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Optics Letters

Security enhancement of double-random phase encryption by amplitude modulation

Xiaohe Cheng, Lutong Cai, Y R Wang, Xiangfeng Meng, H Zhang, Xianfeng Xu, X. X. Shen, Guoyan Dong

Published Jul 10, 2008• 119 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Conventional double-random phase encoding is vulnerable to a chosen or known plaintext attack owing to the linearity of the system. We introduce a technique to break down this linearity with an undercover amplitude modulation in the encryption scheme. As an additional key, this operation can significantly enhance the security of the system. A series of computer simulations have shown the effectiveness of this method and its resistance against the known plaintext attack. The design and parameter choice of the amplitude modulator is also discussed.

DOI
10.1364/ol.33.001575

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Conventional double-random phase encoding is vulnerable to a chosen or known plaintext attack owing to the linearity of the system. We introduce a technique to break down this linearity with an undercover amplitude modulation in the encryption scheme. As an additional key, this operation can significantly enhance the security of the system. A series of computer simulations have shown the effectiveness of this method and its resistance against the known plaintext attack. The design and parameter choice of the amplitude modulator is also discussed.
A security enhanced double random phase-amplitude encryption (DRPAE) scheme is immune against the powerful known-plaintext attack, due to the insertion of an undercover amplitude random mask at the Fourier plane in the conventional double random phase encryption (DRPE) scheme. However, DRPAE, which nullifies the high level known-plaintext attack, is found to be susceptible to a simple impulse function attack. Information about the exact distribution of the amplitude mask as well as that of the Fourier plane random phase mask is divulged from an impulse function attack. A variant form of the impulse function attack is also able to show that the DRPAE scheme is as linear as the conventional DRPE scheme. Numerical simulation results validate the effectiveness of the simple impulse attack on the DRPAE scheme.
In this paper, the security of a cryptosystem based on phase truncation and a designed amplitude modulator (AM) is evaluated. In the cryptosystem, an undercover AM used as an additional key is added to modulate the amplitude information of the spectrum in the Fourier plane. Compared to the conventional phase-truncated Fourier transform (PTFT)-based cryptosystem, the security of the cryptosystem is improved by increasing the number of unknown keys. However, it is found that the designed AM is irrelative to the plaintext, and one of the parameters in the designed AM contributes less to the security enhancement of the cryptosystem due to low key sensitivity. Based on the analysis, a special attack containing two iterative processes is proposed to crack the cryptosystem, in which the known-plaintext-attack-based iterative process I with a specific normalization operator is used to retrieve the designed AM and the amplitude-phase-retrieval-technique-based iterative process II is used to retrieve the corresponding plaintext from the arbitrarily given ciphertext with the help of the retrieved AM. In addition, an inherent drawback widely existing in PTFT-based cryptosystems is reported for the first time: most information of the original image could be retrieved using two correct phase keys (or only the first phase key) generated in the encryption process, even without the corresponding ciphertext in PTFT-based cryptosystems. To address this issue, a security-enhanced cryptosystem is proposed in this paper. Numerical simulation is carried out to demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed attack and cryptosystem.
In the field of optical information security, the most attractive work is the so-called double-random-phase encoding encryption scheme proposed by Javidi. However, the security of this cryptosystem has not been analyzed thoroughly from the point of view of cryptoanalysis. In this article, the weakness of Javidi's optical security system is carefully analyzed with a known-plain text attack. It is shown that the double-random-phase encoding encryption scheme is a linear symmetric block cipher cryptosystem and its linearity opens avenues of attacks. Under the known-plaintext attack, attacker can obtain the phase key(s) in the input plane using the typical phase retrieval algorithms and subsequently deduce the phase key(s) in the Fourier domain easily. In addition, an optical implementation of known-plain text attack is also proposed.
Abstract For the purpose of alleviating the vulnerability of double random phase encryption system in the linear canonical transform domain, a novel approach for optical security and cryptographic systems is presented. This proposed system uses a fully phase encoding technique to augment the security of encryption system in the linear canonical transform. The first step in this system involves phase encoding of the initial amplitude image to be ciphered and then modulated by the phase masks. The decryption process of image is the reversal operation of the encryption method. The effectiveness and sensitivity of our proposed cryptosystem for the encryption secret keys are verified. The resistance of our method against occlusion attacks is investigated. Moreover, the results demonstrate that the fully phase-based optical cryptosystem is more secure and robust than the amplitude-based scheme in a linear canonical domain.