a third party. Over the past years, many deniable authentication protocols have been proposed. In this paper, we would like to present a universal encrypted deniable authentication protocol from any public key encryption scheme. Provided that the public key encryption scheme is secure, a secure deniable authentication protocol can be directly derived.