Optics Letters

Vulnerability to chosen-cyphertext attacks of optical encryption schemes based on double random phase keys

Artur Carnicer, Mario Montes‐Usategui, Sergio Arcos, Ignacio Juvells Prades

Published Jul 1, 2005• 595 citations

Abstract

We show how optical encryption methods based on double random phase keys are vulnerable to an organized attack of the chosen-ciphertext type. The decryption key can be easily obtained by an opponent who has repeated access to either the encryption or decryption machines. However, we have also devised a solution that prevents the attack. Our results cast doubts on the present security of these techniques.

DOI: 10.1364/ol.30.001644

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