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Philosophy of Science

Empirical Adequacy and the Availability of Reliable Records in Quantum Mechanics

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Published Mar 1, 1996• 68 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In order to judge whether a theory is empirically adequate one must have epistemic access to reliable records of past measurement results that can be compared against the predictions of the theory. Some formulations of quantum mechanics fail to satisfy this condition. The standard theory without the collapse postulate is an example. Bell's reading of Everett's relative-state formulation is another. Furthermore, there are formulations of quantum mechanics that only satisfy this condition for a special class of observers, formulations whose empirical adequacy could only be judged by an observer who records her measurement results in a special way. Bohm's theory is an example. It is possible to formulate hidden-variable theories that do not suffer from such a restriction, but these encounter other problems.

DOI
10.1086/289893

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In order to judge whether a theory is empirically adequate one must have epistemic access to reliable records of past measurement results that can be compared against the predictions of the theory. Some formulations of quantum mechanics fail to satisfy this condition. The standard theory without the collapse postulate is an example. Bell's reading of Everett's relative-state formulation is another. Furthermore, there are formulations of quantum mechanics that only satisfy this condition for a special class of observers, formulations whose empirical adequacy could only be judged by an observer who records her measurement results in a special way. Bohm's theory is an example. It is possible to formulate hidden-variable theories that do not suffer from such a restriction, but these encounter other problems.
The central part of Everett's formulation of quantum mechanics is a quantum mechanical model of memory and of observation as the recording of information in a memory. To use this model as an answer to the measurement problem, Everett has to assume that a conscious observer can be in a superposition of such memory states and be unaware of it. This assumption has puzzled generations of readers. The fundamental aim of this dissertation is to find a set of simpler assumptions which are sufficient to show that Everett's model is empirically adequate. I argue that Everett's model needs three assumptions to account for the process of observation: an assumption of decoherence of observers as quantum mechanical systems; an assumption of supervenience of mental states (qualities) over quantum mechanical properties; and an assumption about the interpretation of quantum mechanical states in general: quantum mechanical states describe ensembles of states of affairs coexisting in the same system. I argue that the only plausible understanding of such ensembles is as ensembles of possibilities, and that all standard no-collapse interpretations agree in this reading of quantum mechanical states. Their differences can be understood as different theories about what marks the real state within this ensemble, and Everett's theory as the claim that no additional 'mark of reality' is necessary. Using the three assumptions, I argue that introspection cannot determine the objective quantum mechanical state of an observer. Rather, the introspective qualities of a quantum mechanical state can be represented by a (classical) statistical ensemble of subjective states. An analysis of these subjective states and their dynamics leads to the conclusion that they suffice to give empirically correct predictions. The argument for the empirical adequacy of the subjective state entails that knowledge of the objective quantum mechanical state is impossible in principle. Empirical reality for a conscious observer is not described by the objective state, but by a Everettian relative state conditional on the subjective state, and no theoretical 'mark of reality' is necessary for this concept of reality. I compare the resulting concept of reality to Kant's distinction between empirical and transcendental reality.
Abstract Everett thought of the quantum measurement problem as one of providing a consistent description of nested measurement. He proposed solving the measurement problem by simply supposing that all physical systems whatsoever always obey the linear dynamics and hence never collapse. Dropping the collapse dynamics immediately solves the measurement problem, but it introduces two new problems: explaining determinate measurement records and explaining quantum probabilities. In addition to these, we also consider the problem of empirical coherence in the context of pure wave mechanics. We then discuss how Everett himself understood determinate records and probabilities in his relative-state formulation of pure wave mechanics. What he ultimately provided was an argument that his formulation of quantum mechanics was consistent and empirically faithful. We will see why this is a relative weak standard by which to judge the empirical adequacy of a physical theory.
Abstract Each formulation of quantum mechanics we consider in the book seeks to explain why we have determinate measurement records distributed according to the standard quantum statistics. The explanation we get relies on the metaphysical assumptions that underlie the particular theory. Metaphysics here does real explanatory work in accounting for our experience. While it is not at all clear what specific metaphysical commitments best explain our experience, one can distinguish between different types and degrees of empirical adequacy each formulation provides. Stronger notions of empirical adequacy might be characterized in terms of such things as the plausibility that one’s experience in fact supervenes on the sort of records a particular theory provides and the richness of the account of experience provided by the theory.
Bohmian mechanics (BM) draws a picture of nature, which is completely different from that drawn by standard quantum mechanics (SQM): Particles are at any time at a definite position, and the universe evolves deterministically. Astonishingly, according to a proof by Bohm the empirical predictions of these two very different theories coincide. From the very beginning, BM has faced all kinds of criticism, most of which are either technical or philosophical. There is, however, a criticism first raised by Correggi et al. (2002) and recently strengthened by Kiukas and Werner (2010), which holds that, in spite of Bohm's proof, the predictions of BM do not agree with those of SQM in the case of local position measurements on entangled particles in a stationary state. Hence, given that SQM has been proven to be tremendously successful in the past, BM could most likely not be considered an empirically adequate theory. My aim is to resolve the conflict by showing that 1) it relies on hidden differences in the conceptual thinking, and that 2) the predictions of both theories approximately coincide if the process of measurement is adequately accounted for. My analysis makes no use of any sort of wavefunction collapse, refuting a widespread belief that an "effective collapse" is needed to reconcile BM with the predictions of SQM.
Abstract The measurement problem in quantum mechanics is commonly framed as a conflict between unitary dynamics and the appearance of definite outcomes. This paper argues that the conflict arises from a misplaced assumption about what outcomes must be. In experimental practice, outcomes are not arbitrarily precise microscopic states or instantaneous events, but stable physical records produced in measurement interactions. Treating outcomes as such records allows them to be formalized as coarse-grained equivalence classes of physical states that persist in time and support consistent interaction across systems. On this basis, decoherence explains the stability of outcomes without selecting a unique global result or modifying quantum dynamics. Objectivity is recovered through the robustness of records rather than through absolute, observer-independent outcome facts. The measurement problem is thereby dissolved without invoking collapse mechanisms, branching universes, or observer-dependent postulates, while preserving all standard empirical predictions of quantum mechanics.
Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is conceptually and mathematically simpler, and does, after all, work very well in a low-energy regime. Any solution of the measurement problem, or any account of the ontology of quantum theory, must yield sensible results in this regime, and so nonrelativistic quantum mechanics can serve as a testing ground for the viability of interpretations. On any approach, empirical adequacy requires recovery of at least an approximation to the quantum probabilities for outcomes of experiments, insofar as these have been verified by experiment. A quantum-mechanical theory is what results when one subjects a classical theory of a system with finitely many degrees of freedom to quantization. The task of extending additional beables theories to the context of quantum field theories remains a work in progress. A dynamical collapse theory modifies the evolution of the quantum state. Standard quantum theory predicts correlations between outcomes of spacelike separated experiments that violate Bell inequalities.