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Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Quantum probability, choice in large worlds, and the statistical structure of reality

Don Ross, James Ladyman

Published May 14, 2013• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Classical probability models of incentive response are inadequate in "large worlds," where the dimensions of relative risk and the dimensions of similarity in outcome comparisons typically differ. Quantum probability models for choice in large worlds may be motivated pragmatically - there is no third theory - or metaphysically: statistical processing in the brain adapts to the true scale-relative structure of the universe.

DOI
10.1017/s0140525x1200310x

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Classical probability models of incentive response are inadequate in "large worlds," where the dimensions of relative risk and the dimensions of similarity in outcome comparisons typically differ. Quantum probability models for choice in large worlds may be motivated pragmatically - there is no third theory - or metaphysically: statistical processing in the brain adapts to the true scale-relative structure of the universe.
Clues from psychology indicate that human cognition are not only based on classical probability theory as explained by Kolmogorov’s axioms but additionally on quantum probability. Quantum probabilities lead to the conclusion that our brain adapted to the Everett many-worlds reality trough the evolutionary process. The Everett many-worlds theory views reality as a many-branched tree in which every possible quantum outcome is realized. In this context, one of the cognitive brain functions is to provide a causally consistent explanation of events to maintain self-identity over time. Causality is related to a meaningful explanation. For impossible explanations, causality does not exist, and the identity of the self breaks. Only in meaningful causal worlds may personal identities exist.
The central motivating idea behind the development of this work is the concept of prespace, a hypothetical structure that is postulated by some physicists to underlie the fabric of space or space-time. I consider how such a structure could relate to space and space-time, and the rest of reality as we know it, and the implications of the existence of this structure for quantum theory. Understanding how this structure could relate to space and to the rest of reality requires, I believe, that we consider how space itself relates to reality, and how other so-called “spaces” used in physics relate to reality. In the first chapter I compare space and space-time to other spaces used in physics, such as configuration space, phase space and Hilbert space. I support what is known as the “property view” of space, opposing both the traditional views of space and space-time, substantivalism and relationism. I argue that all these spaces are property spaces. After examining the relationships of these spaces to causality, I argue that configuration space has, due to its role in quantum mechanics, a special status in the microscopic world similar to the status of position space in the macroscopic world. In chapter two prespace itself is considered. One way of approaching this structure is through the comparison of the prespace structure with a computational system, in particular to a cellular automaton, in which space or space-time and all other physical quantities are broken down into discrete units. I suggest that one way open for a prespace metaphysics can be found if physics is made fully discrete in this way. I suggest as a heuristic principle that the physical laws of our world are such that the computational cost of implementing those laws on an arbitrary computational system is minimized, adapting a heuristic principle of this type proposed by Feynman (1982). In the final chapter some of the ideas of the previous chapters are applied in an examination of the physics and metaphysics of quantum theory. I first discuss the “measurement problem” of quantum mechanics: this problem and its proposed solution are the primary subjects of the final chapter. It turns out that considering how quantum theory could be made fully discrete leads naturally to a suggestion of how standard linear quantum mechanics could be modified to give rise to a solution to the measurement problem. The computational heuristic principle reinforces the same solution. I call the modified quantum mechanics Critical Complexity Quantum Mechanics (CCQM). I compare CCQM with some of the other proposed solutions to the measurement problem, in particular the spontaneous localization model of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986). Finally I argue that the measure of complexity of quantum mechanical states I introduce in CCQM also provides a new definition of entropy for quantum mechanics, and suggests a solution to the problem of providing an objective foundation for statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and the arrow of time.
What is the proper metaphysics of quantum mechanics? In this dissertation, I approach the question from three different but related angles. First, I suggest that the quantum state can be understood intrinsically as relations holding among regions in ordinary space-time, from which we can recover the wave function uniquely up to an equivalence class (by representation and uniqueness theorems). The intrinsic account eliminates certain conventional elements (e.g. overall phase) in the representation of the quantum state. It also dispenses with first-order quantification over mathematical objects, which goes some way towards making the quantum world safe for a nominalistic metaphysics suggested in Field (1980, 2016). Second, I argue that the fundamental space of the quantum world is the low-dimensional physical space and not the high-dimensional space isomorphic to the ``configuration space.'' My arguments are based on considerations about dynamics, empirical adequacy, and symmetries of the quantum mechanics. Third, I show that, when we consider quantum mechanics in a time-asymmetric universe (with a large entropy gradient), we obtain new theoretical and conceptual possibilities. In such a model, we can use the low-entropy boundary condition known as the Past Hypothesis (Albert, 2000) to pin down a natural initial quantum state of the universe. However, the universal quantum state is not a pure state but a mixed state, represented by a density matrix that is the normalized projection onto the Past Hypothesis subspace. This particular choice has interesting consequences for Humean supervenience, statistical mechanical probabilities, and theoretical unity.