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Restoring physical realism

Dirk John Pons, Arion Douglas Pons, Aiden Jasper Pons

Published Jan 1, 2015• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Problem- Many attempts have been made, starting from Quantum mechanics (QM), to prove the non-viability of hidden-variable (HV) solutions, and to justify the unnaturalness of QM explanations over physical realism. In particular, Colbeck & Renner (C&R) (2011) claimed to prove that no extension of quantum theory can exist with better predictive power than quantum mechanics itself. This implies that QM is an ideal theory, and that physical realism should be abandoned. Purpose- This paper critiques this proof. Approach- Logical considerations are used to examine the premises in the proof. Findings- The C&R proof is show to be capable of entirely the opposite interpretation that its authors intended, namely that a new deeper physics may exist based on physical realism, but that it will definitely not be quantum theory or even an extension thereof. Also, the proof is falsified by presenting a viable theory of internal structures (hidden-variable solution) with demonstrably better ontological explanatory power than QM. Implications- QM is interpreted as an approximate stochastic representation of a deeper dynamic behaviour at the finer scale. Originality- This work predicts that physical realism still applies, and that hidden-variable solutions still have vitality as the way forward for fundamental physics.

Related papers

A Physical Basis for Entanglement in a Non-Local Hidden Variable Theory

Dirk John Pons, Arion Douglas Pons, Aiden Jasper Pons

Problem: Superposition and entanglement are coherent effects, which can be quantified by quantum mechanics (QM), but lack descriptive explanations. They are typically analysed with inequality methods, and the results favour QM and reject physical realism and hidden-variable solutions. In particular, Colbeck & Renner (2011) showed that no extension of quantum theory can exist with better predictive power than quantum mechanics itself. Purpose: The purpose here is to critically evaluate from a conceptual and philosophical perspective the ontological underpinnings of the inequality approach. The current work is speculative in nature as it is based on a conjectured non-local hidden-variable (NLHV) design for particles, and does not yet have a mathematical formalism. Nonetheless this is worth attempting for the philosophical questions it poses about the nature of reality, and the pointers it gives to possible future directions in fundamental physics. Findings: The premises of the C & R proof (that particles are points, that locality exists, that quantum theory is correct) are inconsistent, hence invalidate its conclusion. We also show that superposition and entanglement may be qualitatively explained if particles were to have the internal structure proposed by the Cordus NLHV theory. Originality: The ability to explain superposition and entanglement conceptually in terms of physical realism is relevant because it rebuts the claim that it is impossible that such a hidden-variable theory could exist. This is significant because previously it has been believed that these phenomena are explainable by QM only.

Journal of Modern Physics•Jan 1, 2017•9 citations

Scientific Realism and the Quantum

French, Steven, Saatsi, Juha

Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?

Oxford University Press eBooks•Feb 27, 2020•62 citations

A survey of the ESR model for an objective reinterpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Claudio Garola

Most scholars concerned with the foundations of quantum mechanics (QM) think that contextuality and nonlocality (hence nonobjectivity of physical properties) are unavoidable features of QM which follow from the mathematical apparatus of QM. Moreover these features are usually considered as basic in quantum information processing. Nevertheless they raise still unsolved problems, as the objectification problem in the quantum theory of measurement. The extended semantic realism (ESR) model offers a possible way out from these difficulties by embedding the mathematical formalism of QM into a broader mathematical formalism and reinterpreting quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than absolute. The embedding allows to recover the formal apparatus of QM within the ESR model, and the reinterpretation of QM allows to construct a noncontextual hidden variables theory which justifies the assumptions introduced in the ESR model and proves its objectivity. According to the ESR model both linear and nonlinear time evolution occur, depending on the physical environment, as in QM. In addition, the ESR model, though objective, implies modified Bell's inequalities that do not conflict with QM, supplies different mathematical representations of proper and improper mixtures, provides a general framework in which the local interpretations of the GHZ experiment obtained by other authors are recovered and explained, and supports an interpretation of quantum logic which avoids the introduction of the problematic notion of quantum truth.

•Jan 1, 2014•2 citations

Quantum mechanics: completely unhidden?A critical review of the work of Colbeck and Renner

Gijs Leegwater

In this thesis a recent claim by Roger Colbeck and Renato Renner is reviewed [18]. This claim concerns the completeness of quantum mechanics. Colbeck and Renner state that no theory can be constructed that is compatible with quantum mechanics, and gives more detailed predictions through supplemental variables added to the description of the state of a system. Their only assumption is that measurement settings can be choosen freely. We will argue that their result is for the most part valid and interesting, but the freedom assumption is not so innocent as it is presented, and parts of the result need to be clarified. Therefore, we will present a reformulation of the result. In our formulation the result is a no-go theorem for hidden variable theories satisfying Parameter Independence. This is a generalization of Bell’s theorem. Performed in the period 01-11-2012 14-08-2012

•Sep 9, 2013•1 citation

1 Against the ‘No-Go ’ Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics

Federico Laudisa

In the area of the foundations of quantummechanics a true industry appears to have developed in the last decades, with the aim of proving as many results as possible concerning what there cannot be in the quantum realm. In principle, the significance of proving ‘no-go’ results should consist in clarifying the fundamental structure of the theory, by pointing out a class of basic constraints that the theory itself is supposed to satisfy. In the present paper I will discuss some more recent no-go claims and I will argue against the deep significance of these results, with a two-fold strategy. First, I will consider three results concerning respectively local realism, quantum covariance and predictive power in quantum mechanics, and I will try to show how controversial the main conditions of the negative theorem turn out to be—something that strongly undermines the general relevance of these theorems. Second, I will try to discuss what I take to be a common feature of these theoretical enterprises, namely that of aiming at establishing negative results for quantum mechanics in absence of a deeper understanding of the overall ontological content and structure of the theory. I will argue that the only way toward such an understanding may be to cast in advance the problems in a clear and well-defined interpretational framework—which in my viewmeans primarily to specify the ontology that quantum theory is supposed to be about—and after to wonder whether problems that seemed worth pursuing still are so in the framework.

•Jan 1, 2013•16 citations

Quantum Mechanics as a Classical Theory III: Epistemology

L. S. F. Olavo

The two previous papers developed quantum mechanical formalism from classical mechanics and two additional postulates. In the first paper it was also shown that the uncertainty relations possess no ontological validity and only reflect the formalism's limitations. In this paper, a Realist Interpretation of quantum mechanics based on these results is elaborated and compared to the Copenhagen Interpretation. We demonstrate that von Neumann's proof of the impossibility of a hidden variable theory is not correct, independently of Bell's argumentation. A local hidden variable theory is found for non-relativistic quantum mechanics, which is nothing else than newtonian mechanics itself. We prove that Bell's theorem does not imply in a non-locality of quantum mechanics, and also demonstrate that Bohm's theory cannot be considered a true hidden variable theory.

arXiv:quant-ph/9503022•Mar 28, 1995•0 citations
Problem- Many attempts have been made, starting from Quantum mechanics (QM), to prove the non-viability of hidden-variable (HV) solutions, and to justify the unnaturalness of QM explanations over physical realism. In particular, Colbeck & Renner (C&R) (2011) claimed to prove that no extension of quantum theory can exist with better predictive power than quantum mechanics itself. This implies that QM is an ideal theory, and that physical realism should be abandoned. Purpose- This paper critiques this proof. Approach- Logical considerations are used to examine the premises in the proof. Findings- The C&R proof is show to be capable of entirely the opposite interpretation that its authors intended, namely that a new deeper physics may exist based on physical realism, but that it will definitely not be quantum theory or even an extension thereof. Also, the proof is falsified by presenting a viable theory of internal structures (hidden-variable solution) with demonstrably better ontological explanatory power than QM. Implications- QM is interpreted as an approximate stochastic representation of a deeper dynamic behaviour at the finer scale. Originality- This work predicts that physical realism still applies, and that hidden-variable solutions still have vitality as the way forward for fundamental physics.
Problem: Superposition and entanglement are coherent effects, which can be quantified by quantum mechanics (QM), but lack descriptive explanations. They are typically analysed with inequality methods, and the results favour QM and reject physical realism and hidden-variable solutions. In particular, Colbeck & Renner (2011) showed that no extension of quantum theory can exist with better predictive power than quantum mechanics itself. Purpose: The purpose here is to critically evaluate from a conceptual and philosophical perspective the ontological underpinnings of the inequality approach. The current work is speculative in nature as it is based on a conjectured non-local hidden-variable (NLHV) design for particles, and does not yet have a mathematical formalism. Nonetheless this is worth attempting for the philosophical questions it poses about the nature of reality, and the pointers it gives to possible future directions in fundamental physics. Findings: The premises of the C & R proof (that particles are points, that locality exists, that quantum theory is correct) are inconsistent, hence invalidate its conclusion. We also show that superposition and entanglement may be qualitatively explained if particles were to have the internal structure proposed by the Cordus NLHV theory. Originality: The ability to explain superposition and entanglement conceptually in terms of physical realism is relevant because it rebuts the claim that it is impossible that such a hidden-variable theory could exist. This is significant because previously it has been believed that these phenomena are explainable by QM only.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
Most scholars concerned with the foundations of quantum mechanics (QM) think that contextuality and nonlocality (hence nonobjectivity of physical properties) are unavoidable features of QM which follow from the mathematical apparatus of QM. Moreover these features are usually considered as basic in quantum information processing. Nevertheless they raise still unsolved problems, as the objectification problem in the quantum theory of measurement. The extended semantic realism (ESR) model offers a possible way out from these difficulties by embedding the mathematical formalism of QM into a broader mathematical formalism and reinterpreting quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than absolute. The embedding allows to recover the formal apparatus of QM within the ESR model, and the reinterpretation of QM allows to construct a noncontextual hidden variables theory which justifies the assumptions introduced in the ESR model and proves its objectivity. According to the ESR model both linear and nonlinear time evolution occur, depending on the physical environment, as in QM. In addition, the ESR model, though objective, implies modified Bell's inequalities that do not conflict with QM, supplies different mathematical representations of proper and improper mixtures, provides a general framework in which the local interpretations of the GHZ experiment obtained by other authors are recovered and explained, and supports an interpretation of quantum logic which avoids the introduction of the problematic notion of quantum truth.
In this thesis a recent claim by Roger Colbeck and Renato Renner is reviewed [18]. This claim concerns the completeness of quantum mechanics. Colbeck and Renner state that no theory can be constructed that is compatible with quantum mechanics, and gives more detailed predictions through supplemental variables added to the description of the state of a system. Their only assumption is that measurement settings can be choosen freely. We will argue that their result is for the most part valid and interesting, but the freedom assumption is not so innocent as it is presented, and parts of the result need to be clarified. Therefore, we will present a reformulation of the result. In our formulation the result is a no-go theorem for hidden variable theories satisfying Parameter Independence. This is a generalization of Bell’s theorem. Performed in the period 01-11-2012 14-08-2012
In the area of the foundations of quantummechanics a true industry appears to have developed in the last decades, with the aim of proving as many results as possible concerning what there cannot be in the quantum realm. In principle, the significance of proving ‘no-go’ results should consist in clarifying the fundamental structure of the theory, by pointing out a class of basic constraints that the theory itself is supposed to satisfy. In the present paper I will discuss some more recent no-go claims and I will argue against the deep significance of these results, with a two-fold strategy. First, I will consider three results concerning respectively local realism, quantum covariance and predictive power in quantum mechanics, and I will try to show how controversial the main conditions of the negative theorem turn out to be—something that strongly undermines the general relevance of these theorems. Second, I will try to discuss what I take to be a common feature of these theoretical enterprises, namely that of aiming at establishing negative results for quantum mechanics in absence of a deeper understanding of the overall ontological content and structure of the theory. I will argue that the only way toward such an understanding may be to cast in advance the problems in a clear and well-defined interpretational framework—which in my viewmeans primarily to specify the ontology that quantum theory is supposed to be about—and after to wonder whether problems that seemed worth pursuing still are so in the framework.
The two previous papers developed quantum mechanical formalism from classical mechanics and two additional postulates. In the first paper it was also shown that the uncertainty relations possess no ontological validity and only reflect the formalism's limitations. In this paper, a Realist Interpretation of quantum mechanics based on these results is elaborated and compared to the Copenhagen Interpretation. We demonstrate that von Neumann's proof of the impossibility of a hidden variable theory is not correct, independently of Bell's argumentation. A local hidden variable theory is found for non-relativistic quantum mechanics, which is nothing else than newtonian mechanics itself. We prove that Bell's theorem does not imply in a non-locality of quantum mechanics, and also demonstrate that Bohm's theory cannot be considered a true hidden variable theory.