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IEEE Communications Letters

Cryptanalysis of a suite of deniable authentication protocols

Runze Zhu, Duncan S. Wong, C.H. Lee

Published Jun 1, 2006• 25 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to transfer an authenticated message to a receiver in such a way that the receiver cannot prove to a third party about the source of the message. In 2001, Deng et al. proposed two deniable authentication protocols under the communication model defined by Aumann and Rabin in 1998. In this paper, we show that these two protocols have a common issue, which incurs vulnerability to the person-in-the-middle (PIM) attack. We also propose a modification for solving the problem.

DOI
10.1109/lcomm.2006.1638630

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A deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to transfer an authenticated message to a receiver in such a way that the receiver cannot prove to a third party about the source of the message. In 2001, Deng et al. proposed two deniable authentication protocols under the communication model defined by Aumann and Rabin in 1998. In this paper, we show that these two protocols have a common issue, which incurs vulnerability to the person-in-the-middle (PIM) attack. We also propose a modification for solving the problem.
A deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to transfer an authenticated message to a receiver, and the receiver cannot prove to a third party about the source of the message. In 2006, Zhu et al. analyzed deniable authentication protocols proposed by Deng et al. in 2001, which were based on a protocol proposed by Aumann et al. in 1998. In this paper, we show that the modified protocols by Zhu et al. suffer from a Byzantine attack when two sessions run concurrently. We also suggest methods to solve the problem.
Deniable Authentication protocols allow a Sender to authenticate a message for a Receiver, in a way that the Receiver cannot convince a third party that such authentication (or any authentication) ever took place.We present two new approaches to the problem of deniable authentication. The novelty of our schemes is that they do not require the use of CCA-secure encryption (all previous known solutions did), thus showing a different generic approach to the problem of deniable authentication. This new approach is practically relevant as it leads to more efficient protocols and security reductions.In the process we point out a subtle definitional issue for deniability. In particular we propose the notion of forward deniability, which requires that the authentications remain deniable even if the Sender wants to later prove that she authenticated a message. We show that forward deniability is not implied by the original notion of deniability, by showing some deniable protocols which are not forward deniable. Our new proposals are forward deniable.
The notion of deniable authentication protocol was introduced in 1998 by Dwork et al. [11] and Aumann and Rabin [1, 2] independently. As a new cryptographic authentication protocol, a deniable authentication protocol enables an intended receiver to identify the source of a given message without being able to prove the identity of the sender to a third party. Over the past years, many deniable authentication protocols have been proposed. In this paper, we would like to present a universal encrypted deniable authentication protocol from any public key encryption scheme. Provided that the public key encryption scheme is secure, a secure deniable authentication protocol can be directly derived.
In 2004, Hsieh and Sun showed that Fan et al.'s deniable protocol does not posse the denial property; that is, a cheating receiver can prove the source of the received message to a third party. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Fan et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper points out an error in Hsieh-Sun's cryptanalysis on Fan et al.'s deniable authentication protocol and demonstrate that Hsieh-Sun's improved deniable authentication protocol still does not posse the deniable property and is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack.
In 2004, Hsieh and Sun showed that Fan et al.'s deniable protocol does not posse the denial property; that is, a cheating receiver can prove the source of the received message to a third party. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Fan et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper points out an error in Hsieh-Sun's cryptanalysis on Fan et al.'s deniable authentication protocol and demonstrate that Hsieh-Sun's improved deniable authentication protocol still does not posse the deniable property and is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack.