One of the primary conceptual difficulties facing the multiple worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics is the interpretation of the Born rule measure as a probability. Given that each world in the MWI is typically envisioned as being equally “real,” a more natural rule would be to assign each of the N branches associated with a measurement the equivalent probability 1/N, rather than the probability |a|^2 prescribed by the Born rule. This approach, the “alternate projection postulate” (APP), has been paid scant attention, however, since it leads to predictions that contradict those of standard quantum mechanics. In this paper, a further modification of the MWI is presented that not only incorporates the aesthetic advantages of the APP, but also is compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. This further modification involves an alternative method of enumerating branches that satisfies what is termed here the “Born identity,” according to which there is not a single branch associated with a given experimental outcome, but rather more than one branch, with each branch being physically distinct and the number of branches being proportional to |a|2. In place of the assumption of the Born identity, however, a feasibility argument for the derivation of the Born identity from more fundamental field-theoretic principles (such as those provided by general relativity) is sought. In this manner, it is proposed that quantum statistics may be derived from a purely classical (general relativistic) foundation without injecting the Born rule – either directly or in disguised form – as an independent postulate.
One of the primary conceptual difficulties facing the multiple worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics is the interpretation of the Born rule measure as a probability. Given that each world in the MWI is typically envisioned as being equally “real,” a more natural rule would be to assign each of the N branches associated with a measurement the equivalent probability 1/N, rather than the probability |a|^2 prescribed by the Born rule. This approach, the “alternate projection postulate” (APP), has been paid scant attention, however, since it leads to predictions that contradict those of standard quantum mechanics. In this paper, a further modification of the MWI is presented that not only incorporates the aesthetic advantages of the APP, but also is compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. This further modification involves an alternative method of enumerating branches that satisfies what is termed here the “Born identity,” according to which there is not a single branch associated with a given experimental outcome, but rather more than one branch, with each branch being physically distinct and the number of branches being proportional to |a|2. In place of the assumption of the Born identity, however, a feasibility argument for the derivation of the Born identity from more fundamental field-theoretic principles (such as those provided by general relativity) is sought. In this manner, it is proposed that quantum statistics may be derived from a purely classical (general relativistic) foundation without injecting the Born rule – either directly or in disguised form – as an independent postulate.
Everett's interpretation is best known under the name "many worlds", a name Everett never used in his published writings and which has concentrated the criticism directed at it: how many worlds are there? when do they split? what can probability mean if everything happens? We argue that these questions target the popularization of the theory rather than the theory itself, and that the last of them can now be retired on a precise ground. The probability problem divides into a quantitative question (why the Born weights?) and a question of meaning (what is there to be uncertain about?). The quantitative question is closed by a theorem, T*: the Born rule is the unique weighting of alternatives that is independent of the chosen grain of description, convergent among observers sharing the same records, and stable under branching. T* is established in a companion article by reduction to two published theorems, Gleason (1957) and Short (2023); non-contextuality, the traditionally contested premise of Gleason-type arguments, is derived there from grain coherence rather than postulated; convergence turns out to be a corollary; and the central theorem is verified end to end in Lean 4 with Mathlib, in full generality, with Gleason's theorem as the single declared axiom. The question of meaning is answered by internality: an observer who is part of the state is, by theorem, ignorant of their own location in it, and self-locates on accessible records. What then remains is one posited principle, the bridge between an objective measure and rational expectation, and we show step by step that it is the same principle a deterministic coin already exacts from classical physics. Everett's interpretation, properly formulated, therefore has no special problem of probability: it carries the normative residue that all probabilistic physics carries, and one postulate fewer, since the Born measure is derived and nothing collapses.
A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett's "many-worlds" interpretation. The resulting theory has the advantage of resolving known issues of both theories, as well as those of standard quantum mechanics. It has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Most importantly, the Born rule can be derived by straightforward application of the Laplacian rule, without reliance on a "quantum equilibrium hypothesis" that is crucial for Bohmian mechanics, and without reliance on a "branch weight" that is crucial for Everett-type theories. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett's approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no "splitting of worlds", which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, 3) the identification of observables as self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, and 4) the apparently random "collapse of the wavefunction" caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.
The Born rule governs the probability of outcomes of measurements of quantum systems. Many attempts have been made to derive the Born rule from other postulates. We perform such an analysis in an Everett interpretation without any measurement postulates at all. We explain that probability is an ill defined concept and that an agent who nevertheless wishes to make approximate predictions will have no alternative measure to weigh the alternatives without subjecting herself to a dutch book. Our demonstration is complete for projective measurements of pure states in a finite dimensional Hilbert space and we discuss how it might be applied to generalized measurements. A similar demonstration is impossible for mixed states. Nevertheless, following the standard convention, probability for mixed states has the same validity and issues as it does in classical physics.
Quantum Mechanics notoriously faces a measurement problem, the problem that the unitary time evolution, encoded in its dynamical equations, together with the kinematical structure of the theory generally implies the non-existence \nof definite measurement outcomes. There have been multiple suggestions to solve this problem, among them the so called many worlds interpretation that originated with the work of Hugh Everett III. According to it, the quantum state and time evolution fully and accurately describe nature as it is, implying that under certain conditions multiple measurement outcomes that are seemingly mutually exclusive can be realized at the same time – but as different 'worlds' contained in a global, quantum mechanical structure, sometimes referred to as 'the multiverse'. The many worlds interpretation has, however, been confronted with serious difficulties over the course of its development, some of which were solved by the advent of decoherence theory. The present thesis critically investi- \ngates the state of play on a key remaining problem of the many worlds interpretation, the problem of the meaning and quantification of probabilities in a quantum multiverse. Recent attempts of deriving the pivotal statistical ingredient of quantum mechanics, Born’s rule, from either principles of decision theory or from quantum mechanics alone, supplemented with a few general premises about \nprobability are analyzed and their premises are scrutinized. It will be argued that, though both approaches yield promising results, they both ultimately fail \nto clearly establish the validity of Born’s rule in the context of the many worlds interpretation. It is hence suggested that further research on this problem is indicated.
A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that describes the universe as a continuum of worlds whose mutual interference gives rise to quantum phenomena. A logical framework is introduced to properly deal with propositions about objects in a multiplicity of worlds. In this logical framework, the continuum of worlds is treated in analogy to the continuum of time points; both “time” and “world” are considered as mutually independent modes of existence. The theory combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett’s many-worlds interpretation; it has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Probability as given by the Born rule emerges as a consequence of insufficient knowledge of observers about which world it is that they live in. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett’s approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no splitting of worlds, which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains (1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, (2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, and (3) the apparently random “collapse of the wavefunction” caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.
The Born rule assigns probabilities to quantum measurement outcomes using only the local quantum amplitudes immediately before measurement. Yet the physical consequences of those outcomes may differ dramatically in their subsequent evolution, producing spacetime histories with very different entropies, information content, computational complexity, entanglement structure, and ultimately even spacetime curvature. These global properties appear to play no role in determining quantum probabilities. This paper argues that, viewed through the relativistic block-universe picture, this separation between local probability and global physical structure raises a natural conceptual question. The Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) preserves the complete branching structure of these histories, whereas collapse interpretations retain only a single realized history. The purpose of this paper is not to challenge the Born rule, but to highlight a conceptual asymmetry that may deserve further investigation.