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Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences

Breaking and repairing the certificateless key agreement protocol from ASIAN 2006

Liang Xia, Shengbao Wang, Jiajun Shen, Guoming Xu

Published Oct 1, 2008• 14 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol proposed by Mandt et al does not have the property of key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) resilience. An improved protocol with a simple modification of their protocol is proposed in this paper. In particular, our improved protocol is proved to be immune to the K-CI attack and at the same time possess other security properties.

DOI
10.1007/s11859-008-0510-9

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The certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol proposed by Mandt et al does not have the property of key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) resilience. An improved protocol with a simple modification of their protocol is proposed in this paper. In particular, our improved protocol is proved to be immune to the K-CI attack and at the same time possess other security properties.
Key agreement is a fundamental activity to establish communication between two parties. Kim et al. (2013) proposed a CertificateLess two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocol, which is secure in extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. This paper describes the security flaw of Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, which is found vulnerable against Key-Compromise Impersonation (K-CI) attack. For the resistance of the attack in Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, a defensive measure has been proposed, which is secure in eCK model.
Recently, two certificateless three-party authenticated key agreement protocols were proposed, and both protocols were claimed they can meet the desirable security properties including forward security, key compromise impersonation resistance and so on. Through cryptanalysis, we show that one neither meets forward security and key compromise impersonation resistance nor resists an attack by an adversary who knows all users' secret values, and the other cannot resist key compromise impersonation attack. Finally, we propose improved protocols to make up two original protocols' security weaknesses, respectively. Further security analysis shows that our improved protocols can remove such security weaknesses.
Key agreement is a fundamental activity to establish communication between two parties. Kim et al. (2013) proposed a CertificateLess two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocol, which is secure in extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. This paper describes the security flaw of Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, which is found vulnerable against Key-Compromise Impersonation (K-CI) attack. For the resistance of the attack in Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, a defensive measure has been proposed, which is secure in eCK model.
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) is a new paradigm in public key cryptography which avoids the inherent key escrow problem of identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and yet requires no certificates to guarantee the authenticity of users' public keys. It was first introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003. Subsequently, several certificateless two-party key agreement protocols were presented. Unfortunately, some of these protocols are not as secure as they were claimed to be. We will show that some existing certificateless key agreement protocols do not satisfy the requirements of key-compromise impersonation security and known session-specific temporary information security. Further more, we present two improved certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocols which possess all security attributes of a key agreement protocol.
Abstract. Key agreement protocols are essential for secure communications in open and distributed environments. The protocol design is, however, extremely error-prone as evidenced by the iterative process of fixing discovered attacks on published protocols. We revisit an efficient identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol due to Ryu, Yoon and Yoo. The protocol is highly efficient and suitable for real-world applications despite offering no resilience against key-compromise impersonation (K-CI). We then show that the protocol is, in fact, insecure against reflection attacks. A slight modification to the protocol is proposed, which results in significant benefits for the security of the protocol without compromising on its efficiency. Finally, we prove the improved protocol secure in a widely accepted model.
This paper analyzed a bilinear pairing-free certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol proposed by Kim et al. The protocol did not satisfy an important security feature that was the basic impersonation attack under public key replacement attack. As well as,it mounted a specific attack on the protocol. Then an improved certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol was presented in order to satisfy the missing security property. The analysis shows that the improved protocol can efficiently withstand public key replacement attack and satisfy some necessary security properties.