Abstract Here, some difficulties resulting from the application of any empirical acceptability conditions on sequences of single measurements are investigated. In particular, the often used acceptability requirement that each single measurement be made under the "same conditions" is discussed. In quantum mechanics, this means that each single measurement is made of the same physical quantity on a system in a ensemble of identically prepared systems. One of the resultant difficulties is that such an application leads to an infinite regression of sequences of single measurements. That is, it does not account for the fact that an observer must start the process of measurement or knowledge acquisition. Furthermore, it is seen that there are some basic sequences of single measurements for which an observer can not possibly know at the outset that the "same condition" requirements are satisfied. These include those measurements by which the homogeneity of space-time is tested. The possible relevance of these difficulties to physics is shown by first considering two possibilities of avoiding these difficulties. One is that the "same condition" requirements can be given the weaker interpretation that there be no physical principle forbidding an observer from knowing in terms of limit empirical means, that they are satisfied at the outset of any sequence. This gets rid of the infinite regression problem as it does not mean that an observer must know in fact that these requirements are satisfied. The other possibility is that if physics does not forbid one in principle from measuring an expectation value in an arbitrarily small time interval then both the basic sequence as well as those by which one knows the "same" requirements are satisfied can be relegated to arbitrarily small time intervals. As far as physics is concerned, then the epistemological difficulties while existing in these small intervals, do not exist for other times, or almost all time. It is then shown that quantum mechanics, as distinct from classical mechanics, and the special relativity require that an infinite time interval is necessary to measure, as a limit mean, any expectation value. Thus physics denies both the above possibilities as it forbids an observer from knowing even in principle, by any finite time that the "same" requirements are satisfied. Also, physics forbids the relegation of the epistemological problems to arbitrarily small time intervals.
Abstract Here, some difficulties resulting from the application of any empirical acceptability conditions on sequences of single measurements are investigated. In particular, the often used acceptability requirement that each single measurement be made under the "same conditions" is discussed. In quantum mechanics, this means that each single measurement is made of the same physical quantity on a system in a ensemble of identically prepared systems. One of the resultant difficulties is that such an application leads to an infinite regression of sequences of single measurements. That is, it does not account for the fact that an observer must start the process of measurement or knowledge acquisition. Furthermore, it is seen that there are some basic sequences of single measurements for which an observer can not possibly know at the outset that the "same condition" requirements are satisfied. These include those measurements by which the homogeneity of space-time is tested. The possible relevance of these difficulties to physics is shown by first considering two possibilities of avoiding these difficulties. One is that the "same condition" requirements can be given the weaker interpretation that there be no physical principle forbidding an observer from knowing in terms of limit empirical means, that they are satisfied at the outset of any sequence. This gets rid of the infinite regression problem as it does not mean that an observer must know in fact that these requirements are satisfied. The other possibility is that if physics does not forbid one in principle from measuring an expectation value in an arbitrarily small time interval then both the basic sequence as well as those by which one knows the "same" requirements are satisfied can be relegated to arbitrarily small time intervals. As far as physics is concerned, then the epistemological difficulties while existing in these small intervals, do not exist for other times, or almost all time. It is then shown that quantum mechanics, as distinct from classical mechanics, and the special relativity require that an infinite time interval is necessary to measure, as a limit mean, any expectation value. Thus physics denies both the above possibilities as it forbids an observer from knowing even in principle, by any finite time that the "same" requirements are satisfied. Also, physics forbids the relegation of the epistemological problems to arbitrarily small time intervals.
This paper uses the sample probability-space description to review, under general conditions, the measurement process whereby an empirical expectation value is obtained for comparison either with other values or with values calculated from a theory. The emphasis here is on some of the conditions which must be satisfied by general sequences of single measurements, about which an observer may have relatively little knowledge, in order that such sequences yield suitable expectation values. In particular, sequences are considered for which the requirements that the single measurements of the sequence be independent and made of the same physical quantity on ensembles of identically prepared systems are not necessarily satisfied. The differences between sequences which satisfy these requirements and those which do not are discussed in terms of the implications or meaning of the resultant expectation value as a point of contact between theory and experiment.
Measurement in classical physics Measurements in classical physics are the means by which we come to know the current state of a mechanical system without appreciably disturbing it. The laws of classical mechanics imply that we may interact with the system in such a way that this ideal may be approached arbitrarily closely, at least in principle (i.e., in theory, ignoring practical problems). The aim of this chapter is to examine how far we must revise this programme in the quantum theory of measurement. Did the classical physicist believe in the objective existence of material systems with well-defined position and momentum just because these quantities could be empirically determined with arbitrary precision at the same time? It seems she made a stronger assumption than this; that two successive observations of an apple, first in a tree and then on the ground, are connected to one another by virtue of the fact that the apple actually has a definite position and momentum at each instant, whether it is observed or not. Thus, the programme of classical physics was not merely to predict the results of future experiments by inserting data from previous ones into the laws of motion, but to show how the observations are a function of a causally connected sequence of unique processes undergone by the system of interest, which possesses properties independently of measurements. Measurement was then something of a secondary affair and indeed, prior to quantum mechanics, the theory of measurement as a distinct branch of theoretical physics did not exist.
Quantum mechanics has several deficiencies as a complete theoretical description of the measurement process. Among them is the fact that the quantum mechanical description of correlations between the single measurements of a sequence is quite problematic. A single measurement is defined to be a preparation followed by an observation. In particular, one feels that an infinite sequence of such single measurements which corresponds to the measurement of a question O on a state η where η does not lie entirely in an eigenspace of O should generate a random output sequence. However, quantum mechanics seems to say nothing about this. In this paper, physical theories are defined in such a manner that correlations between single measurements are explicitly included. In particular, a physical theory is considered to be a mapping U, with domain in the set [Qsτ] of infinite instruction strings for carrying out infinite sequences of single measurements and range in the set of probability measures defined on A, the usual σ algebra of subsets of Ω. Ω is the set of all infinite sequences of natural numbers. A fundamental property which any valid physical theory must satisfy is that it agrees with experiment. It is proposed and discussed here that much of the intuitive meaning of agreement between a theory U and experiment with respect to H is given by the statement ∀Qsτ [U(Qsτ) defined⇒E(H,U(Qsτ),ψQsτ)],where U(Qsτ) is the probability measure U associates with the infinite instruction string Qsτ and ψQsτ is the outcome sequence obtained by carrying out Qsτ. E(H, U(Qsτ),ψQsτ) is the statement that all formulas in H with one free sequence variable which are true on Ω almost everywhere with respect to U(Qsτ) are true for ψQsτ. H is a subclass of the class of all formulas in a formal language L. A theorem is proved which states that, if U(Qsτ) corresponds to a nontrivial product probability measure and U H-agrees with experiment, then the outcome sequence ψQsτ is H-random. H-randomness is defined here in terms of the statement E(H, P, φ). Another property of a valid physical theory, which is defined here, is that, for some Qsτ, U(Qsτ) must be determinable on much of AH from ψQsτ. Sufficient conditions for this property to hold are given. AH is the class of all H definable subsets of Ω. Some properties of the statement E(H, P, φ) are given. Among other things, it is proved that, if E(H, P, φ) holds and P is a nontrivial probability measure on A, then φ is not definable in H.
Measurements play a crucial role in doing physics: Their results provide the basis on which we adopt or reject physical theories. In this note, we examine the effect of subjecting measurements themselves to our experience. We require that our contact with the world is empirically warranted. Therefore, we study theories that satisfy the following assumption: Interactions are accounted for so that they are empirically traceable, and observations necessarily go with such an interaction with the observed system. Examining, with regard to these assumptions, an abstract representation of measurements with tools from quantum logic leads us to contextual theories. Contextuality becomes a means to render interactions, thus also measurements, empirically tangible. The measurement becomes problematic---also beyond quantum mechanics---if one tries to commensurate the assumption of tangible interactions with the notion of a spectator theory, i.e., with the idea that measurement results are read off without effect. The problem, thus, presents itself as the collision of different epistemological stances with repercussions beyond quantum mechanics.
The informal aspects, arising in the interpretation of physical experiments, of the theory of probability and mathematical statistics are discussed. The conditions that verifying experiments must satisfy are presented and the role of heuristic (extralogical) assertions is analyzed using the example of mathematical expectation. The principal hypotheses implicit in experiments are enumerated: the principle of reproducibility (the past will be repeated in the future); the principle of reasonable sufficiency; and, the statistical principle (better to predict something rather than nothing). Considerable attention is devoted to Fisher and multisample confidence intervals. It is noted that Fisher confidence intervals are inconsistent. The arguments for introducing contrivances into practical calculations of probabilities are enumerated: incompleteness of any system of hypotheses; subjective estimates of probabilities; adjoining of statistical ensembles; nonstationariness and instability; rare phenomena; and, the use of classical probabilities and the law of large numbers. It is concluded that the relative frequency of appearance (empirical probability) is a normal physical quantity in the sense that it admits physical measurement. Its abnormality is manifested in the fact that it is burdened, more than other physical quantities, with conventions and hypotheses which must be specially checked (verified).
The concept of measurement plays both a central and a problematic role in quantum mechanics. First of all, and unusually, the word ‘measurement’ figures in the fundamental axioms of quantum mechanics - in principle (3) of Chapter 2 for example - and in this quantum physics is quite unlike classical physics as a whole. For though a measurement made on a classical system naturally involves an interaction between the system and a measuring apparatus, there is nothing special according to classical physics about measurement interactions. Describing the measuring process is a straightforward problem of applied classical physics. The classical laws of motion do not break down during the measuring process. For example, suppose you observe a classical particle using light bounced off it. In the classical account you can make the disturbance on the observed system as small as you like and, ‘in principle', you can observe the system with arbitrary accuracy. ‘In principle’ - a favorite expression of the philosopher of physics - means what it always means in physics. The contrast is with ‘in practice'. Of course, in practice there are all sorts of limitations on measurement. There are also some theoretical limitations, like those due to thermodynamics. But these are not the limitations imposed by the theory we are considering, namely classical mechanics. Such limitations as there are are imposed by some other theory. (The expression ‘in principle’ tends to be used when we are discussing the principles of a particular theory and, theoretically but not in practice, physics is a collection of disjoint theories.)