This paper aims at clarifying the mechanism of using in building scientific laws since the early scientific beginning of the physical thinking. The paper shows that beauty is no more than consistency of the equation with what is required, and structure with everything symmetrical and beautiful. The sought, physics-wise, becomes super in quantum physics and super strings theory. Breaking this will either be a case of or a case of abnormality that ends up in nothing but itself. The paper stresses that the concept of symmetry is just an attempt of the human mind to impart its tools on nature. It is likely to almost be an intuition or an intuitive handling of logic. This raised some philosophical questions on the type of reality and the conformity of law to existence.
This paper aims at clarifying the mechanism of using in building scientific laws since the early scientific beginning of the physical thinking. The paper shows that beauty is no more than consistency of the equation with what is required, and structure with everything symmetrical and beautiful. The sought, physics-wise, becomes super in quantum physics and super strings theory. Breaking this will either be a case of or a case of abnormality that ends up in nothing but itself. The paper stresses that the concept of symmetry is just an attempt of the human mind to impart its tools on nature. It is likely to almost be an intuition or an intuitive handling of logic. This raised some philosophical questions on the type of reality and the conformity of law to existence.
Beginning in 1900 with 1-iax Planck's hypothesis of quanta, physics has been embarked on a course which has raised serious questions about the true nature of physical reality, about the foundational assumptions and structures of science, and about the relationships between physical reality and physical theory. In particular, attempts to give a physical interpretation to quantum theory seem to result in "pictures" of nature which are paradoxical. A subatomic entity is described by the theory as exhibiting the properties and behavior of both particle-like phenomena and wavelike phenomena. Since it seems unreasonable that a single entity could be both a point-like mass and a wave spread out through a region of space, quantum theory would seem to be less than satisfactory or less than complete at the interpretational level. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the underlying causes of this paradox. The dissertation proceeds by reviewing the development of quantum theory and the emergence of the paradox. Next, the problem of physical interpretation is examined and several of the more significant existing interpretations are discussed and analyzed. Finally, the foundations of science and the general structure of scientific theory are examined in a search for the origins of the paradox. As a result of these investigations and analyses, it is concluded that the paradoxical nature of the physical interpretation of quantum theory is the consequence of certain paradigms and preconceptualizations about physical reality which have been incorporated into the theory at the foundational level. These fundamental assU14ptions produce, within quantum theory, a forced marriage of the plenum and atomic views of physical reality. They also produce an ambiguity with respect to the nature of causality which is charaeteristic of the theory. These problems are reflected in the mathematical formalisms and physical concepts of the theory as well as in its metaphysical foundations. Lastly, methods of resoling the paradox are discussed. It is argued that a successful solution is possible, but that it would involve the creation of a new metaphor-an extension of the present language--which would lead science to a deeper, subquantum level in terms of which the present paradox would vanish.
The article discusses the problem of a correct description of reality in science and philosophy, taking into account the acceptance of the many-world hypothesis. Many-worlds are understood as modern physical hypotheses that allow the existence of other universes (many-world interpretation, chaotic inflation, string landscape, and others). It is shown that these models are likely to challenge the traditional intellectual intuition on which classical science is built: they require new methodological approaches, and perhaps a new epistemology in general. Some requirements of classical logic, based on principles such as the laws of non-contradiction or the excluded middle, may turn out to be incorrect and even counterintuitive under many-world hypotheses. It is suggested that some logical systems (paraconsistent logic, quantum logic) may in the future become an ontological and epistemological foundation for the concepts of many-world physical reality. It is concluded that the considered multi-world models in conjunction with the indicated logics are more intuitively acceptable, since they allow getting rid of not only a number of cosmological problems (for example, fine tuning), but also problems of a logical and mathematical nature arising from the considered traditional requirements for formal systems.
Philosophy of science and, more specifically, philosophy of quantum physics can be but special fields of a general philosophy of knowledge; and the problems arising in these fields can be evaluated properly only when they are seen under the perspective of the whole range of human knowledge. This paper deals with problems of quantum physics and, in particular, with the problem of scientific objects in quantum physics from the epistemological point of view previously defined in the author's books, A Philosophy of Science (1940) and The Basis and Structure of Knowledge (1948). The argument of the paper, however, has not been stated before in the direct and concise manner here attempted and may therefore contain elements of novelty even for those readers who are familiar with the books just mentioned.
This dissertation formulates a closed world in which the observer, in whatever capacity, does not stand outside the universe but is intrinsically part of it. Biologically formed or not.This position is often misunderstood in classical science. You observe something while you yourself are part of what you observe. This becomes evident at the quantum level. The debate between Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein revolved around this for decades, and continues to this day. Likewise, there are many discussions about the role of the observer, such as in the Double Slit Experiment. There it becomes clear that the observer perceives something different from the underlying reality. It is well known that it matters whether you observe or not.This dissertation explains clearly that this position of an external observer, present in both of these examples, is impossible to maintain within classical science. It also assumes that everything in the universe, even at the quantum level or smaller, proceeds according to strict rules. No process in the universe can escape them. It may seem that as a human being (or as another biological or non‑biological entity) you possess free will because of your mobility and mind, but even that can be traced back to a universal process that adheres precisely to the same rules from which everything is built. Nothing in the entire universe can escape them. This is reinforced and clarified by the central thought experiment used here: the frozen universe. It reveals that time, change, and free will do not exist in reality but only as experience. Time is a concept from point A to point B within which change occurs. Because of this, we are accustomed to process thinking. In a static universe, this is impossible. It then becomes apparent that things we consider normal—even at the scientific level—manifest themselves in a completely different way. This dissertation on the frozen universe therefore has major consequences. As a result, Einstein’s block universe can no longer be taken as a starting point—something on which many theories are based—and the debate between Bohr and Einstein on determinism and indeterminism becomes largely redundant. The Schrödinger equation and numerous scientific publications are thereby put under pressure, precisely because everything unfolds according to the fixed, universal, continuous process over which one has no influence. As humans or observers, we live in our world while continuously being part of that same process and of how that universal process unfolds. As a human being, you have only the freedom to experience the human world. Therefore, free will and time should be regarded as separate from all universal processes, because these human processes—also applicable to other biological beings—experience a different world than the universal process of which they are part.In short: we live in an illusion of our reality that does not align with the universal processes that have existed as long as the universe itself. This also shows that everything is determined according to the rules that unfold continuously within the one‑direction continuum, and that nothing can be changed about it. It is thus a framework in which reality, perception, and causality converge into one closed, relational whole. In doing so, it forms a conceptual bridge between physics, philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, and epistemology, and provides a foundation for a new, reflexive scientific method. It is also a bridge between classical science—from Newton to contemporary quantum theory.
This article considers a partly philosophical question: What are the ontological and epistemological reasons for using quantum-like models or theories (models and theories based on the mathematical formalism of quantum theory) vs. classical-like ones (based on the mathematics of classical physics), in considering human thinking and decision making? This question is only partly philosophical because it also concerns the scientific understanding of the phenomena considered by the theories that use mathematical models of either type, just as in physics itself, where this question also arises as a physical question. This is because this question is in effect: What are the physical reasons for using, even if not requiring, these types of theories in considering quantum phenomena, which these theories predict fully in accord with the experiment? This is clearly also a physical, rather than only philosophical, question and so is, accordingly, the question of whether one needs classical-like or quantum-like theories or both (just as in physics we use both classical and quantum theories) in considering human thinking in psychology and related fields, such as decision science. It comes as no surprise that many of these reasons are parallel to those that are responsible for the use of QM and QFT in the case of quantum phenomena. Still, the corresponding situations should be understood and justified in terms of the phenomena considered, phenomena defined by human thinking, because there are important differences between these phenomena and quantum phenomena, which this article aims to address. In order to do so, this article will first consider quantum phenomena and quantum theory, before turning to human thinking and decision making, in addressing which it will also discuss two recent quantum-like approaches to human thinking, that by M. G. D'Ariano and F. Faggin and that by A. Khrennikov. Both approaches are ontological in the sense of offering representations, different in character in each approach, of human thinking by the formalism of quantum theory. Whether such a representation, as opposed to only predicting the outcomes of relevant experiments, is possible either in quantum theory or in quantum-like theories of human thinking is one of the questions addressed in this article. The philosophical position adopted in it is that it may not be possible to make this assumption, which, however, is not the same as saying that it is impossible. I designate this view as the reality-without-realism, RWR, view and in considering strictly mental processes as the ideality-without-idealism, IWI, view, in the second case in part following, but also moving beyond, I. Kant's philosophy.