Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Secure Deniable Authentication Protocol Based on ElGamal Cryptography

Eun‐Jun Yoon, Kee-Young Yoo

Published Apr 1, 2008• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In 2006, Shao et al. showed that Wang et al.'s deniable authentication protocol based on ElGamal cryptography is insecure to a person-in-the-middle attack; that is, in the whole process, the receiver cannot be aware of the existence of this adversary as well as the modification of the messages. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Wang et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper demonstrates that Shao et al.'s improved deniable authentication protocol is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack. To mitigate this security breach, we propose an improved deniable authentication protocol based on ElGamal cryptography.

DOI
10.1109/isa.2008.85

Related papers

Cryptanalysis of a suite of deniable authentication protocols

Runze Zhu, Duncan S. Wong, C.H. Lee

A deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to transfer an authenticated message to a receiver in such a way that the receiver cannot prove to a third party about the source of the message. In 2001, Deng et al. proposed two deniable authentication protocols under the communication model defined by Aumann and Rabin in 1998. In this paper, we show that these two protocols have a common issue, which incurs vulnerability to the person-in-the-middle (PIM) attack. We also propose a modification for solving the problem.

IEEE Communications Letters•Jun 1, 2006•25 citations

Security Analysis of Hsieh-Sun's Deniable Authentication Protocol

Eun‐Jun Yoon, Kee-Young Yoo

In 2004, Hsieh and Sun showed that Fan et al.'s deniable protocol does not posse the denial property; that is, a cheating receiver can prove the source of the received message to a third party. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Fan et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper points out an error in Hsieh-Sun's cryptanalysis on Fan et al.'s deniable authentication protocol and demonstrate that Hsieh-Sun's improved deniable authentication protocol still does not posse the deniable property and is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack.

International Conference on Hybrid Information Technology (ICHIT)•Nov 1, 2006•3 citations

Security Analysis of Hsieh-Sun's Deniable Authentication Protocol

Eun‐Jun Yoon, Kee-Young Yoo

In 2004, Hsieh and Sun showed that Fan et al.'s deniable protocol does not posse the denial property; that is, a cheating receiver can prove the source of the received message to a third party. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Fan et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper points out an error in Hsieh-Sun's cryptanalysis on Fan et al.'s deniable authentication protocol and demonstrate that Hsieh-Sun's improved deniable authentication protocol still does not posse the deniable property and is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack.

International Conference on Hybrid Information Technology (ICHIT)•Nov 9, 2006•3 citations

An efficient certificateless deniable authentication protocol without pairings

Chunhua Jin, Chunxiang Xu, Xiaojun Zhang +1 more

A deniable authentication protocol enables an intended receiver to identify the source of a given message, but the receiver cannot prove the source of a given message to any third party. It is very useful in some particular applications such as electronic voting, online negotiation and online shopping. However, many related protocols are lack of formal security proof which is very important for cryptographic protocol design. In this paper, we present a certificateless deniable authentication protocol. Our protocol is based on certificateless cryptography, which can solve the public key certificate management problem of public key infrastructure (PKI)-based cryptography and the key escrow problem of identity-based cryptography. Our protocol does not need the pairing operation which is the most time-consuming. In addition, our protocol can admit formal security proof in the random oracle model and resist key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack. Compared with the existing deniable authentication protocols, our protocol can be well applied in electronic voting system.

International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics•Jan 1, 2015•8 citations

Security Analysis of a Suite of Deniable Authentication Protocols

Haibo Tian, Xiaofeng Chen, Baodian Wei +1 more

A deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to transfer an authenticated message to a receiver, and the receiver cannot prove to a third party about the source of the message. In 2006, Zhu et al. analyzed deniable authentication protocols proposed by Deng et al. in 2001, which were based on a protocol proposed by Aumann et al. in 1998. In this paper, we show that the modified protocols by Zhu et al. suffer from a Byzantine attack when two sessions run concurrently. We also suggest methods to solve the problem.

International journal of network security•Jan 1, 2013•3 citations

A deniable authenticated key agreement protocol

Haibo Tian, Xiaofeng Chen, Fangguo Zhang +1 more

This paper presents a deniable authenticated key agreement protocol. This protocol can provide an authenticated session key while the sender and the receiver can deny their involvement in such a protocol if the protocol is executed successfully. Then both can deny their transmitted messages protected by the authenticated session key. If this protocol fails, no authenticated session key can be established and no protected messages can be transmitted. The protocol can be proved secure against key compromise impersonation attack. The protocol employs a new method to isolate a session key from confirmation keys.

Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences•Nov 7, 2008•0 citations
In 2006, Shao et al. showed that Wang et al.'s deniable authentication protocol based on ElGamal cryptography is insecure to a person-in-the-middle attack; that is, in the whole process, the receiver cannot be aware of the existence of this adversary as well as the modification of the messages. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Wang et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper demonstrates that Shao et al.'s improved deniable authentication protocol is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack. To mitigate this security breach, we propose an improved deniable authentication protocol based on ElGamal cryptography.
A deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to transfer an authenticated message to a receiver in such a way that the receiver cannot prove to a third party about the source of the message. In 2001, Deng et al. proposed two deniable authentication protocols under the communication model defined by Aumann and Rabin in 1998. In this paper, we show that these two protocols have a common issue, which incurs vulnerability to the person-in-the-middle (PIM) attack. We also propose a modification for solving the problem.
In 2004, Hsieh and Sun showed that Fan et al.'s deniable protocol does not posse the denial property; that is, a cheating receiver can prove the source of the received message to a third party. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Fan et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper points out an error in Hsieh-Sun's cryptanalysis on Fan et al.'s deniable authentication protocol and demonstrate that Hsieh-Sun's improved deniable authentication protocol still does not posse the deniable property and is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack.
In 2004, Hsieh and Sun showed that Fan et al.'s deniable protocol does not posse the denial property; that is, a cheating receiver can prove the source of the received message to a third party. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Fan et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper points out an error in Hsieh-Sun's cryptanalysis on Fan et al.'s deniable authentication protocol and demonstrate that Hsieh-Sun's improved deniable authentication protocol still does not posse the deniable property and is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack.
A deniable authentication protocol enables an intended receiver to identify the source of a given message, but the receiver cannot prove the source of a given message to any third party. It is very useful in some particular applications such as electronic voting, online negotiation and online shopping. However, many related protocols are lack of formal security proof which is very important for cryptographic protocol design. In this paper, we present a certificateless deniable authentication protocol. Our protocol is based on certificateless cryptography, which can solve the public key certificate management problem of public key infrastructure (PKI)-based cryptography and the key escrow problem of identity-based cryptography. Our protocol does not need the pairing operation which is the most time-consuming. In addition, our protocol can admit formal security proof in the random oracle model and resist key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack. Compared with the existing deniable authentication protocols, our protocol can be well applied in electronic voting system.
A deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to transfer an authenticated message to a receiver, and the receiver cannot prove to a third party about the source of the message. In 2006, Zhu et al. analyzed deniable authentication protocols proposed by Deng et al. in 2001, which were based on a protocol proposed by Aumann et al. in 1998. In this paper, we show that the modified protocols by Zhu et al. suffer from a Byzantine attack when two sessions run concurrently. We also suggest methods to solve the problem.
This paper presents a deniable authenticated key agreement protocol. This protocol can provide an authenticated session key while the sender and the receiver can deny their involvement in such a protocol if the protocol is executed successfully. Then both can deny their transmitted messages protected by the authenticated session key. If this protocol fails, no authenticated session key can be established and no protected messages can be transmitted. The protocol can be proved secure against key compromise impersonation attack. The protocol employs a new method to isolate a session key from confirmation keys.