arXiv:2008.01444 · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics

Completely real? A critical note on the claims by Colbeck and Renner

Ronnie Hermens

Published Nov 1, 2020• 3 citations

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Abstract

In a series of papers Colbeck and Renner (2011, 2015a, 2015b) claim to have shown that the quantum state provides a complete description for the prediction of future measurement outcomes. In this paper I argue that thus far no solid satisfactory proof has been presented to support this claim. Building on the earlier work of Leifer (2014), Landsman (2015) and Leegwater (2016), I present and prove two results that only partially support this claim. I then discuss the arguments by Colbeck, Renner and Leegwater concerning how these results are to generalize to the full claim. This argument turns out to hinge on the implicit use of an assumption concerning the way unitary evolution is to be represented in any possible completion of quantum mechanics. I argue that this assumption is unsatisfactory and that possible attempts to validate it based on measurement theory also do not succeed.

DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsb.2020.08.005

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