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BIOPHYSICS

Many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory and fundamental problems of biophysics

Vladimir A. Namiot

Published Jan 1, 2014• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

The main aspects connected with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory are discussed in the article. A possible relation of the interpretation with fundamental biological problems is emphasized. The context of the many-worlds interpretation is discussed in the frames of the so-called “wave function reduction” problem. Thus, some difficulties that arise when we try to imagine how a wave function is reduced in the many-worlds interpretation, are focused on. It is shown that explanations suggested by now as to how the “wave function reduction” happens cannot claim to be the final answer to this question, even though they are not formally contradictory.

DOI
10.1134/s0006350914010102

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The main aspects connected with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory are discussed in the article. A possible relation of the interpretation with fundamental biological problems is emphasized. The context of the many-worlds interpretation is discussed in the frames of the so-called “wave function reduction” problem. Thus, some difficulties that arise when we try to imagine how a wave function is reduced in the many-worlds interpretation, are focused on. It is shown that explanations suggested by now as to how the “wave function reduction” happens cannot claim to be the final answer to this question, even though they are not formally contradictory.
Standard quantum theory is highly successful in all its applications, from photons and atoms, to semiconductors, superconductors, quarks, and so on. Yet the need to understand what the theory is really trying to tell us about the nature of the world beyond specific predictions forces us into the realm of philosophy, or, as some have dubbed it, quantum metaphysics: the study of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. There is a wide range of opinions regarding the philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics. This chapter focuses on two of the most prominent interpretations: the Copenhagen interpretation, and one alternative interpretation that has been gaining some support in recent years, the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), also known as the many universes interpretation. The central issues of contention are: firstly, that the measurement of some attribute of a quantum system generally involves the probabilistic collapse, or reduction, of the state vector where the probabilistic nature of the process is inherent—that is, not reducible to a more fundamental, deterministic explanation; and, secondly, the problem of bringing a measurement to a completion—a problem generally known as the measurement paradox.
The articles provides a phenomenological reading of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics and its answer to the measurement problem, or the question of “why only one of a wave function’s probable values is observed when the system is measured.” Transcendental-phenomenological and hermeneutic-phenomenological approaches are employed. The project comprises four parts. Parts one and two review MWI and the standard (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics. Part three reviews the phenomenologies. Part four deconstructs the hermeneutics of MWI. It agrees with the confidence the theory derives from its (1) unforgiving appropriation of the Schrödinger equation and (2) association of branching universes with the evolution of the wave function insofar as that understanding comes from the formalism itself. Part four also reveals the hermeneutical shortcomings of the standard interpretation.
Since the 1970s, the Everett-Wheeler many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of Quantum Mechanics (1955) has been much in the news. One wonders about the worlds in question, their branches, their splittings, their number. It is most often ignored that this language is not that of Everett, whom Wheeler very quickly stopped supporting. Moreover, for some interpreters, the real meaning of Everett ideas is not the coexistence of many worlds, but the existence of a single quantum one. In this context, what should we think of attempts to verify Everett thesis? What about the connexion between MWI and the cosmological multiverse? How to understand the links between the quantum world and the classical one? This article tries to answer some of these questions.
This paper deals with the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the nature of physical theory, and the future of physics. First, the question of why there are so many different interpretations of quantum mechanics proposed and accepted by outstanding quantum experts is treated. This requires a discussion of the relation between physics and philosophy and drawing a distinction between a physical formalism and a physical explanation. The Copenhagen interpretation is considered, criticized, and found to be unsatisfactory in some respects. Finally, an interpretation that contains ideas from previous interpretations but which may itself be new, is proposed. Hopefully, this is superior to the previous interpretations. It has, I believe, the advantage of logical clarity. In the process of doing this, I introduce a theory of levels of physical theory, according to which microscopic physical theory, as it develops in successive stages, becomes more and more adaptable to explaining—or at least taking cognizance of—fundamental biological or ultimately psychological phenomena.
Abstract The many-worlds view is one of the most discussed “interpretations” of quantum mechanics. As is well known, this view has some very controversial and much discussed aspects. This paper focuses on one particular problem arising from the combination of quantum mechanics with Special Relativity. It turns out that the ontology of the many-worlds view – the account of what there is and what branches of the universe exist – is relative to inertial frames. If one wants to avoid relativizing ontology, one has to argue either that there is an additional source of branching due to Special Relativity and thus additional branches or worlds. Or one has to argue that there are not only many worlds but also many universes (sets of worlds or world-branches); there is thus not only one tree of many world-branches but many frame-specific trees, a “forest” of many world-trees. The main problem here is how one can understand all or any of this.