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Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics

Attacking quantum key distribution with single-photon two-qubit quantum logic

Jeffrey H. Shapiro, Franco N. C. Wong

Published Jan 1, 2006• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The Fuchs-Peres-Brandt (FPB) probe realizes the most powerful individual attack on BB84 quantum key distribution. A physical simulation of the FPB-probe attack using single-photon two-qubit quantum logic is described.
DOI
10.1109/cleo.2006.4628906

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The Fuchs-Peres-Brandt (FPB) probe realizes the most powerful individual attack on Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution (BB84 QKD) by means of a single controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate. This paper describes a complete physical simulation of the FPB-probe attack on polarization-based BB84 QKD using a deterministic CNOT constructed from single-photon two-qubit quantum logic. Adding polarization-preserving quantum nondemolition measurements of photon number to this configuration converts the physical simulation into a true deterministic realization of the FPB attack.
We have used deterministic single-photon two-qubit quantum logic to implement the most powerful individual-photon attack against the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol. Our measurement results, including physical source and gate errors, are in good agreement with theoretical predictions for the R\'enyi information obtained by Eve as a function of the errors she imparts to Alice and Bob's sifted key bits. The current experiment is a physical simulation of a true attack, because Eve has access to Bob's physical receiver module. Nevertheless, the physical simulation allows investigation of the fundamental security limit of the BB84 protocol against eavesdropping in the presence of realistic physical errors, and it affords the opportunity to study the effectiveness of error correction and privacy amplification when the BB84 protocol is attacked.