A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett's "many-worlds" interpretation. The resulting theory has the advantage of resolving known issues of both theories, as well as those of standard quantum mechanics. It has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Most importantly, the Born rule can be derived by straightforward application of the Laplacian rule, without reliance on a "quantum equilibrium hypothesis" that is crucial for Bohmian mechanics, and without reliance on a "branch weight" that is crucial for Everett-type theories. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett's approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no "splitting of worlds", which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, 3) the identification of observables as self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, and 4) the apparently random "collapse of the wavefunction" caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.
A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett's "many-worlds" interpretation. The resulting theory has the advantage of resolving known issues of both theories, as well as those of standard quantum mechanics. It has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Most importantly, the Born rule can be derived by straightforward application of the Laplacian rule, without reliance on a "quantum equilibrium hypothesis" that is crucial for Bohmian mechanics, and without reliance on a "branch weight" that is crucial for Everett-type theories. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett's approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no "splitting of worlds", which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, 3) the identification of observables as self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, and 4) the apparently random "collapse of the wavefunction" caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.
A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that describes the universe as a continuum of worlds whose mutual interference gives rise to quantum phenomena. A logical framework is introduced to properly deal with propositions about objects in a multiplicity of worlds. In this logical framework, the continuum of worlds is treated in analogy to the continuum of time points; both “time” and “world” are considered as mutually independent modes of existence. The theory combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett’s many-worlds interpretation; it has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Probability as given by the Born rule emerges as a consequence of insufficient knowledge of observers about which world it is that they live in. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett’s approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no splitting of worlds, which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains (1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, (2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, and (3) the apparently random “collapse of the wavefunction” caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.
Everett's interpretation is best known under the name "many worlds", a name Everett never used in his published writings and which has concentrated the criticism directed at it: how many worlds are there? when do they split? what can probability mean if everything happens? We argue that these questions target the popularization of the theory rather than the theory itself, and that the last of them can now be retired on a precise ground. The probability problem divides into a quantitative question (why the Born weights?) and a question of meaning (what is there to be uncertain about?). The quantitative question is closed by a theorem, T*: the Born rule is the unique weighting of alternatives that is independent of the chosen grain of description, convergent among observers sharing the same records, and stable under branching. T* is established in a companion article by reduction to two published theorems, Gleason (1957) and Short (2023); non-contextuality, the traditionally contested premise of Gleason-type arguments, is derived there from grain coherence rather than postulated; convergence turns out to be a corollary; and the central theorem is verified end to end in Lean 4 with Mathlib, in full generality, with Gleason's theorem as the single declared axiom. The question of meaning is answered by internality: an observer who is part of the state is, by theorem, ignorant of their own location in it, and self-locates on accessible records. What then remains is one posited principle, the bridge between an objective measure and rational expectation, and we show step by step that it is the same principle a deterministic coin already exacts from classical physics. Everett's interpretation, properly formulated, therefore has no special problem of probability: it carries the normative residue that all probabilistic physics carries, and one postulate fewer, since the Born measure is derived and nothing collapses.
A type of mechanics will be presented that possesses some distinctive properties. On the one hand, its physical description & rules of operation are readily comprehensible & intuitively clear. On the other, it fully satisfies all observable predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Within it, particles exist at points in space, follow continuous, piecewise differentiable paths, and their linear momentum is equal to their mass times their velocity along their path. Yet the probabilities for position and momentum, conditioned on the state of the particle's environment, follow the rules of quantum theory. Indeed, all observable consequences of quantum theory are satisfied; particles can be entangled, have intrinsic spin, this spin is not local to the particle, particle identity can effect probabilities, and so forth. All the rules of quantum mechanics are obeyed, and all arise in a straightforward fashion. After this is established, connections will be drawn out between this type of mechanics and other types of quantum worlds; those that obey Bohmian mechanics, stochastic mechanics, the many worlds interpretation, and physical collapse. In the final section, a relativistic version of the mechanics will be presented.
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is, inter alia, an interpretation of objective probability: an account of what probability really is. Everett called his work “wave mechanics without probability” for good reason: it provides a non-chancy base level of categorical properties and relations. The objection may concern justification rather than understanding, particularly if decoherence theory is used to derive the Born rule. The branch-counting rule makes nonsense of quantum mechanics but it appears to be suggested by the picture of branching. Branch counting is hardly a rival to the branch-weight rule as an interpretation of branching structure, if it brings that branching structure crashing down. Denizens of anomalous branches, or of anomalous stretches of history in one-world theories, will be misled by the observed statistics of measurements.
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.
The paper takes up Bell's (1987) "Everett (?) theory" and develops it further. The resulting theory is about the system of all particles in the universe, each located in ordinary, 3-dimensional space. This many-particle system as a whole performs random jumps through 3N-dimensional configuration space - hence "Tychistic Bohmian Mechanics" (TBM). The distribution of its spontaneous localisations in configuration space is given by the Born Rule probability measure for the universal wavefunction. Contra Bell, the theory is argued to satisfy the minimal desiderata for a Bohmian theory within the Primitive Ontology framework (for which we offer a metaphysically more perspicuous formulation than is customary). TBM's formalism is that of ordinary Bohmian Mechanics (BM), without the postulate of continuous particle trajectories and their deterministic dynamics. This "rump formalism" receives, however, a different interpretation. We defend TBM as an empirically adequate and coherent quantum theory. Objections voiced by Bell and Maudlin are rebutted. The "for all practical purposes"-classical, Everettian worlds (i.e. quasi-classical histories) exist sequentially in TBM (rather than simultaneously, as in the Everett interpretation). In a temporally coarse-grained sense, they quasi-persist. By contrast, the individual particles themselves cease to persist.