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Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE

Security analysis of optical encryption

Yann Frauel A, Albertina Castro, Thomas J. Naughton, Bahram Javidi

Published Oct 13, 2005• 38 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper analyzes the security of amplitude encoding for double random phase encryption. We describe several types of attack. The system is found to be resistant to brute-force attacks but vulnerable to chosen and known plaintext attacks.
DOI
10.1117/12.633677

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