The Gibbs Paradox is an important question in thermodynamics. In this thesis I search for a solution for the paradox from a classical, philosophical and quantum mechanical point of view. A common way to solve the Gibbs Paradox is by using the reduced entropy. However, this definition of entropy should not be interpreted as an argument for the indistinguishability of identical particles, because all other particles which have unique trajectories through space-time are distinguishable in principle. The Gibbs paradox could be solved in a few ways, but each solution has certain constrains.
Erwin Schrodinger first described the thought-experiment which has since become known as 'the paradox of Schrodinger's cat' 51 years ago. In recent years, popular accounts of quantum mechanics have tended to adopt one or other of the philosophically most extreme solutions to this paradox, i.e. the consciousness hypothesis or the many worlds interpretation. The author attempts to redress the balance by describing what he takes to be the orthodox solution to the paradox which explains the paradox, without recourse to such counterintuitive notions as a cat simultaneously dead and alive or a universe continually splitting into multiple worlds, as being due to a misapplication of the quantum formalism.
In this paper I argue that the consistency condition from the Deutsch's influential model for closed timelike curves (CTCs) differs significantly from the classical consistency condition found in Lewis (1976) and Novikov (2002), as well as from the consistency condition found in the P-CTC model, the major rival to Deutsch's approach. Both the CCC and the P-CTC consistency condition are formulable in the context of a single history of the world. Deutsch's consistency condition relies on the existence of a structure of parallel worlds. I argue that Deutsch's commitment to realism about parallel worlds puts his solutions to the information paradox in jeopardy. I argue that, because of Deutsch's commitment to this metaphysical picture, he is committed to the existence of physical situations that are in every way indistinguishable from the paradoxes he attempts to rule out by adopting the model in the first place. Deutsch's proposed solution to the Knowledge Paradox, in particular his commitment to the actuality of the many worlds of the Everett interpretation (on which he relies to solve the paradoxes), guarantees the existence of worlds that are indistinguishable from worlds in which the genuine Knowledge Paradox arises.