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Acta Physica Sinica

Chosen plaintext attack on double random-phase encoding in the Fresnel domain

Peng Xiang, Wei Heng-Zheng, Peng Zhang, (1)天津大学精密测试技术及仪器国家重点实验室，天津 300072; (2)天津大学精密测试技术及仪器国家重点实验室，天津 300072;深圳大学光电子学研究所，教育部光电子器件与系统重点实验室，深圳 518060; (3)中国建设银行总行电子银行部，北京 100032

Published Jan 1, 2007• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper analyzes the security of double random phase encoding in fresnel domain from the viewpoint of cryptoanalysis. We demonstrate the encryption system is vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attack with a prior knowledge of diffraction distance and wavelength. With this attack an opponent can access double random phase keys with the help of the impulse functions as chosen plaintext. The significant feature of proposed attack is that the decryption process is lossless. Numerical simulations show good agreement with theoretical analysis.

DOI
10.7498/aps.56.3924

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This paper analyzes the security of double random phase encoding in fresnel domain from the viewpoint of cryptoanalysis. We demonstrate the encryption system is vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attack with a prior knowledge of diffraction distance and wavelength. With this attack an opponent can access double random phase keys with the help of the impulse functions as chosen plaintext. The significant feature of proposed attack is that the decryption process is lossless. Numerical simulations show good agreement with theoretical analysis.
We demonstrate a method of chosen-plaintext attack on lensless double-random phase encoding (L-DRPE) in the Fresnel domain. With this attack an opponent can access two encryption keys with help of the impulse functions as chosen plaintexts. This shows that a lensless optical encryption scheme based on DRPE is vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attack. Cryptoanalysis also indicates that the security worry originates from the linearity of the encryption and decryption mechanism of the L-DRPE scheme. One of the interesting features of the proposed attack is that the decryption process is lossless. Numerical simulations show good agreement with theoretical analysis.
In the field of optical information security, the most attractive work is the so-called double-random-phase encoding encryption scheme proposed by Javidi. However, the security of this cryptosystem has not been analyzed thoroughly from the point of view of cryptoanalysis. In this article, the weakness of Javidi's optical security system is carefully analyzed with a known-plain text attack. It is shown that the double-random-phase encoding encryption scheme is a linear symmetric block cipher cryptosystem and its linearity opens avenues of attacks. Under the known-plaintext attack, attacker can obtain the phase key(s) in the input plane using the typical phase retrieval algorithms and subsequently deduce the phase key(s) in the Fourier domain easily. In addition, an optical implementation of known-plain text attack is also proposed.
In this paper, we analyze the security of the classical double random phase encoding (DRPE) technique in Fourier domain, as well as its extended schemes in Fresnel and fractional Fourier domains. These schemes are resistant to bruteforce attacks, for their large key spaces. However, due to the linearity property of their encryption transformations, they are vulnerable to other attacks, such as chosen-plaintext attack and known-plaintext attack. We successfully break each of the three encryption schemes with the help of a certain quantity of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Each attack is validated by computer simulations. The cryptanalysis indicates that, to minimize the risks, it is recommendable to introduce nonlinear operations to optical encryption systems.