Measurement in classical physics Measurements in classical physics are the means by which we come to know the current state of a mechanical system without appreciably disturbing it. The laws of classical mechanics imply that we may interact with the system in such a way that this ideal may be approached arbitrarily closely, at least in principle (i.e., in theory, ignoring practical problems). The aim of this chapter is to examine how far we must revise this programme in the quantum theory of measurement. Did the classical physicist believe in the objective existence of material systems with well-defined position and momentum just because these quantities could be empirically determined with arbitrary precision at the same time? It seems she made a stronger assumption than this; that two successive observations of an apple, first in a tree and then on the ground, are connected to one another by virtue of the fact that the apple actually has a definite position and momentum at each instant, whether it is observed or not. Thus, the programme of classical physics was not merely to predict the results of future experiments by inserting data from previous ones into the laws of motion, but to show how the observations are a function of a causally connected sequence of unique processes undergone by the system of interest, which possesses properties independently of measurements. Measurement was then something of a secondary affair and indeed, prior to quantum mechanics, the theory of measurement as a distinct branch of theoretical physics did not exist.
Measurement in classical physics Measurements in classical physics are the means by which we come to know the current state of a mechanical system without appreciably disturbing it. The laws of classical mechanics imply that we may interact with the system in such a way that this ideal may be approached arbitrarily closely, at least in principle (i.e., in theory, ignoring practical problems). The aim of this chapter is to examine how far we must revise this programme in the quantum theory of measurement. Did the classical physicist believe in the objective existence of material systems with well-defined position and momentum just because these quantities could be empirically determined with arbitrary precision at the same time? It seems she made a stronger assumption than this; that two successive observations of an apple, first in a tree and then on the ground, are connected to one another by virtue of the fact that the apple actually has a definite position and momentum at each instant, whether it is observed or not. Thus, the programme of classical physics was not merely to predict the results of future experiments by inserting data from previous ones into the laws of motion, but to show how the observations are a function of a causally connected sequence of unique processes undergone by the system of interest, which possesses properties independently of measurements. Measurement was then something of a secondary affair and indeed, prior to quantum mechanics, the theory of measurement as a distinct branch of theoretical physics did not exist.
The concept of measurement plays both a central and a problematic role in quantum mechanics. First of all, and unusually, the word ‘measurement’ figures in the fundamental axioms of quantum mechanics - in principle (3) of Chapter 2 for example - and in this quantum physics is quite unlike classical physics as a whole. For though a measurement made on a classical system naturally involves an interaction between the system and a measuring apparatus, there is nothing special according to classical physics about measurement interactions. Describing the measuring process is a straightforward problem of applied classical physics. The classical laws of motion do not break down during the measuring process. For example, suppose you observe a classical particle using light bounced off it. In the classical account you can make the disturbance on the observed system as small as you like and, ‘in principle', you can observe the system with arbitrary accuracy. ‘In principle’ - a favorite expression of the philosopher of physics - means what it always means in physics. The contrast is with ‘in practice'. Of course, in practice there are all sorts of limitations on measurement. There are also some theoretical limitations, like those due to thermodynamics. But these are not the limitations imposed by the theory we are considering, namely classical mechanics. Such limitations as there are are imposed by some other theory. (The expression ‘in principle’ tends to be used when we are discussing the principles of a particular theory and, theoretically but not in practice, physics is a collection of disjoint theories.)
The term measurement theory refers to that part of a physical theory in which the empirical and operational content of the concepts of the theory is determined. Measurements are analyzed both as operational procedures defining the → observables of the theory and as physical processes which are themselves subject to the laws of physics. In classical physics, measurements are performed in order to deter-mine the values of one or several observables of the physical system un-der consideration. Classical physics allowed the idealized notion that every physical quantity has a definite value at any time, and that this value can be determined with certainty by measurement without influ-encing the object system in a significant way. By contrast, in quantum mechanics both features fail to hold without strong qualifications. Ac-cordingly, in their seminal paper of 1935 [1], Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen used elements of this description as a sufficient criterion of phys-ical reality, applicable both in classical and quantum mechanics:
The classical theory of measurement is built upon the conception of an interaction between the system of interest and the measuring apparatus that can be made arbitrarily small, or at least precisely compensated, so that one can speak meaningfully of an idealized measurement that disturbs no property of the system. In the most elementary type of measurement, an ensemble of independent similar systems is sorted by the apparatus into subensembles, distinguished by definite values of the physical quantity being measured. The use of complex numbers in the measurement algebra implies the existence of a dual algebra in which all numbers are replaced, by the complex conjugate numbers. No physical result can depend upon which algebra is employed. The measurement symbols of a given description provide a basis for the representation of an arbitrary operator by N 2 numbers, and the abstract properties of operators are realized by the combinatorial laws of these arrays of numbers, which are those of matrices.
This chapter examines the reasons why measurement theory is a particularly controversial part of modern theoretical physics. The problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is considered as nonexistent or trivial by an impressive body of theoretical physicists and as presenting almost insurmountable difficulties by a somewhat lesser but steadily growing number of their colleagues. The law of evolution in time constitutes the essential part of the conventional measurement theory. In this theory, the existence of a Hamiltonian describing the instrument-system interaction is postulated, not derived. In other words, this assumption is considered as a legitimate idealization of the experimental facts. A wave packet reduction can be considered as a phenomenological procedure that, in many instances, can be applied in order to calculate the results of successive observations and the correlations between them without introducing into the formulas the complicated wave functions of the various instruments.
States and observables Bras, kets, and operators There are at least two fundamental assumptions made in classical physics which do not apply in quantum physics. These two assumptions concern the types of measurements we can perform on a given system. The first assumption made is that it is possible, at least in principle, to perform a measurement on a given system in a way in which the interaction between the system being studied and the measuring apparatus can be made as small as we like. Because the act of measurement will disturb the system in some way, it is assumed that we can compensate for this disturbance to minimize the interaction. For example, if we look visually at an object by illuminating it with light, the illumination caused by the light leaving the light source and striking the object before being reflected to our eyes will impart some momentum to the object. Given the wavelength of light used we can always (in classical physics) work out what momentum is imparted, and we can compensate for this change in momentum by applying an appropriate force to the object to counteract this change. The second assumption made in classical physics is that there are no restrictions on what measurements we can make on a system either in type or in accuracy. Both assumptions can break down when we consider systems which must be described by quantum mechanics.
THE PROBLEM Within classical physics the relation between physical theory and ordinary experience was conceived in the following way: ordinary experience is something that can be described and understood in terms of physics. Such a description involves, apart from physical theory, certain approximations. But the conditons under which those approximations apply (they correspond to the initial conditions of, say, celestial mechanics), taken together with the theory, are supposed to be sufficient for giving a full account of ordinary experience. Consequently, classical theory of measurement (which, like any other theory of measurement, links together terms of ordinary experience and theoretical terms), is a piece of applied physics and all processes which happen during measurement can be analysed on the basis of the equations of motion only. When we enter quantum mechanics (QM), we are apparently presented with a completely different picture. For according to the current interpretation of elementary quantum mechanics, ordinary experience – and this now means classical physics – and physical theory (and this now means QM), belong to two completely different levels and it is impossible to give an account of the first in terms of the second. Any transition from the quantum level to the level of classical physics must be taken, not as a transition within QM from the general to the particular, but as an essentially new element which is incapable of further analysis.