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arXiv:2208.04618 · Quantum Reports

Why the Many-Worlds Interpretation?

Lev Vaidman A

Published Aug 4, 2022• 22 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

A brief (subjective) description of the state of the art of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) is presented. It is argued that the MWI is the only interpretation which removes action at a distance and randomness from quantum theory. Limitations of the MWI regarding questions of probability which can be legitimately asked are specified. The ontological picture of the MWI as a theory of the universal wave function decomposed into a superposition of world wave functions, the important parts of which are defined in three-dimensional space, is presented from the point of view of our particular branch. Some speculations about misconceptions, which apparently prevent the MWI from being in the consensus, are mentioned.

DOI
10.3390/quantum4030018

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•Jun 24, 2010•352 citations
A brief (subjective) description of the state of the art of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) is presented. It is argued that the MWI is the only interpretation which removes action at a distance and randomness from quantum theory. Limitations of the MWI regarding questions of probability which can be legitimately asked are specified. The ontological picture of the MWI as a theory of the universal wave function decomposed into a superposition of world wave functions, the important parts of which are defined in three-dimensional space, is presented from the point of view of our particular branch. Some speculations about misconceptions, which apparently prevent the MWI from being in the consensus, are mentioned.
The articles provides a phenomenological reading of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics and its answer to the measurement problem, or the question of “why only one of a wave function’s probable values is observed when the system is measured.” Transcendental-phenomenological and hermeneutic-phenomenological approaches are employed. The project comprises four parts. Parts one and two review MWI and the standard (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics. Part three reviews the phenomenologies. Part four deconstructs the hermeneutics of MWI. It agrees with the confidence the theory derives from its (1) unforgiving appropriation of the Schrödinger equation and (2) association of branching universes with the evolution of the wave function insofar as that understanding comes from the formalism itself. Part four also reveals the hermeneutical shortcomings of the standard interpretation.
This thesis takes a look at the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and discusses if it can become the leading interpretation of quantum mechanics. Firstly the Copenhagen interpretation is outlined and its issues relating to the measurement problem are discussed while taking recent insights in decoherence theory into account. Establishing that wave-function collapse still yields interpretational issues, I discuss the ideas of Hugh Everett, who proposed the many-worlds interpretation, and David Wallace who is a prominent advocate of the MWI. In particular I discuss and review Wallace's arguments in favor of viewing the wave-function and the many worlds realistically. The next part shortly focuses on the testability of the many-worlds interpretation and the philosophical and theoretical issues relating to probability in the MWI. I end by concluding that the no-collapse interpretations are preferable to the Copenhagen interpretation, and I argue in favor of a realistic view towards all of the worlds. Furthermore, I conclude that standard textbooks on quantum mechanics should be updated to introduce students to the insight that wave-function collapse isn't needed in forming a complete theory of quantum mechanics.
Next year, there will be a 100-year celebration of quantum mechanics, but there is no consensus on the interpretation of this theory. This reprint presents recent works on one of the most intriguing interpretations, the many-worlds interpretation, presented at a workshop in October 2022 at Tel Aviv University. The many-worlds interpretation solves the measurement problem, avoids action at a distance and indeterminism, and does not contradict empirical evidence. The main question discussed in the workshop was as follows: why is it not in the consensus? Major issues such as preferred basis, the meaning of probability, non-locality, and alternative approaches were discussed, which are increasingly drawing attention in physics and philosophy. The contributions demonstrated a striking diversity in understanding the basic concepts. What are the worlds in the many-worlds interpretation? Do the worlds diverge or split? Is probability objective or subjective, or is it just an illusion? Can we avoid the non-separability of quantum mechanics? Many questions were raised and significant progress in understanding was achieved, but the papers showed that consensus is still far away. This reprint describes the current status of the research and will be invaluable for physicists and philosophers who want to resolve the long-standing problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.