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arXiv:quant-ph/0508051 · Physical Review A

Attacking quantum key distribution with single-photon two-qubit quantum logic

Jeffrey H. Shapiro, Franco N. C. Wong

Published Jan 1, 2006• 23 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The Fuchs-Peres-Brandt (FPB) probe realizes the most powerful individual attack on Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution (BB84 QKD) by means of a single controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate. This paper describes a complete physical simulation of the FPB-probe attack on polarization-based BB84 QKD using a deterministic CNOT constructed from single-photon two-qubit quantum logic. Adding polarization-preserving quantum nondemolition measurements of photon number to this configuration converts the physical simulation into a true deterministic realization of the FPB attack.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.73.012315

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The Fuchs-Peres-Brandt (FPB) probe realizes the most powerful individual attack on Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution (BB84 QKD) by means of a single controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate. This paper describes a complete physical simulation of the FPB-probe attack on polarization-based BB84 QKD using a deterministic CNOT constructed from single-photon two-qubit quantum logic. Adding polarization-preserving quantum nondemolition measurements of photon number to this configuration converts the physical simulation into a true deterministic realization of the FPB attack.
We have used deterministic single-photon two-qubit quantum logic to implement the most powerful individual-photon attack against the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol. Our measurement results, including physical source and gate errors, are in good agreement with theoretical predictions for the R\'enyi information obtained by Eve as a function of the errors she imparts to Alice and Bob's sifted key bits. The current experiment is a physical simulation of a true attack, because Eve has access to Bob's physical receiver module. Nevertheless, the physical simulation allows investigation of the fundamental security limit of the BB84 protocol against eavesdropping in the presence of realistic physical errors, and it affords the opportunity to study the effectiveness of error correction and privacy amplification when the BB84 protocol is attacked.
In this work, we simulate a fiber-based Quantum Key Distribution Protocol (QKDP) BB84 working at the telecoms wavelength 1550 nm with taking into consideration an optimized attack strategy. We consider in our work a quantum channel composed by probabilistic Single Photon Source (SPS), single mode optical Fiber and quantum detector with high efficiency. We show the advantages of using the Quantum Dots (QD) embedded in micro-cavity compared to the Heralded Single Photon Sources (HSPS). Second, we show that Eve is always getting some information depending on the mean photon number per pulse of the used SPS and therefore, we propose an optimized version of the QKDP BB84 based on Quantum Dense Coding (QDC) that could be implemented by quantum CNOT gates. We evaluate the success probability of implementing the optimized QKDP BB84 when using nowadays probabilistic quantum optical devices for circuit realization. We use for our modeling an abstract probabilistic model of a CNOT gate based on linear optical components and having a success probability of sqrt (4/27), we take into consideration the best SPSs realizations, namely the QD and the HSPS, generating a single photon per pulse with a success probability of 0.73 and 0.37, respectively. We show that the protocol is totally secure against attacks but could be correctly implemented only with a success probability of few percent.
Abstract The mathematical physical bases are given for quantum cryptographic probes which exploit entanglement to eavesdrop on quantum key distribution. The quantum circuits and designs are presented for two different optimized entangling probes for attacking the BB84 Protocol of quantum key distribution (QKD) and yielding maximum information to the probes. Probe photon polarization states become optimally entangled with the signal states on their way between the legitimate transmitter and receiver. The designs are based on different optimum unitary transformations, each yielding the same maximum information on the pre-privacy amplified key. In each of the designs, the main quantum circuit consists of a single CNOT gate which produces the optimum entanglement between the BB84 signal states and the correlated states of the probe. For each design a different well-defined single-photon polarization state serves as the initial state of the probe, and in each case the probe is projectively measured. Symmetric projective measurements of the probe yield maximum information on the pre-privacy amplified key once basis information becomes available during basis reconciliation.