I discuss some questions of quantum physics, for instance the validity and limitations of the basic language of set theory to deal with problems related to elementary particles. I also present a sketch of a formalization of a “metaphysics of structures”, which might be useful for a kind of “ontic structural realism”, and briefly review the concept of quasi-truth, which underlies my way of understanding scientific theories and the scientific activity.
I discuss some questions of quantum physics, for instance the validity and limitations of the basic language of set theory to deal with problems related to elementary particles. I also present a sketch of a formalization of a “metaphysics of structures”, which might be useful for a kind of “ontic structural realism”, and briefly review the concept of quasi-truth, which underlies my way of understanding scientific theories and the scientific activity.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
Quantum theory is the most successful physical theory ever.About one third of the gross national product in the developed countries results from its applications.These applications range from nuclear power to most of the high-tech tools for computing, laser, solar cells and so on.No limit for its range of validity has been found up to now.Quantum theory has a clear mathematical structure, so a physics student can learn it in a short time.However, very often quantum theory is considered as being "crazy" or "not understandable".Such a stance appears reasonable as long as quantum theory is seen primarily as a theory of small particles and the forces between them.However, if quantum theory is understood more deeply, namely as a general theory of structures, not only the range is widely expanded, but it also becomes more comprehensible (T.Görnitz, 1999).Quantum structures can be material, like atoms, electrons and so on.They can also be energetic, like photons, and finally they can be mere structures, such as quantum bits.Keeping this in mind it becomes apprehensible that quantum theory has two not easily reconcilable aspects: on the one hand, it possesses a clear mathematical structure, on the other hand, it accounts for well-known experiences of everyday life: e.g. a whole is often more than the sum of its parts, and not only the facts but also the possibilities can be effective.If henadic and future structures (i.e.structures which are related to unity [Greek "hen"] and to future) become important in scientific analysis, then the viewable facts in real life differ from the calculated results of models of classical physics, which suppose elementary distinctions between matter and motion, material and force, localization and extension, fullness and emptiness and which describe any process as a succession of facts.From quantum theory one can learn two elementary insights:1.Not only facts but also possibilities can influence the way in which material objects behave.2. The elementary distinctions made in classical models are often useful, but not fundamental.Quantum theory shows that there are equivalences between the concepts of matter and motion, material and force, localization and extension, fullness and emptiness, and so on, www.intechopen.com How to referenceIn order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to
Introduction Chapter 1 dealt with one of the deepest mysteries in modern science: how to explain consciousness. This Part deals with another mystery: how to make sense of quantum mechanics. Both involve a problem of reconciliation with the classical worldview, which is one hint that the two mysteries might be related. A second is that, unlike classical physics, which makes no reference to or allowance for consciousness, quantum theory raises the issue of consciousness and its relationship to the physical world in a very direct way. These hints do not necessarily mean there is a connection between the two mysteries, but by the end of this Part I hope to have shown why it would be natural to look for one. My more immediate aim here is to give the social scientific reader an introductory understanding of the experimental findings of quantum theory, its key concepts, and the debates about its interpretation. The discussion assumes no prior knowledge of quantum physics and makes no use of mathematics. Quantum theory without equations might seem like an oxymoron, and certainly reading this Part will not enable anyone to use quantum theory. But to a perhaps surprising degree it is possible to understand quantum theory without being able to use it. Its findings can be communicated in ordinary language, and the same goes for its main concepts and interpretive debates. One consequence of this has been the emergence of a virtual cottage industry of books on quantum theory for a lay audience. Most are written by physicists, and many are quite good. However, it is not just popular treatments that do without equations: much of the professional philosophical literature does as well. (I draw on both kinds of literature below.) Philosophers of physics are trained to understand the math, of course, which is necessary for a full appreciation of the issues.
During the past two or three centuries western philosophy and science have confirmed each other in their ontological attitude towards external reality. The particular opinion that physical objects have an existence completely independent of observation was established as the necessary basis for all scientific investigation. The discovery in quantum physics that the phenomena ultimately constituting the stability of the material world cannot be separated from the instruments of observation was necessarily felt disastrous to the scientific world-picture, and many philosophers and scientists, including celebrated physicists, are still trying by all means to save ontology in quantum physics. The motive power behind this activity is the belief that the objectivity of science can be maintained only if the elementary particles of matter can be objectified in the usual way. The present chapter deals with the fundamental conditions in quantum physics which entail a complete breakdown of the conceptual frame of classical mechanics
First published in 1956 The Language of Modern Physics gives a complete account of the concepts both of classical and quantum physics. The first part of the book deals with modern logic and semantics and discussion is based on the semantic conception of truth and leads up to the criterion of meaning. The second and main part of the book is about basic ideas of physics. Here the model which underlies a scientific theory is of greatest import; in most instances the model is tacitly assumed, but we must bring it into the open if we want to understand the theory. The third and last part deals with the methods scientists use for confirming their hypotheses. This book is a must read for students and scholars of philosophy of science and philosophy in general.