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The Gibbs Paradox. About the paradox and the indistinguishability of identical particles

S.C. van Berkum

Published May 26, 2014• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The Gibbs Paradox is an important question in thermodynamics. In this thesis I search for a solution for the paradox from a classical, philosophical and quantum mechanical point of view. A common way to solve the Gibbs Paradox is by using the reduced entropy. However, this definition of entropy should not be interpreted as an argument for the indistinguishability of identical particles, because all other particles which have unique trajectories through space-time are distinguishable in principle. The Gibbs paradox could be solved in a few ways, but each solution has certain constrains.

Related papers

The Gibbs paradox and the physical criteria for indistinguishability of identical particles

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Gibbs paradox in the context of statistical mechanics addresses the issue of additivity of entropy of mixing gases. The usual discussion attributes the paradoxical situation to classical distinguishability of identical particles and credits quantum theory for enabling indistinguishability of identical particles to solve the problem. We argue that indistinguishability of identical particles is already a feature in classical mechanics and this is clearly brought out when the problem is treated in the language of information and associated entropy. We pinpoint the physical criteria for indistinguishability that is crucial for the treatment of the Gibbs’ problem and the consistency of its solution with conventional thermodynamics. Quantum mechanics provides a quantitative criterion, not possible in the classical picture, for the degree of indistinguishability in terms of visibility of quantum interference, or overlap of the states as pointed out by von Neumann, thereby endowing the entropy expression with mathematical continuity and physical reasonableness.

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Identical classical particles are distinguishable. This distinguishability affects the number of ways W a macrostate can be realized on the microlevel, and from the relation S=k ln W leads to a nonextensive expression for the entropy. This result is usually considered incorrect because of its inconsistency with thermodynamics. It is sometimes concluded from this inconsistency that identical particles are fundamentally indistinguishable and that quantum mechanics is indispensable for making sense of this inconsistency. In contrast, we argue that the classical statistics of distinguishable particles and the resulting nonextensive entropy function are perfectly acceptable from both a theoretical and an experimental perspective. The inconsistency with thermodynamics can be removed by taking into account that the entropy concept in statistical mechanics is not completely identical to the thermodynamical one. We observe that even identical quantum particles are in some cases distinguishable, and conclude that quantum mechanics is irrelevant to the Gibbs paradox.

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The Gibbs paradox has frequently been interpreted as a sign that particles of the same kind are fundamentally indistinguishable; and that quantum mechanics, with its identical fermions and bosons, is indispensable for making sense of this. In this article we shall argue, on the contrary, that analysis of the paradox supports the idea that classical particles are always distinguishable. Perhaps surprisingly, this analysis extends to quantum mechanics: even according to quantum mechanics there can be distinguishable particles of the same kind. Our most important general conclusion will accordingly be that the universally accepted notion that quantum particles of the same kind are necessarily indistinguishable rests on a confusion about how particles are represented in quantum theory.

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Yet another resolution of the Gibbs paradox: an information theory approach

Chih‐Yuan Tseng

The “Gibbs Paradox” refers to several related questions concerning entropy in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics: whether it is an extensive quantity or not, how it changes when identical particles are mixed, and the proper way to count states in systems of identical particles. Several authors have recognized that the paradox is resolved once it is realized that there is no such thing as the entropy of a system, that there are many entropies, and that the choice between treating particles as being distinguishable or not depends on the resolution of the experiment. The purpose of this note is essentially pedagogical; we add to their analysis by examining the paradox from the point of view of information theory. Our argument is based on that ‘grouping’ property of entropy that Shannon recognized, by including it among his axioms, as an essential requirement on any measure of information. Not only does it provide the right connection between different entropies but, in addition, it draws our attention to the obvious fact that addressing issues of distinguishability and of counting states requires a clear idea about what precisely do we mean by a state.

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Janneke van Lith

The Gibbs paradox in statistical mechanics is often taken to indicate that already in the classical domain particles should be treated as fundamentally indistinguishable. This paper shows, on the contrary, how one can recover the thermodynamical account of the entropy of mixing, while treating states that only differ by permutations of similar particles as distinct. By reference to the orthodox theory of thermodynamics, it is argued that entropy differences are only meaningful if they are related to reversible processes connecting the initial and final state. For mixing processes, this means that processes should be considered in which particle number is allowed to vary. Within the context of statistical mechanics, the Gibbsian grandcanonical ensemble is a suitable device for describing such processes. It is shown how the grandcanonical entropy relates in the appropriate way to changes of other thermodynamical quantities in reversible processes, and how the thermodynamical account of the entropy of mixing is recovered even when treating the particles as distinguishable.

Entropy•Apr 30, 2018•8 citations

The Logic of Identity: Distinguishability and Indistinguishability in Classical and Quantum Physics

Dennis Dieks

The suggestion that particles of the same kind may be indistinguishable in a fundamental sense, even so that challenges to traditional notions of individuality and identity may arise, has first come up in the context of classical statistical mechanics. In particular, the Gibbs paradox has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of the untenability of the classical concept of a particle and as a premonition that quantum theory is needed. This idea of a ‘quantum connection’ stubbornly persists in the literature, even though it has also been criticized frequently. Here we shall argue that although this criticism is justified, the proposed alternative solutions have often been wrong and have not put the paradox in its right perspective. In fact, the Gibbs paradox is unrelated to fundamental issues of particle identity; only distinguishability in a pragmatic sense plays a role (in this we develop ideas of van Kampen [10]), and in principle the paradox always is there as long as the concept of a particle applies at all. In line with this we show that the paradox survives even in quantum mechanics, in spite of the quantum mechanical (anti-)symmetrization postulates.

•May 13, 2014•12 citations
The Gibbs Paradox is an important question in thermodynamics. In this thesis I search for a solution for the paradox from a classical, philosophical and quantum mechanical point of view. A common way to solve the Gibbs Paradox is by using the reduced entropy. However, this definition of entropy should not be interpreted as an argument for the indistinguishability of identical particles, because all other particles which have unique trajectories through space-time are distinguishable in principle. The Gibbs paradox could be solved in a few ways, but each solution has certain constrains.
Gibbs paradox in the context of statistical mechanics addresses the issue of additivity of entropy of mixing gases. The usual discussion attributes the paradoxical situation to classical distinguishability of identical particles and credits quantum theory for enabling indistinguishability of identical particles to solve the problem. We argue that indistinguishability of identical particles is already a feature in classical mechanics and this is clearly brought out when the problem is treated in the language of information and associated entropy. We pinpoint the physical criteria for indistinguishability that is crucial for the treatment of the Gibbs’ problem and the consistency of its solution with conventional thermodynamics. Quantum mechanics provides a quantitative criterion, not possible in the classical picture, for the degree of indistinguishability in terms of visibility of quantum interference, or overlap of the states as pointed out by von Neumann, thereby endowing the entropy expression with mathematical continuity and physical reasonableness.
Identical classical particles are distinguishable. This distinguishability affects the number of ways W a macrostate can be realized on the microlevel, and from the relation S=k ln W leads to a nonextensive expression for the entropy. This result is usually considered incorrect because of its inconsistency with thermodynamics. It is sometimes concluded from this inconsistency that identical particles are fundamentally indistinguishable and that quantum mechanics is indispensable for making sense of this inconsistency. In contrast, we argue that the classical statistics of distinguishable particles and the resulting nonextensive entropy function are perfectly acceptable from both a theoretical and an experimental perspective. The inconsistency with thermodynamics can be removed by taking into account that the entropy concept in statistical mechanics is not completely identical to the thermodynamical one. We observe that even identical quantum particles are in some cases distinguishable, and conclude that quantum mechanics is irrelevant to the Gibbs paradox.
The Gibbs paradox has frequently been interpreted as a sign that particles of the same kind are fundamentally indistinguishable; and that quantum mechanics, with its identical fermions and bosons, is indispensable for making sense of this. In this article we shall argue, on the contrary, that analysis of the paradox supports the idea that classical particles are always distinguishable. Perhaps surprisingly, this analysis extends to quantum mechanics: even according to quantum mechanics there can be distinguishable particles of the same kind. Our most important general conclusion will accordingly be that the universally accepted notion that quantum particles of the same kind are necessarily indistinguishable rests on a confusion about how particles are represented in quantum theory.
The “Gibbs Paradox” refers to several related questions concerning entropy in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics: whether it is an extensive quantity or not, how it changes when identical particles are mixed, and the proper way to count states in systems of identical particles. Several authors have recognized that the paradox is resolved once it is realized that there is no such thing as the entropy of a system, that there are many entropies, and that the choice between treating particles as being distinguishable or not depends on the resolution of the experiment. The purpose of this note is essentially pedagogical; we add to their analysis by examining the paradox from the point of view of information theory. Our argument is based on that ‘grouping’ property of entropy that Shannon recognized, by including it among his axioms, as an essential requirement on any measure of information. Not only does it provide the right connection between different entropies but, in addition, it draws our attention to the obvious fact that addressing issues of distinguishability and of counting states requires a clear idea about what precisely do we mean by a state.
The Gibbs paradox in statistical mechanics is often taken to indicate that already in the classical domain particles should be treated as fundamentally indistinguishable. This paper shows, on the contrary, how one can recover the thermodynamical account of the entropy of mixing, while treating states that only differ by permutations of similar particles as distinct. By reference to the orthodox theory of thermodynamics, it is argued that entropy differences are only meaningful if they are related to reversible processes connecting the initial and final state. For mixing processes, this means that processes should be considered in which particle number is allowed to vary. Within the context of statistical mechanics, the Gibbsian grandcanonical ensemble is a suitable device for describing such processes. It is shown how the grandcanonical entropy relates in the appropriate way to changes of other thermodynamical quantities in reversible processes, and how the thermodynamical account of the entropy of mixing is recovered even when treating the particles as distinguishable.
The suggestion that particles of the same kind may be indistinguishable in a fundamental sense, even so that challenges to traditional notions of individuality and identity may arise, has first come up in the context of classical statistical mechanics. In particular, the Gibbs paradox has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of the untenability of the classical concept of a particle and as a premonition that quantum theory is needed. This idea of a ‘quantum connection’ stubbornly persists in the literature, even though it has also been criticized frequently. Here we shall argue that although this criticism is justified, the proposed alternative solutions have often been wrong and have not put the paradox in its right perspective. In fact, the Gibbs paradox is unrelated to fundamental issues of particle identity; only distinguishability in a pragmatic sense plays a role (in this we develop ideas of van Kampen [10]), and in principle the paradox always is there as long as the concept of a particle applies at all. In line with this we show that the paradox survives even in quantum mechanics, in spite of the quantum mechanical (anti-)symmetrization postulates.