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International Conference on Mobile Ubiquitous Computing, Systems, Services and Technologies (UBICOMM)

On the Deniability of Some Deniable Authentication Protocols

Meng-Hui Lim, Sang-Gon Lee, Hoon Jae Lee

Published Sep 1, 2008• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A deniable authentication protocol enables the protocol participants to authenticate their respective peers, while able to deny their participation after the protocol execution. This protocol can be extremely useful in some practical applications such as online negotiation and electronic voting. In 2007, Ma et al. proposed a chameleon-based deniable authenticated key agreement protocol while in 2006, Lin-Chang proposed another improved deniable authentication protocol. However, we discover that both these schemes are in fact undeniable due to some flaws in their protocol design. In this paper, we prove the opposite of their claims and discuss the undeniability of their schemes in detail.

DOI
10.1109/ubicomm.2008.13

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A deniable authentication protocol enables the protocol participants to authenticate their respective peers, while able to deny their participation after the protocol execution. This protocol can be extremely useful in some practical applications such as online negotiation and electronic voting. In 2007, Ma et al. proposed a chameleon-based deniable authenticated key agreement protocol while in 2006, Lin-Chang proposed another improved deniable authentication protocol. However, we discover that both these schemes are in fact undeniable due to some flaws in their protocol design. In this paper, we prove the opposite of their claims and discuss the undeniability of their schemes in detail.
This paper presents a deniable authenticated key agreement protocol. This protocol can provide an authenticated session key while the sender and the receiver can deny their involvement in such a protocol if the protocol is executed successfully. Then both can deny their transmitted messages protected by the authenticated session key. If this protocol fails, no authenticated session key can be established and no protected messages can be transmitted. The protocol can be proved secure against key compromise impersonation attack. The protocol employs a new method to isolate a session key from confirmation keys.
Deniable authenticate is a different and attractive authenticate mechanism compared with the traditional authentication. It allows the appointed receiver to identify the identity of the sender, but not to prove the source of a given message to a third party even if the appointed receiver is willing to reveal its private key. Certificateless public key cryptography can solve both the public key certificate management problem of public key infrastructure-based cryptography and the key escrow problem of identity-based cryptography. In this paper, we first define a security model for certificateless deniable authentication protocols. Then we propose a non-interactive certificateless deniable authentication protocol. In addition, we prove its security in the random oracle model. Our protocol can be applied in many actual application scenarios, such as electronic voting, electronic tendering, and online shopping.
A deniable authentication protocol enables an intended receiver to identify the source of a given message, but the receiver cannot prove the source of a given message to any third party. It is very useful in some particular applications such as electronic voting, online negotiation and online shopping. However, many related protocols are lack of formal security proof which is very important for cryptographic protocol design. In this paper, we present a certificateless deniable authentication protocol. Our protocol is based on certificateless cryptography, which can solve the public key certificate management problem of public key infrastructure (PKI)-based cryptography and the key escrow problem of identity-based cryptography. Our protocol does not need the pairing operation which is the most time-consuming. In addition, our protocol can admit formal security proof in the random oracle model and resist key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack. Compared with the existing deniable authentication protocols, our protocol can be well applied in electronic voting system.
The notion of deniable authentication protocol was introduced in 1998 by Dwork et al. [11] and Aumann and Rabin [1, 2] independently. As a new cryptographic authentication protocol, a deniable authentication protocol enables an intended receiver to identify the source of a given message without being able to prove the identity of the sender to a third party. Over the past years, many deniable authentication protocols have been proposed. In this paper, we would like to present a universal encrypted deniable authentication protocol from any public key encryption scheme. Provided that the public key encryption scheme is secure, a secure deniable authentication protocol can be directly derived.
Deniable Authentication protocols allow a Sender to authenticate a message for a Receiver, in a way that the Receiver cannot convince a third party that such authentication (or any authentication) ever took place.We present two new approaches to the problem of deniable authentication. The novelty of our schemes is that they do not require the use of CCA-secure encryption (all previous known solutions did), thus showing a different generic approach to the problem of deniable authentication. This new approach is practically relevant as it leads to more efficient protocols and security reductions.In the process we point out a subtle definitional issue for deniability. In particular we propose the notion of forward deniability, which requires that the authentications remain deniable even if the Sender wants to later prove that she authenticated a message. We show that forward deniability is not implied by the original notion of deniability, by showing some deniable protocols which are not forward deniable. Our new proposals are forward deniable.